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SEC NO-ACTION LE'IRS
INTRODUCTION

In 1967, during a panel discussion sponsored by the Section of
Administrative Law of the American Bar Association, administrative
law scholar Kenneth Gulp Davis contended that "some of the most
important law of the SEC is embodied in [a] big batch of no-action
letters. This is law. The interpretations are law."' Manuel Cohen,
then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or
"Commission"), objected vehemently to this characterization and retorted that the SEC's bevy of no-action letters "may be lore, 1-o-r-e, but
2
it is not law."
Today, more than thirty years later, the legal status and significance of SEC no-action letters still engender spirited debate. Much of
the controversy stems from the fact that these letters are issued not by
the SEC as such, 3 but by members of the SEC staff,4 in response to
particular inquiries by market participants or their counsel in the context of proposed transactions. At times, the staff's response merely
conveys an enforcement position-whether the staff would recommend enforcement action to the full Commission if the transaction
were undertaken in the manner described in the incoming letter.
Other times, in addition to an enforcement position, .the staff's response contains explicit interpretations of relevant statutory provisions or SEC rules and regulations 5 as they relate to the proposed
transaction. Under either scenario, the SEC has made clear that any
regulatory interpretations expressed by the staff in a no-action letter
1 Panel Discussion, Public Information Act and Interpretative and Advisory Rulings, 20
ADmiN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1967) [hereinafter ABA Panel Discussion] (remarks of Kenneth Gulp

Davis).
Id. (remarks of Manuel Cohen).
3 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm
(1994 & Supp. II 1996), created the SEC as an independent regulatory agency composed
of five Commissioners (no more than three of whom may be from the same political party)
who are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a five
year term. Id. § 78d. In addition to administering and enforcing the Exchange Act, the
SEC has responsibility over five other federal statutes: the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), id. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. II 1996); the Investment Company Act of 1940
(the "Investment Company Act"), id. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Investment Advisers Act"), id. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, id. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1994);
and the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1994).
4 The SEC staff is composed of attorneys, accountants, financial analysts and examiners, economists, investigators, engineers, and other professionals. Under the Commissioner's direction, the staff ensures that publicly held companies, broker-dealers,
investment companies and advisers, and other market participants comply with the federal
securities laws. See OFFicE OF PUBuC AFrAiRs, SEC, THE WORK OF THE SEC 5-6 (1994).
Some commentators refer to actions by the SEC as actions by the full Commission, distinguishing SEC actions from actions on the part of its staff members. See, e.g., THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, 1 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SEcuRrIEs REGULATION § 1.3 (3d ed. 1996).
5 For a discussion of the SEC's statutory authority to promulgate rules and regulations, see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
2
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"do not constitute an official expression of the Commission's views," 6
nor do they constitute rulings binding on any party, including the
Commission. 7 Thus, even though they are publicly available, 8 regulatory interpretations articulated through the vehicle of no-action letters are said to be informal and advisory, rather than official and
definitive. In short, the SEC did not design the process to be formal
agency action.
Notwithstanding their status as unofficial and informal pronouncements, SEC no-action letters have assumed a considerable degree of importance to market participants and their counsel in
planning transactions and conducting business. As the SEC has recognized, many issuers, securities law practitioners, and other members
of the public closely monitor such letters, and often view them as "the
most comprehensive secondary source on the application of [the federal securities] laws." 9 Securities law commentators have made an
even stronger case for the significance of no-action letters, contending
that such letters are often "the sole body of precedent" on particular
provisions, 10 and that certain complex and technical areas of securities regulation have become "almost exclusively topics for staff interpretation .

.

. in the sense that there are few court cases and few

authoritative interpretations by the Commission itself." 1 Thus, many
6

17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1997).

7

See Monthly Publication of List of Significant Letters Issued by the Division of Cor-

poration Finance, Securities Act Release No. 5691, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,682 (1976) [hereinafter
List Release] ("The Commission is not bound by these staff responses ....
The staff's
responses to letters are not rulings of the Commission or its staff on questions of law or fact
.... Further, such letters are not intended to affect the rights of private persons."); see also
infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text (discussing similar disclaimers placed upon noaction letters by the staff and Commission).
8 See infra Part I.C.l.a.
9 Expedited Publication of Interpretative, No-Action and Certain Exemption Letters,
Securities Act Release No. 6764, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,228, at 89,053, 89,054 (Apr. 7, 1988).
10 Thomas P. Lemke, The SEC No-Action Letter Process,42 Bus. LAw. 1019, 1019 (1987).
Casebooks and treatises on federal securities regulation routinely cite individual no-action
letters. See, e.g.,JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURIEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 402-08
(2d ed. 1997) (using no-action letters to clarify Securities Act Regulation D's ban on general solicitation and general advertising); HAZEN, supra note 4, at §§ 12.2-12.5 (using noaction letters to clarify Exchange Act section 16's reporting requirements and trading restrictions on insiders of public companies); MARC I. STEmNBE,
SECURITEs REGULATION
§ 5.05 (2d ed. 1993) (noting that the well recognized Section 4(11/2) exemption from the
Securities Act's registration provisions is "based largely on SEC no-action letters and other
SEC pronouncements"). See generallyLouis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITI-ES REGULATION
(3d ed. 1989) (twelve volume treatise citing hundreds of no-action letters as interpretive
authority).
11 ROBERTJ. HAFr, ANALYSiS OF KEY SEC No-ACrION Lm-a=Rs, at vii (1996). Professor
Haft's book, which is updated annually, summarizes, synthesizes, and distinguishes a wide
variety of no-action letters and places them in context with related adjudicative decisions,
SEC rules, and SEC releases. By devoting an entire volume to the analysis of no-action
letters, Professor Haft displays an impressive willingness to elevate the important substance
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securities law practitioners and their clients consider no-action letters
2
a source of de facto law.'
In addition to affecting the planning and structuring of securities
transactions, the staffs regulatory interpretations articulated through
the no-action letter vehicle also have significant repercussions when
parties challenge securities transactions in court.13 Indeed, litigants
in securities cases frequently urge courts to defer to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters, 14 and courts frequently rely on no-acin these letters over their unofficial form. As one reviewer has noted, the book "is an
indispensable asset for every practicing corporate and securities lawyer." Alan B. Leven-

son, Analysis ofKey No-Action Letters, 48 Bus. LAw. 387, 387 (1992) (book review). A number
of other securities scholars have also analyzed, and often criticized, regulatory interpretations in no-action letters relating to specific substantive areas of securities regulation. See,
e.g.,J. Robert Brown, Jr., BureaucraticPracticesinJapanand the United States and the Regulation
of Advertisements By Investment Advisors, 12 UCLA PAc. BAsIN LJ. 237 (1994) (concluding
that many of the requirements imposed by the SEC on U.S. investment adviser advertising
are rooted in no-action letters rather than in formal and official SEC rules and regulations); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Resales of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1333, 1349 (1995) (critically observing that the SEC has "developed
nearly all of its 'rules' regarding resales of Registered Securities, through its no-action responses"); Therese H. Maynard, What is an "Exchange?"---Prprietary
Electronic Securities Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of An Exchange, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 833, 876-96
(1992) (contending that the SEC initially used the no-action letter process to set the policy
that would govern activities by proprietary trading systems); Donald E. Schwartz & ElliottJ.
Weiss, An Assessment of the SEC ShareholderProposalRule 65 GEo. LJ. 635 (1977) (analyzing
numerous no-action letters in the course of assessing the SEC's shareholder proposal rule).
12 See WilliamJ. Lockhart, SEC No-Action Letters: InformalAdvice as a DiscretionaryAdministrative Clearance 37 LAw & CoNTmzvn. PROBS. 95, 122 (1972) ("The Commission-reviewed
no-action positions and accompanying statements would seem, from counsel's perspective,
to constitute 'law,' for they involve a final official disposition of a concrete claim not unlike
the mass of case law on which lawyers commonly rely for guidance."); Lewis D. Lowenfels,
SEC No-Action Letters: Conflicts with Existing Statutes, Cases, and Commission Releases, 59 VA. L.
REv. 303, 303 (1973) [hereinafter Lowenfels, Conflicts] ("Recent years have seen an additional source of substantive law emerge through the publication of requests for 'no-action
letters' and the SEC staff's responses to these requests."); Lewis D. Lowenfels, SEC "NoAction" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1256, 1257 (1971)
[hereinafter Lowenfels, Problems] ("'[N]o-action' letters have acquired the force and authority of law in guiding and shaping private business transactions."); see also LAuRY D.
BARr, MtrrUAL FtnDS AND FEDERAL REGULATION 1-4 (1997) (contending that no-action
letters are "an important source of law").
13 The SEC, the Department ofJustice, or private parties may initiate litigation alleging violations of the federal securities laws based on explicit or implied statutory rights of
action. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (1994) (authorizing the SEC to institute administrative
proceedings for Securities Act violations); id. § 77t (authorizing the SEC to institute injunctive actions and suits for monetary penalties in federal district court for Securities Act violations); id. § 77x (providing criminal penalties for certain willful violations of the Securities
Act); id. § 77i(a) (1) (providing express right of action against securities sellers who violate
the registration provisions in Securities Act section 5); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston,
459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("[A] private right of action under [section) 10(b) ... and Rule
lOb-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.") (footnote omitted).
14 Requests for judicial deference to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters
have come from private litigants-both plaintiffs and defendants-as well as the SEC itself.
See cases discussed infra notes 276-314 and accompanying text.
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tion letter authority in the course of resolving legal disputes. 15
Securities law scholarship, however, has yet to focus on the judiciary's
treatment of no-action letters in securities litigation.' 6 Perhaps even
more surprising than the lack of empirical study is the absence of normative analysis.' 7 And while administrative law scholars have devoted
substantial attention to questions concerning judicial deference to
regulatory interpretations articulated by agencies in informal formats, 18 their general critiques ofjudicial practices have not explored
the specific problem of judicial reliance on SEC no-action letters.
This Article is designed to fill this significant gap between securities
law and administrative law scholarship.' 9
See infra notes 276-99 and accompanying text.
Professor Haft certainly identifies judicial treatment of no-action letters as an important issue and observes that courts may accept no-action letters "as authoritative on the
issue presented." HAFr, supranote 11, at ix; see also Richard H. Rowe, Reliance on SEC Staff
"No-Action" Letters-A Shield or a Sword, in OPINIONS IN SEC TRANSAanONS 667 (1995)
[hereinafter Rowe, Reliance] (analyzing whether reliance on no-action letters operates as
an affirmative defense in securities litigation); Richard H. Rowe, A SEC Staff 'No-Action'
Position: An Impervious Shield Against Liability or a Paper Tiger?, INsiGHrs, July 1992, at 21
[hereinafter Rowe, Paper Tigers] (same).
17
The paucity of attention paid to judicial reliance on regulatory interpretations in
no-action letters is, however, somewhat predictable against a backdrop of securities law
scholarship that includes relatively few critiques of the SEC's no-action letter process. The
most comprehensive articles date back to the early 1970s, when the SEC first made noactions letters available to the public. See Lockhart, supra note 12; Lowenfels, Conflicts,
supra note 12; Lowenfels, Problems, supra note 12. In recent years, securities law practitioners focusing on particular aspects have generated insightful commentary regarding the noaction letter process. See, e.g., Rowe, Reliance, supra note 16; Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L.
Johnson, Evisceratingthe SEC No-Action Process, INSIGHlrS, May 1991, at 2 [hereinafter Pitt &
Johnson, Evisceratingthe Process];Harvey L. Pitt & Dixie L. Johnson, 'No Action'Doesn'tMean
'No Action'Any Longer,N.Y. LJ., Apr. 1, 1991, at Al [hereinafter Pitt &Johnson, No-Action];
see also Rowe, Paper Tigers, supra note 16 (discussing the reliance aspect of the process);
Richard H. Rowe, SEC No-Action Letters-A Highlight of the AdministrativeProcess, 3 J. CORP.
DiscLosuR & CONFIDENTIAL= 74 (1992) [hereinafter Rowe, Highlights] (emphasizing the
importance of the SEC's no-action letter process); Lemke, supra note 10 (assisting attorneys with the mechanics of preparing requests for no-action letters).
18 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They JustDon't
Get I 10 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Anthony, Supreme Court and the APA];
Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts, 7 YAiEJ.
ON REG. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Anthony, Which Interpretations Bind Courts?]; Robert A.
Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould GetJudicialDeference?-A PreliminaryInquiry, 40
ADMIN. L. Rxv. 121 (1988) [hereinafter Anthony, JudicialDeference];John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructureandJudicialDeference to Agency Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 612 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdministrationAfterChevron, 90 CoLuM. L. REv.
2071, 2093-94 (1990); Russell L. Weaver, Chevron: Martin, Anthony, and Format Requirements, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 587 (1992) [hereinafter Weaver, FormatRequirements]; Russell L.
Weaver, EvaluatingRegulatory Interpretations:Individual Statements, 80 Kyr. LJ. 987 (1991-92)
[hereinafter Weaver, Individual Statements].
19 The absence of securities law commentary is particularly noteworthy because scholars in other disciplines driven by federal agency practices-such as taxation law, environmental law, and patent law-have already been exploring the doctrinal and normative
issues concerning judicial treatment of regulatory interpretations embodied in formats less
formal than agency rules and regulations. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia Meets Tax
15

16
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Traditionally, and still typically, judicial descriptions of SEC no-

21
20
action letters have run the gamut from "law," to "orders," to "rul23
to "prosecutorial decision[s].1"24
ings," 22 to "informal opinions,"

This judicial failure to characterize no-action letters consistently is
symptomatic of a more fundamental problem: many courts treat informal regulatory interpretations in no-action letters as interchangeable
with formal and official regulatory interpretations that the full Commission has promulgated. Consequently, courts often defer automatically to the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters. In other
words, many courts accept no-action letter authority as definitive interpretations of the federal securities statutes and SEC rules and regulations without independently analyzing the particular regulatory
provisions in dispute. This Article contends that such automatic deference is unwarranted as a doctrinal matter. It also identifies important normative reasons why courts should subject no-action letters to
meaningful scrutiny prior to relying on them as interpretive authority.
Finally, this Article proposes a framework to assist courts in performing this critical function.
Part I focuses on the SEC's no-action letter process. It first places
no-action letters in context with various other formats used by the SEC
to announce regulatory interpretations. It then describes the SEC's
practice of issuing no-action letters, and discusses the ways in which
these letters have impacted the actions of securities law practitioners
and their clients. These practical consequences have significant bearHyperopia: The Unproven Case ofIncreasedJudicialDeference to Revenue Rulings, 57 OnIo ST. LJ.
637 (1996) (responding to Galler,JudicialDeference, infra);JohnF. Coverdale, CourtReview
of Tax Regulations andRevenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 35 (1995);
Linda Caller, Emerging Standardsfor JudicialReview of LRS Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L.Rxv.
841 (1992); Linda Galler, JudicialDeference to Revenue Rulings: ReconcilingDivergentStandards,
56 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037 (1995) [hereinafter Galler, JudicialDeference]; James T. Hamilton &
Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The
Selection of Formalvs. Informal Rules in RegulatingHazardous Waste, LAw & CoNTEmep. PROBS.,
Spring 1994, at 111; Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHio ST.
L.J. 1415 (1995) (focusing on the relationship between the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") with respect to PTO patentability decisions and interpretations of various provisions of the federal patent code); Bryan G.
Tabler & Mark E. Shere, EPA's Practiceof Regulation-by-Memo, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall

1990, at 3.
20 Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens, 705 F. Supp. 958, 965 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
21 Brooks v. Standard Oil Co., 308 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
22 Fulco v. American Cable Sys., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,980, at 95,485, 95,489 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 1989); Colema Realty Corp. v. Bibow,
555 F. Supp. 1030, 1040 (D. Conn. 1983); Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
23 NYCERS v. Dole Food Co., 795 F. Supp. 95, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot,
969 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1992).
24 Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 1989).
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ing on questions concerning the weight that courts should accord noaction letters in securities litigation.
Part II examines how courts have treated no-action letters and
postulates how courts should treat such interpretive authority. It first
discusses the principles of "automatic deference" that the Supreme
Court developed to ensure that administrative agencies, rather than
courts, have primary interpretive authority over ambiguous provisions
in agency-administered statutes and rules.2 5 Part H then criticizes a
number ofjudicial opinions for applying these principles to the informal and unofficial regulatory interpretations in no-action letters. It
also criticizes those opinions that cite no-action letters as authority
without specifying why--let alone how-they are relying on that authority. Part II concludes that courts must never rely on no-action
letters as definitive interpretations of ambiguous provisions in the federal securities laws. This Part also emphasizes the benefits attained
when courts subject the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters
to independent and meaningful scrutiny.
The third and final Part proposes a framework that courts can use
when presented with interpretive issues under the federal securities
laws that the SEC seemingly has resolved in no-action letters. The proposed framework recognizes that while courts are never required to
defer automatically to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters,
courts should nonetheless treat no-action letters as informal and unofficial authority, and may rely on regulatory interpretations in the letters to the extent that they are persuasive. Part III's framework draws
on factors for evaluating the persuasive force of an agency's regulatory
interpretation suggested in Skidmore v. Swift &

Co. 2 6

In so doing, this

Article concludes that, prior to relying on regulatory interpretations
in SEC no-action letters, courts should consider a number of variables
including: (1) whether the regulatory provision is, in fact, ambiguous;
(2) the validity of the staffs reasoning in the letter; (3) whether the
full Commission has reviewed and approved the no-action letter issued by the staff; (4) the letter's consistency with earlier and later interpretive pronouncements; (5) the extent to which the no-action
letter draws on the staffs particular expertise; and, in certain instances, (6) the extent to which private parties may have relied on the
no-action letter.

25
See infra Part IIA (discussing deference principles that the Supreme Court annunciated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)).
26
323 U.S. 134 (1944). In Skidmore, the Supreme Court determined that a regulatory
interpretation may constitute "persuasive authority" in a situation where a court is not legally bound to follow the interpretation. Id. at 139-40.
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I
THE SEC's No-ACTION LETTER PROCESS
A.

Formats Used by the SEC to Announce Regulatory
Interpretations

Since its creation by Congress in 1934, the SEC has been the federal agency responsible for administering and enforcing federal statutes concerned with protecting investors in the U.S. securities
markets.2 7 Particularly because the statutory language is both broad
and ambiguous, the task of administering and enforcing this statutory
scheme necessitates continual interpretive judgments.2 8 The SEC announces these regulatory interpretations in different contexts and in a
variety of formats.
1.

Formal and Official Interpretations

The SEC announces many of its important interpretations of the
federal securities statutes through the exercise of congressionally dele-

gated rulemaking powers. On some occasions, the SEC bases its
rulemaking on statutory provisions that grant the agency specific authority to promulgate rules or regulations imposing requirements or
defining the scope of lawful or unlawful conduct. 29 On other occa-

sions, the SEC premises its rulemaking on statutory provisions that
grant the agency general authority to "make, amend, and rescind such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out [the stat27 See statutes cited supra note 3; see also OF0cE oF PuBLic AFsARs, supra note 4, at 5
("The [SEC's] mission is to administer federal securities laws that seek to provide protection for investors. The purpose of these laws is to ensure that the securities markets are fair
and honest and to provide the means to enforce the securities laws through sanctions
where necessary.").
28 See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1020; see also 1 KENNErH CuLu DAVIs & RICHARD J.
PIERCE,JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.1, at 107 (3d ed. 1994) ("Every agency-administered statute contains ambiguities. It is impossible to draft a statute with sufficient precision and foresight to resolve each of the hundreds of issues that are likely to arise during
the life of the statute.").
29 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides a good illustration of a specific congressional grant of rulemaking authority. The statutory provision makes it "unlawful...
[tlo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ....
any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraventionof such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribeas necessary or appropriatein the public interest orfor the protection
of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, provisions such as section
10(b) of the Exchange Act delegate to the SEC plenary authority to promulgate rules that
have the force and effect of positive law. The SEC utilized this authority to promulgate
Rule IOb-5, which makes it unlawful to engage in acts or practices that "operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person." 17 C.FR. § 240.10b-5(c) (1997). Many other statutes include
specific grants of rulemaking authority to the SEC. See, e.g., Securities Act § 3(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(b) (granting authority to promulgate exemptions from registration); Exchange Act
§ 14(a), id. § 78n(a) (granting authority to promulgate rules governing proxy solicitation);
Exchange Act § 15(b), id. § 78o(b) (granting authority to promulgate rules governing broker-dealer conduct).
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utes]."°30 The SEC often uses its general rulemaking powers to define
statutory terms or to create "safe harbors" that provide objective criteria upon which market participants may rely to secure exemptions
provided for in the statutory text.3 ' Before promulgating a rule pursuant to either type of authority, the SEC generally publishes the proposed rule in the Federal Register for notice and comment. 32 When
finalized, the rule is again published in the FederalRegister and then
codified in the Code of FederalRegulations ("C.F.R"). Rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the SEC's statutory authority, whether
specific or general, are aptly described as "SEC rules."
The SEC also received from Congress broad quasijudicial powers.3 3 Through the process of adjudicating administrative proceed30
Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a); accord Exchange Act § 23(a)(1), id.
§ 78w(a) (1). Congress has also granted the SEC the authority to define terms used in the
Exchange Act. Id. § 78c(b).
31 See, e.g., Rule 144, 17 C.F.R- § 230.144 (specifying bright-line criteria for persons
deemed not to be underwriters); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (specifying
bright-line criteria for limited offerings and private offerings exempt from registration).
As more fully explained infra notes 165-66 and accompanying text, safe harbor rules are
particularly popular with market participants, for such rules alleviate risk and reduce the
incidence of litigation. See generally Cass R.Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv.
953, 969-77 (1995) (discussing benefits of rules).
32 The Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA") affords interested parties the right
to participate in an agency's rulemaking process. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706. For
rulemaking to be valid, the agency must (1) publish general notice of the proposed rule in
the FederalRegister,see id. § 553(b), and (2) give interested persons "an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or argument," id.
§ 553(b)-(c). These requirements are known as "the notice and comments requirements"
of the APA. The APA also specifies that agencies must "incorporate in the rules adopted a
concise general statement of their basis and purpose" and must publish a final rule in the
Federal Register at least 30 days before it becomes effective. Id. Agency rules that may be
classified as "interpretative rules" or "statements of policy" are exempt from these requirements. Id. § 553(d); see also infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. Although the APA
uses the term "interpretative rules," courts and commentators often use the terms "interpretative" and "interpretive" interchangeably. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc.
v. EPA, 869 F.2d 1526, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Consistent with the current practice of most
courts and commentators, this Article uses the term "interpretive."
33
See, e.g., Securities Act § 8A, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1 (granting authority to issue ceaseand-desist orders, after notice and a hearing, for Securities Act violations); Exchange Act
§ 15(b) (4) (D), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (4) (D) (granting authority to enter orders that censure,
suspend, or revoke registration of broker-dealers, if the SEC finds, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that a securities law violation has occurred); Exchange Act §§ 21B,
21C, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 to -3 (granting authority to issue cease-and-desist orders, after notice and a hearing, for Exchange Act violations and authority to impose monetary penalties
against certain regulated individuals and entities); see also SEC Procedural Rule § 2(e), 17
C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (authorizing the institution of administrative disciplinary proceedings
against individuals "practicing" before the SEC and who have engaged in "unethical or
improper professional conduct"). In addition, although not an adjudicative proceeding as
such, the SEC has authority under section 21(a) of the Exchange Act to publish reports
concerning violations of the federal securities laws which it has investigated. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(a). The SEC often uses section 21 (a) reports to announce new, and typically novel,
interpretations of regulatory provisions as they pertain to matters of public importance. See
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ings against alleged securities law violators, the full Commission may
announce new interpretations of statutory provisions and SEC rules. 3 4
These regulatory interpretations are embodied in "SEC orders" and,
through the principle of stare decisis, are generally applied in subsequent SEC proceedings. The SEC conducts these formal adjudications pursuant to procedures set forth in both the securities statutes3 5
and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").36
In addition to rulemaking and adjudicatory powers of statutory
origin, the SEC possesses inherent power to issue interpretations of
the federal securities laws and the SEC rules it has promulgated thereunder. This authority to make interpretive statements derives from
Congress's charge to the SEC to administer and enforce the federal
securities laws. 3 7 Moreover, the Constitution provides a textual basis

for this inherent power.38 That is, as Professor Thomas Merrill has
maintained, "law interpretation is an inevitable and necessary byproduct of the performance of the constitutional functions of the ex1 MARc I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRAcaFCE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 4.16 (1992).
34 In SEC v. Chene y Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Supreme Court recognized that
announcing new regulatory interpretations in the course of a litigated proceeding would
necessarily have a retroactive effect on the respondent. The Court nonetheless held that

announcing new rules of law by means of adjudication was not per se an abuse of discretion. Id. at 203-04. The Court concluded that "the choice made betveen proceeding by
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed
discretion of the administrative agency." Id. at 203; see also Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that "[t]raditionaly, it is
the agency, not the court, which determines whether to proceed by rulemaking, by individual adjudication, or by a combination of the two"). The SEC's preference for developing
new regulatory interpretations through litigated proceedings instead of rulemakingeither directly through adjudicating administrative proceedings or indirectly through initiating civil enforcement actions in federal district court-has been subject to sharp criticism. See ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 96 (1982) (strongly disfavoring prosecutorial strategies for developing law, in part because "[o]ther regulated persons who will become subject to that regulatory policy do not have the opportunity to object or to comment upon
the new interpretation or rule, as they would have in a rulemaking proceeding"); see also
Richard W. Painter &Jennifer E. Duggan, LawryerDisclosure of CorporateFraud:Establishinga
FirmFoundation, 50 SMU L. REv. 225, 276 (1996) (concluding that litigated proceedings
against attorneys have failed to articulate intelligible standards regarding attorney conduct,
and advocating the adoption of "a clear set of rules stating exactly what lawyers must do
about client fraud").
35 See, e.g., statutory provisions cited supra note 33.
36
5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (setting forth APA procedures applicable to "every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing").
37 All agencies charged with enforcing and administering a statute have "inherent
authority to issue interpretive rules informing the public of the procedures and standards
it intends to apply in exercising its discretion." Production Tool Corp. v. Employment &
TrainingAdm'r, 688 F.2d 1161, 1166 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
38
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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ecutive branch."3 9 Interpretive statements that the SEC issues
pursuant to this inherent authority fall within the APA's broad definition of "rule";40 however, provided such statements can be classified as
"interpretive rules"41 or "general statements of policy," 42 they are exempt from the notice and comment procedures generally applicable
to agency rulemaking. 43 Typically, the SEC announces interpretive
39

Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE

LJ.

969, 1004

(1992).
40
The APA broadly defines a rule to mean "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4).
41
Unlike either the text of the APA or its legislative history, the Attorney General's
Manual on the APA provides definitional guidance as to what constitutes interpretive rules.
U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Acr (1947) [hereinafter APA MANUAL]. The APA Manual defines interpretive rules as
"rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction of
the statutes and rules which it administers." Id. at 30 n.3. The Supreme Court has observed that the APA Manual is "a contemporaneous interpretation previously given some
deference by this Court because of the role played by the Department ofJustice in drafting
the legislation." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (citations omitted).
42
The APA Manual defines general statements of policy, or "policy statements," as
those "statements issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in
which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." APA MANUAL, supranote 41,
at 30 n.3. Thus, further action on the part of an agency is necessary before the policy
described in the statement can have a legally binding effect on the public. See 1 DAvis &
PIERCE, supra note 28, § 6.2.
43
See supra note 32 (discussing APA notice and comment requirements). Interpretive
rules and policy statements are often described collectively as nonlegislative rules to distinguish them from legislative rules (also known as substantive rules) which are "issued by an
agency pursuant to statutory authority and which implement the statute," and, therefore,
must adhere to APA notice and comment requirements. APA MANUAL, supra note 41, at 30
n.3; see also 1 DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 28, § 6.3 (distinguishing generally between interpretive rules and legislative rules). While relatively easy to state, courts have had notorious
difficulty applying the legal distinction between interpretive rules and policy statements,
on the one hand, and legislative rules, on the other. The D.C. Circuit, which decides a
large percentage of cases alleging APA violations, has on different occasions described this
distinction as "fuzzy," "hazy," "tenuous," "blurred," "baffling," and "enshrouded in considerable smog." American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that "the spectrum between a clearly interpretive rule and a clearly substantive one is a
hazy continuum"); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(quoting authorities describing the distinction between legislative rules and general policy
statements as "'tenuous,'" "'blurred,'" "'baffling,"' and "'enshrouded in considerable
smog'"); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 909 (5th Cir. 1983)
(noting the D.C. Circuit's description of the "'fuzzy perimeters'" of interpretative rule exemption). Yet Professor Charles Koch argues that "[t]he distinction is not 'fuzzy' but dear:
a legislative rule must be promulgated pursuant to a legislative grant of authority. The
distinction is troublesome not because it is unclear, but because it is not always easy to
determine." Charles H. Koch, Jr., Public Proceduresfor the Promulgationof InterpretativeRules
and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1049 n.11 (1976); see also Robert A.
Anthony, "Interpretive"Rules, "Legislative"Rules and "Spurious"Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1, 2 (1994) (stating that unless a rule has been promulgated by the use of
the rulemaking procedures required for making rules with the force of law (e.g., prior
notice and comment), an agency's rule can never be described as a "legislative rule").
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rules or statements of policy in the form of "SEC releases" that are

44
published in the FederalRegister and often listed in the C.F.R
Together, SEC rules, SEC orders, and SEC releases comprise
what can be characterized as the official and formal side of the SEC's
spectrum of interpretive authority. Publication in the FederalRegister,
codification or at least reference in the C.F.R., issuance of a final decision on the record after a hearing, and authorization by the full Commission constitute some defining characteristics of these formal and
official formats.

2.

Informal and Unofficial Interpretations

Notwithstanding the SEC's efforts to clarify provisions in the federal securities laws through rulemaking, adjudication, and the issuance of SEC releases, securities law practitioners constantly struggle to
apply statutory provisions and SEC rules to specific securities transac44 The SEC often issues releases to clarify the meaning or effect of existing statutes or
rules, particularly those provisions containing vague standards or that rarely are subject to
judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Guidelines for the Release of Information by Issuers
Whose Securities Are in Registration, Securities Act Release No. 5180, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,192, at 80,578 (Aug. 16, 1971) [hereinafter Guidelines for Registration Release] (setting forth guidelines to assist issuers in complying with
section 5 of the Securities Act); Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Exchange
Act Release No. 36,346, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,702, at
87,112 (Oct. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Electronic Delivery Release] (setting forth guidelines
for complying with the document delivery requirements under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act). The SEC also issues releases to announce
the formal adoption of new rules or amendments and to explain how the SEC intends to
apply these newly enacted provisions. See, e.g., Revision of Holding Period Requirements in
Rules 144 and 145, Securities Release Act No. 7390, 63 S.E.C. 2077 (Feb. 20, 1997) (announcing amendments shortening Rule 144's holding periods). In addition, the SEC uses
releases to notify the public about proposed rules or amendments to rules, and to solicit
public comment. See, e.g., Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rule 144; Section
16(a) Reporting of Equity Swaps and Other Derivative Securities, Securities Act Release
No. 7187, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 85,638, at 86,881 (June 27, 1995)
(inviting comments on the shortening of Rule 144's holding periods). See generally HAzEN,
supra note 4, § 1.4 (discussing SEC releases).
From time to time, the SEC also uses an SEC release to publish the views of particular
Divisions on various questions regarding provisions in statutes or SEC rules. See, e.g., Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and
Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,400 (Oct. 16,
1987) (conveying the Division of Investment Management's views clarifying, among other
things, the "business" element of the definition of investment adviser); Interpretive Release
on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 6455, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,045 (Mar. 10, 1983)
(stating the Division of Corporation Finance's views on various interpretive questions regarding Regulation D). The full Commission, however, expressly authorizes the issuance
of these releases and does not appear to draw substantive differences between Commission
views expressed in releases and authorized staff views that are expressed in releases. See
Rowe, Highlights, supra note 17, at 75-76. For example, both types of releases are published in the FederalRegister,and the C.F.R.'s listing of interpretive releases does not distinguish between Commission releases and Commission-authorized staff releases.
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tions contemplated by their clients. The Commission has long recognized and appreciated this struggle. Consequently, from its earliest
days, the Commission has encouraged its staff to provide advice and
guidance to those seeking assistance. 45
Several factors account for the SEC's willingness to assist the public in this manner. First, the intricate and complex federal securities
statutes, together with the more than 1400 SEC rules codified in the
C.F.R., 46 often exacerbate public confusion. Additional formal
rulemaking projects, therefore, do not always provide an antidote.
Second, the varied and complicated nature of business transactions
often makes "one-size-fits-all" securities law interpretations difficult to
apply. In contrast, the staff can tailor its informal advice and guidance
to specific transactions. Moreover, the SEC recognizes that effective
capital formation and the success of the securities markets depend on
public confidence in issuers, financial institutions, and market professionals. By reviewing proposed transactions, staff officials can suggest
modifications that may alleviate the need for future enforcement actions and the negative publicity often generated therefrom. 47 Finally,
securities law practitioners (many of whom are former SEC staff members themselves) 48 frequently work as business planners and, as such,
45 The Commission's willingness to allow its staff to render informal advice has been
commended as an "excellent practice in administrative procedure." TASK FORCE ON LEGAL
SERV. & PROC., COMMISSION ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOV'T, REPORT ON
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 189 (1955); see also U.S. Arr'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN.
PROC., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATroRNEY GENERAL's COMMrI-E ON

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 39-40 (1941) (noting SEC informal procedures with approval).
For historical accounts of the staffs advice-giving responsibilities, see Robert M. BlairSmith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation Under the Securities Laws, 26 IOwA L. REV. 241
(1941); Comment, Administrative Interpretationof the Securities Act of 1933, 45 YA.u LJ. 1076
(1936).
46 See Hearingson H.R. 994 Before the Subcomm. on Nat'lEcon. Growth, Nat. Resources and
Reg. Affairs, 104th Cong. 12 (1995) (statement of RichardY. Roberts, Commissioner, SEC)
(basing this estimate on the number of SEC rules contained in the 1994 C.F.R.).
47
See Request for Comments on Whether Staff Interpretative and No-Action Letters
Should Be Made Public, Securities Act Release No. 4924, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
77,606, at 83,293, 83,294 (Sept. 20, 1968) [hereinafter Request for
Comments on Publication Release] ("The willingness of the staff to state its position with
respect to particular proposed transactions has undoubtedly promoted compliance with
the statutes by reducing uncertainty and by deterring persons from consummating transactions which they might otherwise proceed with in the mistaken belief that no enforcement
action would be called for.").
48 Securities lawyers make up approximately 62% of the SEC's professional staff, and
nearly 70% of the SEC's Commissioners have been securities lawyers or lawyers with experience in securities law. See ANNE M. KHADEmILA, THE SEC AND C-rrAPTL MARKT' REGULAITON: THE PoLrTCS OF EXPERTISE 89 (1992). Ms. Khademian also notes the high
percentage of SEC Commissioners and staff members that return to the practicing securities bar following their tenure at the agency. She relays the following statements by a
senior SEC staffer: "'The revolving door works well here.... [The] government doesn't
pay well, but the commission can offer highly marketable skills.... We get good people
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are uniquely positioned to apply interpretive guidance to a client's
49
business transaction from its inception.
SEC staff members utilize a panoply of techniques to dispense
this informal advice to the public. For example, regulatory interpretations may be provided in face-to-face meetings or telephone conversations between SEC staff members and securities law practitioners; 50 in
staff letters commenting on filed material; 51 through speeches and
presentations at professional conferences; in congressional testimony;
and, most importantly for the purposes of this Article, in no-action
letters that respond to requests for advice on the appropriateness of
52
contemplated transactions.
coming in the front door. People get the experience and move on.'" Id. (omissions and
alteration in original).
49 As one commentator advises, "congruence with the Commission's policies and interpretations is often the best way efficiently to accomplish a client's transaction." LARRYD.
SODERQUIST, SECURIrIES REGULATION 13 (3d ed. 1994); see also Beaumont v. American Can
Co., 621 F. Supp. 484, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (stating that
'as a practical matter the custom of soliciting the SEC's guidance in the
form of exemptions or 'no-action' positions with respect to transactions
which fall into gray areas of the securities statutes or regulations provides
indispensable information to those seeking to structure advantageous, and
sometimes creative, deals while staying within the bounds of the law"),
afj'd, 797 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1986).
50 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.2 (1997). The Commission recently expanded public access to
such advice by designating a toll-free number for public use, and by publicizing the staff's
willingness to respond to both telephone and e-mail inquiries. See Informal Guidance Program for Small Entities, Securities Act Release No. 7407, 62 Fed. Reg. 15,604, 15,606 (Apr.
2, 1997) [hereinafter Small Entities Release]. In addition, for purposes of general guidance, the Commission makes available to the public a "Manual of Telephone Interpretations" that compiles responses by the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance to
telephone inquiries concerning the statutes, rules, and regulations administered by the
Division. See Notice of Public Availability of Certain Staff Manuals, Securities Act Release
No. 6497, 29 S.E.C. Docket 96 (Nov. 3, 1983). Although the SEC originally developed this
Manual for staff training and discussion purposes, beginning in 1983 it made the Manual
available to the public in the Commission's Public Reference Room, though it emphasized
that the Manual does "not necessarily represent the views or policies of the Commission."
Id. Recently, the Commission opted to publish this Manual electronically, and a revised
July 1997 version is now easily locatable on the SEC's World Wide Web Site. Division of
Corp. Fin., SEC, Manual of Publicly-Available Telephone Interpretations(visited Feb. 23, 1998)
<http://www.sec.gov/rules/phoneint.htm>. The relative accessibility of this Manual and
ease of application virtually guarantees that securities law practitioners will begin to use it
as an important reference tool. SeeJesse M. Brill, Highlights andPitfas,CoP oarATE CotNs.,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 4-6 (discussing staff telephone interpretations pertaining to shelf registration and the proxy screening process).
51 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.3 (setting forth the "letter of comment" or "deficiency letter"
process for certain filings under the Securities Act or Exchange Act).
52
See infra Part I.B. (discussing the SEC's practice of issuing no-action letters). Furthermore, the SEC is constantly generating new vehicles for dispensing informal advice to
the public. For instance, in November 1996, the SEC announced that the Corporation
Finance Division was preparing a number of "staff legal bulletins" to assist the public with a
variety of interpretive issues. See Securities Regulation Briefs, CorporationFinanceDivision
Staff 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1376 (Nov. 8, 1996). The Corporation Finance Division has produced five such bulletins thus far, and they are publicly available on the SEC's
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While encouraging its staff to provide advice to the public in all
of these formats, the SEC has taken steps to maintain a distinction
between the formal and official regulatory interpretations that it provides as an agency and the informal and unofficial ones provided by
its staff.53 The SEC's procedural rules, for example, describe the avail-

ability of "informal administrative interpretations" 54 and specifically
provide that "opinions expressed by members of the staff do not constitute an official expression of the Commission's views. 55
To some, the SEC's distinction between Commission views and
staff views may seem exceedingly formalistic. After all, actions by the
full Commission comprise only a fraction of the agency's day-to-day
activities. But the full Commission's ability to separate its actions from
those of its staff makes the agency more accommodating to the needs
of securities law practitioners and their clients. Conversely, if staff officials' interpretive statements bound the agency, the Commission
might significantly curtail its traditional support of staff advisory prac56
tices, or perhaps eliminate such practices entirely.
B. The SEC's Practice of Issuing No-Action Letters
The SEC first issued SEC "opinions of counsel," the precursor to
today's no-action letters, as early as 1936, in response to specific requests from members of the public seeking advice regarding the applicability of the federal securities laws to particular transactions. 57 The
SEC rarely made views set forth in these opinions of counsel public,
and expressly stated that they were "staff views" that did not constitute
Commission rulings. 58 Moreover, from time to time, particularly
when a question of law or fact was very close, the staffs response
would not express a legal opinion. 59 Rather, the staff member would
World Wide Web Site. See, e.g., Division of Corp. Fin., SEC, Staff Legal Bulletin No. 1 (CF)
(visited Jan. 5, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/nles/othern/slbcfl.txt> [hereinafter Staff
Legal Bulletin No. 1.]. Corporation Finance Division Director Brian Lane has described
these bulletins as "super no-action letters." Conference News, Corp Fin Division Plans to
Receive InterpretiveRequests Electronically, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 310 (Mar. 7, 1997). A
bulletin is expressly labeled as "views of the staff," and specifies that it is "not a rule, regulation or statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission;" it also bears the disclaimer
that "the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved its content." StaffLegal Bulletin No. 1., supra.
53 See supra notes 50-52, infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (providing additional discussion on unofficial nature of staff opinions).
54 17 C.F.R. § 202.2.
55 Id. § 202.1(d).
56

See generallyMICHAEL ASIMOW, ADvICE TO THE PUBLIC FRoM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES §§ 1.01-1.07 (1973) (discussing advice-giving practices of federal government
agencies including the SEC).
57 Lemke, supra note 10, at 1021.
58 Id.
59 See 1 Loss & SELGMAN, supra note 10, at 533-34 n.29.
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merely indicate a position on the likelihood of enforcement action.
According to Professors Loss and Seligman, by the early 1960s, the
60
SEC largely replaced opinions of counsel with no-action letters.
1.

What Are No-Action Letters?

Today, the staff's written responses to requests for advice from
members of the public generally take one of three forms: a "pure" noaction letter, an interpretive letter, or a no-action letter issued pursuant to Rule 14a-861 -an SEC rule providing shareholders of a public
company with the right to have their proposals included in the company's annual proxy materials.
a.

"Pure"No-Action Letters and Interpretive Letters

According to the SEC, "[a] no-action letter is one in which an
authorized staff official indicates that the staff will not recommend
any enforcement action to the Commission if the proposed transac62
tion described in the incoming correspondence is consummated."
"Pure" no-action letters typically conclude with a statement that the
"response only represents the staff's position on enforcement action
and does not purport to express any legal conclusion on the questions
presented." 63 Ironically, even when the staff does not grant the requested "no-action" relief, its disfavorable written response is still
termed a "no-action letter."64 Moreover, negative responses to no-action requests generally contain some type of statutory or regulatory
analysis as to why the staff cannot respond positively to the requestor's
inquiry. 65 Thus, pure no-action letters most often communicate
favorable enforcement positions.
The SEC contrasts a pure no-action letter with an "interpretive
letter" wherein "the staff provides an interpretation of a specific statute, rule or regulation in the context of an actual fact situation."6 6 In
general, the SEC does not label interpretive letters as such. Rather, if
the staff fails to disclaim the letter's expression of a legal conclusion
the letter is deemed interpretive. In other words, because the staff has
60
61

Seeid,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997).

62 Procedures Utilized by the Division of Corporation Finance for Rendering Informal Advice, Securities Act Release No. 6253, 21 S.E.C. Docket 320 n.2 (Oct. 28, 1980)
[hereinafter Procedures Utilized Release].
63 Lemke, supra note 10, at 1032; see Rowe, Reliance, supranote 16, at 706, 766 (discussing pure no-action letters).
64 See generally HAFr, supra note 11 (outlining and analyzing both favorable and dis-

favorable no-action letters).
65 See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1035 ("Unlike a favorable response, the staff is more
apt to explain the basis for [an] adverse response, particularly if it is based on a disagreement regarding an interpretation of the law.").
66 Procedures Utilized Release, supra note 62, at 320-21 n.2.
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not included a sentence that describes the letter as solely the staff's
position on enforcement action, the letter may be characterized as
67
interpretive.
Most securities law scholars and practitioners agree that the SEC's
distinction between no-action and interpretive letters is frequently
blurred. 68 Indeed, many, if not most, letters advising a no-action position do so based on a staff member's interpretation of the law, regardless of whether she explicitly communicates that interpretation within
the body of the letter. 69 Accordingly, when a staff member explicitly
bases a no-action position on a particular interpretation of the law,
the so-called interpretive letter fits into a subset of the broader category of no-action letters. 70 For these reasons, the general term "noaction letter" encompasses both pure no-action and interpretive letters. Similarly, the term "regulatory interpretations" fairly describes
both explicit interpretations inno-action letters as well as those interpretations implied from particular enforcement positions articulated
71
in some pure no-action letters.
b.

No-Action Letters Relating to ShareholderProposals Under Rule
14a-8

Because they are often cited by parties in litigation, 72 no-action
letters containing interpretations of SEC Rule 14a-873 merit brief, separate attention. Rule 14a-8 provides shareholders of a public company with a general right to have their proposals included in the
company's proxy materials for its annual shareholder meeting, 7 4 but
specifies that the company may omit a shareholder proposal on any of
See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1032.
See Rowe, Highlights, supra note 17, at 75 (stating that "insome instances, these
distinctions may be blurred and, for some purposes, may not be relevant"); see also Lemke,
supra note 10, at 1022 (stating that "it is often difficult to categorize a response definitively
as either no-action or interpretive").
69
See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1022; see also 3 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SEcurrMEs
AND FEDERAL CoRPoRATE LAW § 1.13, at 1-93 (1997) (stating that "no-action letters in many
instances have an underlying interpretative rationalization").
70
See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1032; Rowe, Highlights, supra note 17, at 75.
71
But see infra notes 410-11 and accompanying text (advising courts to accord greater
scrutiny when relying on regulatory interpretations in pure no-action letters).
72
See, e.g., infra notes 194-200, 276-83, 304-12 and accompanying text (discussing the
so-called "Cracker Barrel' controversy and other cases involving requests by public companies forjudicial deference to no-action letters containing regulatory interpretations of SEC
Rule 14a-8).
73 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1997).
74
Rule 14a-8(a) provides that "[i]f any security holder of a registrant notifies the
registrant of his intention to present a proposal for action at a forthcoming meeting of the
registrant's security holders, the registrant shall set forth the proposal in its proxy statement and identify it in its form of the proxy." Id. § 240.14a-8(a).
67

68
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thirteen independent grounds. 75 The rule also specifies that a company planning to exclude a proposal from its proxy materials must file
the following with the SEC: the proposal, any supporting statements
by the shareholder, a statement of the reasons why the company considers the omission proper, and, where the reasons for omission are
based on matters of law, a supporting opinion of counsel.7 6 Although
Rule 14a-8 merely prescribes notification and filing requirements, virtually all companies that decide to omit a shareholder proposal seek a
no-action letter in support of their decision. 7 7 Consequently, in responding to no-action requests, staff members necessarily must draw
interpretive conclusions regarding whether the shareholder proposals
are properly excludable.
Although no-action letter requests and responses involving other
SEC rules or statutory provisions may practically affect the legal rights
of third parties, 78 no-action letters issued in connection with Rule 14a8 are somewhat special because the rule itself contemplates the presence and involvement of a clearly identifiable third party-the shareholder-proponent. 7 9 Hence, in addition to a company's no-action
letter request and its opinion of counsel, the staff also receives submissions from the shareholder-proponent's counsel or the individual
shareholder.8 0 The process therefore takes on many characteristics of
an adjudication-the SEC staff reviews "briefs" submitted by both con8
stituencies and chooses the position with which it most agrees. '
75 Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(1)-(13); see, e.g., id. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (stating that a proposal
may be excluded if it is not a proper subject for action under the laws of registrant's domicile); id. § 240.14a-8(c) (2) (stating that a proposal may be excluded if its implementation
would require registrant to violate any state or U.S. law, or any law of any foreign jurisdiction to which the registrant is subject); id § 240.14a-8(c) (7) (stating that a proposal may
be excluded if it "deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business
operations of the registrant").
76 Id. § 240.14a-8(d)(1)-(4).
77 SeeJonathan E. Gottlieb, Regulation of ShareholderProposals-RecentDevelopments and
Some Suggestions for Reform. INsIGrrs, Dec. 1993, at 25; see also Schwartz & Weiss, supra note
11, at 648-49 (discussing no-action letters in the context of Rule 14a-8).
78 See infra note 352 and accompanying text.
79 17 C.F.R1 § 240.14a-8(d) (3)-(4) (stating that registrant must furnish shareholder
proponentwith the reasons for omission and a copy of the supporting opinion of counsel);
id. § 240.14a-8(e) (specifying that if the shareholder believes that the statement in opposition contains materially false and misleading information, the shareholder may bring this
matter to the Commission's attention via a letter setting forth the reasons for this view).
80 See Statement of Informal Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with Respect to Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 12,599, [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,635, at 86,602, 86,605 (July 7, 1976) [hereinafter
Shareholder Proposals Release] (noting that the staff will consider arguments by the proponent as to "why it is believed that the intended omission of a shareholder proposal
would be violative of the proxy rules").
81 See Howard L. Vickery III, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action: A Case Study of
ShareholderProposalNo-Action Letters, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 307, 311 (1976); Note, The SEC and
"No-Action" Decisions UnderProxy Rule 14a-8: The Casefor DirectJudicial Review, 84 HARv. L.
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Shareholders who fail to convince the staff to issue a disfavorable noaction letter may pursue their legal arguments in court by alleging, in
an action against the company, a Rule 14a-8 violation.8 2 The shareholders' strong interest in having their proposals included in proxy
materials, particularly those raising important social and political issues,8 3 coupled with the possibility of recouping attorney fees under
the "common benefit rule,"8 4 virtually guarantees that some cases will
end up in a federal district court. The federal judge must then decide
what weight to accord the no-action letter that the SEC staff issued to
85
the company.
2.

Proceduresfor Requesting No-Action Letters and Public Reliance
on No-Action Letters

The SEC has developed a set of fairly rigid procedures applicable
to individuals and entities seeking no-action letters.8 6 Generally, such
requests are directed to the chief counsel of the SEC division responsible for administering the statute or SEC rules under which the request
REv. 835, 838-39 (1971). But see Shareholder Proposals Release, supra note 80, at 86,604

("[T]he Commission and its staff do not purport in any way to issue 'rulings' or 'decisions'
on shareholder proposals management indicates it intends to omit, and they do not adjudicate the merits of a management's posture concerning such a proposal."); id.at 86,605
(specifying that "neither the receipt of [shareholder] information or arguments, nor the
acknowledgement of them by the staff in its response to management's submission under
Rule 14a-8(d), should be construed as changing the staff's informal procedures and proxy
review into a formal or adversary procedure or proceeding").
82 See Shareholder Proposals Release, supra note 80, at 86,605 (emphasizing that
'nothing the Commission or its staff does or omits to do in connection with such proposals
affects the right of the proponent, or any shareholder for that matter, to institute a private
action."); id. at 86,606 ("IT]he staff's views are advisory only," and management's decision
to accept or reject that advice "is subject to review by a district court in the event appropriate enforcement action is instituted by... the proponent.").
83 See infra notes 194, 306 (discussing shareholder proposals seeking corporate measures prohibiting discrimination against gay men and lesbians and supporting race and
gender based affirmative action).
84 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 54
F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming grant of attorneys' fees to ACTWU because the proponent's litigation, which resulted in an injunction against the company, vindicated the legal
rights of all the company's shareholders).
85 See infra text accompanying notes 304-12.
86 See Commission Policy and Guidelines for Filing of Applications for Exemption,
Investment Company Act Release No. 14,492, 32 S.E.C. Docket 1879 (Apr. 30, 1985); Procedures Applicable to Requests, Securities Act Release No. 5127, 36 Fed. Reg. 2600, 2600
(Feb. 9, 1971); Procedures Applicable to Requests for No-Action and Interpretive Letters,
Securities Act Release No. 6269, 21 S.E.C. Docket 839 (Dec. 5, 1980) [hereinafter NoAction and Interpretive Letters Release]; see also 17 C.F.R. § 200.81 (1997) (describing procedures applicable to publication of interpretive, no-action, and certain exemption letters); Expedited Publication of Interpretative, No-Action, and Certain Exemption Letters,
Securities Act Release No. 6793, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,314, at 89,382 (Aug. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Expedited Publication Release] (same). See
generally Lemke, supra note 10, at 1023-41 (discussing both written and unwritten SEC procedures regarding its no-action process).
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arises. 8 7 Consequently, three SEC divisions handle the bulk of requests-Corporation Finance, Market Regulation, and Investment
Management. 88 Staff attorneys working for the division's chief counsel typically prepare a draft of the response which, depending on the
significance and level of complexity of the regulatory issue involved,
one or more higher ranking officials review prior to transmission.8 9
The SEC's procedural rules expressly provide that "any statement by
the... chief counsel ...of a division can be relied upon as representing the views of that division." 90 Moreover, for the purposes of this
provision, a statement that an attorney on the chief counsel's staff
signs is regarded as a statement by the chief counsel. 9 1
In the context of no-action letters, the SEC's pronouncement
that statements by certain high ranking officials "can be relied upon"
as the position of the corresponding division certainly begs the critical
question of what it means for an individual or entity to be able to rely
on such a statement. However, in a number of SEC releases, the SEC
has set forth examples of what permissible reliance does not mean.
87
See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1024. In addition to reciting specific facts relating to
the transaction at issue, the SEC has made clear that the requestor "should indicate why he
thinks a problem exists, his own opinion in the matter and the basis for such an opinion."
No-Action and Interpretive Letters Release, supra note 86, at 840. This dictate prompted
the following advice from a securities law practitioner:
In explaining [the basis of the problem] there should be a discussion of
relevant precedent, including any applicable case law or administrative positions and particularly any no-action letters relevant to the issues involved .... In addition, applicable contrary precedent should be discussed
and distinguished, if possible, and a request that is unprecedented should
be noted as such. The staff may return a request unanswered if the requestor's opinion is unsubstantiated.
Lemke, supra note 10, at 1027 (footnotes omitted).
88 See id. at 1022.
89 See id. at 1029. In 1980, following the model that other SEC divisions employed,
Corporation Finance adopted an "abbreviated response" format for most of the no-action
letters it issues. Procedures Utilized Release, supra note 62, at 321. Pursuant to this format, most no-action letters authored by the staff do not restate the facts and legal issues
presented by the requestor. Rather, the Division "simply sets forth its position on the issues
raised... on a separate page attached" to the requestor's letter. Id. Consequently, as
Professor Haft has noted, "the staff usually does not, except in a conclusory fashion, state
the rationale for its ruling in a specific case." HAr, supra note 11, at viii; see also Lemke,
supra note 10, at 1031 ("IT]he staff's response usually consists of no more than two or
three paragraphs setting forth the position of the division."), The SEC staff has also enumerated particular areas and situations where it will not express any position or comment.
For example, it will not respond to questions regarding the availability of either Securities
Act section 4(2) exemptions for private offerings or interstate offering exemptions under
Securities Act section 3(a) (11). See Procedures Utilized Release, supra note 62, at 322-23
(discussing these and other identified areas of "no-comment").
90 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1997). The full provision specifies that "any statement by the
director, associate director, assistant director, chief accountant, chief counsel, or chief financial analyst of a division can be relied upon as representing the views of that division."
Id.
91
See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1024 & n.21.
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For instance, it does not mean that no-action letters bind the full
Commission to a particular interpretive view because the Commission
92
takes the position that "it is not bound by these staff responses."
The phrase "can be relied upon" also does not mean that the Commission promises to refrain from instituting an enforcement action
against the recipient of a no-action letter because "the Commission
reserves the right to act contrary to staff advice." 93 It also does not
mean that parties can rely on no-action letters in subsequent transactions because "no-action and interpretative responses by the staff are
subject to reconsideration." 94 Likewise, permissible reliance does not
mean that similarly situated third parties can rely on no-action letters95 because the SEC places a theoretical "addressee-only" limitation
on its advice in most letters. 96 Finally, possession of a no-action letter
does not insulate the recipient from suit by a private party because noaction letters are "not rulings of the Commission or its staff on questions of law or fact and are not dispositive of the legal issues raised as
to the applicability of the federal securities laws to a given transaction."97 Furthermore, "such letters are not intended to affect the
rights of private parties."98
List Release, supra note 7, at 13,682.
93 Small Entities Release, supra note 50, at 15,606.
94 Adoption of Section 200.81, Concerning Public Availability of Requests for No-Action and Interpretative Letters and the Responses Thereto by the Commission's Staff, and
Amendment of Section 200.80, Securities Act Release No. 5098, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,921, at 80,051, 80,052 (Oct. 29, 1970) [hereinafter
Public Availability Release).
95 See Shareholder Proposals Release, supra note 80, at 86,605 (stating that "[b ]ecause
the staff's advice on contested proposals is informal and nonjudicial in nature, it does not
have precedential value with respect to identical or similar proposals submitted to other
issuers in the future"). But see Procedures Utilized Release, supra note 62, at 324 (stating
that
"issuers ...and their counsel should review past statements issued by the
Division [of Corporation Finance] in connection with the same or similar
proposals submitted to other issuers to make certain that the grounds for
omission have not been previously addressed, thereby reducing the need
for the Division to discuss previously settled issues")
(footnote omitted).
96 Unless otherwise specified, any legal conclusions are limited solely to the specific
facts and circumstances described in the incoming letter. See Small Entities Release, supra
note 50, at 15,606 ("In general, only the party or parties requesting a no-action or interpretive position may rely on a no-action or interpretive letter, and they may rely on the position with regard only to the specific facts addressed in the letter."). But see infra notes 15758 and accompanying text (discussing instances where divisions specifically approve of reliance by third parties and instances where no-action letters are issued in response to requests by associations or industry groups on behalf of their membership).
97 List Release, supra note 7, at 13,682.
98 Id.; see also Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27
Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962) (advising the public that, when presented with identical
facts, federal courts may nonetheless apply alternative tests and draw different conclusions
regarding the availability of Securities Act section 4(1)'s transactional exemption); supra
note 82 (quoting SEC statements regarding rights of shareholder proponents to institute
92
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Thus, by a process of elimination, one may conclude that the SEC
intends reliance on views of the division to simply mean that the recipient can consider the letter a promise that the division staff will not
bring that particular transaction to the Commission's attention for enforcement action. Such a promise, however, probably would not constitute a basis for legal estoppel. 99 Yet recipients highly value noaction letters, undoubtedly because the Commission appears to have
never proceeded against the recipient of a no-action letter who acted
in good faith on the letter's advice. 10 0
3.

Commission Review of No-Action Letters

Commentators have observed that, when a no-action letter request involves a novel or highly complex issue or area of interpretation, the staff typically consults with the Commission prior to issuing a
response. 1 1 Indeed, the SEC's procedural rules specifically provide
for such consultation. 10 2 However, this provision is qualified, as the
rules also make it clear that any consultation lies solely in the discre10 3
tion of the Commission.
In its discretion, the Commission may also act on requests from
the public for Commission review of staff positions articulated in noaction letters. 10 4 Members of the division that issued the challenged
private actions under Rule 14a-8 regardless of staff or Commission views expressed in noaction letters).
99 See, e.g, SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 1959) ("It has often been said
that 'the Commission may not waive the requirements of an act of Congress nor may the
doctrine of estoppel be invoked against the Commission.'") (emphasis added) (quoting SEC v.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, 209 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1953)); Frank C. Newman, Should OfficialAdvice Be Reliable?-Proposalsas to Estoppel and Related Doctrines in AdministrativeLaw, 53
COLUM. L. Rxv. 374 (1953) (discussing estoppel arguments in claims of reliance on agency
advice).
100 See 10 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 4543-44 & n.197 (noting that "it is no
secret that the Commission will normally take no action when a person has acted in good
faith on the basis of a staff letter" and citing sources contending that the Commission has
never proceeded against a recipient of a no-action letter relying in good faith on that
letter).
101 See, e.g., Louis Loss, 3 SECURrEs REGULATION 1895 (1961) (opining that "it is no
secret that Commission officials do not express opinions on close questions of construction, particularly when they are major or novel, without some clearance with the Commission"); Lemke, supra note 10, at 1029.
102
See 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1997). This section provides that
[i] n certain instances an informal statement of the views of the Commission
may be obtained. The staff, upon request or on its motion, will generally
present questions to the Commission which involve matters of substantial
importance and where the issues are novel or highly complex, although the
granting of a request for an informal statement by the Commission is entirely within its discretion.
Id.
103 See id.
104 See id.; see also Lemke, supranote 10, at 1026 (describing the Commission's requirements for reviewing staff no-action letters). Requests for review by the full Commission
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no-action letter are generally responsible for presenting the matter to
the Commission. This presentation often takes the form of a staff rec10 5
ommendation that the Commission decline to review the matter.
More often than not, the Commission accepts this
06

recommendation.1

On some occasions the Commission reviews the staffs no-action
letter and issues a brief statement expressing agreement or disagreement with the staff's position. 10 7 However, even when the Commission exercises its discretion to review the staffs no-action position, the
108
Commission characterizes any statement it issues as "informal."
Thus, the Commission appears to draw a distinction between the views
expressed in SEC releases and those expressed in "informal statements" regarding no-action letters issued by the staff. One manifestation of this distinction is that, unlike SEC releases, Commission
statements approving or reversing staff no-action letters are neither
published in the FederalRegister nor referenced in the C.F.R Rather,
such informal statements are generally made at Commission meetings, and the Secretary of the Commission notifies the requestor of
10 9
the Commission's action.
4. DirectJudicialReview of Regulatory Interpretationsin No-Action
Letters
Each federal securities statute contains a provision permitting
"[a] person aggrieved by an order of the Commission" to seek direct
judicial review at the federal appellate level." 0O The APA supplements
arise most frequently in instances where the staff refuses to take the no-action position that
was sought in the incoming letter. See, e.g., Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,704, at 96,327 (D.D.C.July 10, 1974) [hereinafter

Potomac1]. Furthermore, shareholders seeking to include proposals in a company's proxy
materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8 will often seek Commission review of staff positions that
do not object to a company's exclusion of the proposal. See, e.g., NYCERS v. SEC, 45 F.3d
7, 10 (2d Cir. 1995); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254,
256 (2d Cir. 1994); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 663 (D.C. Cir.
1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
105 See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1039.
106 See id.; see also Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting the Commission's denial of market participant's request for Commission review of a no-action letter).
107 See cases cited supra note 104.
108 17 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1997).
109 See, e.g., Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL
11016 (Jan. 15, 1993) (stating that "[p]ursuant to 17 C.F.R. section 201.1(d) the Division
presented the matter to the Commission for review. The Commission has affirmed the
Division's position that the proposal was excludable from the company's proxy material in
reliance upon rule 14a-8(c) (7)"); American Tel. & Tel. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988
WL 235316 (Dec. 29, 1988) (stating that the Commission has affirmed in part and reversed
in part the staff's no-action position).
110 Securities Act § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1994); Trust Indenture Act § 322(a), id. § 77vvv;
Exchange Act § 25(a), id. § 78y(a); Public Utility Holding Co. Act § 24, id. § 79x; Investment Company Act § 43, id. § 80a-42 (a); Investment Advisers Act § 213, id. § 80b-13.
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this statutory provision by specifying that "[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review
thereof."'' The availability of either type of judicial review for SEC
no-action letters is a disputed issue.
As a threshold matter, the availability of judicial review depends
on whether the Commission reviewed and approved the particular noaction letter. In cases where the Commission has refused to review a
no-action letter issued by the staff, direct judicial review under either
the federal securities statutes' review provisions or the APA is gener11 2
ally foreclosed because there is no final agency action to review.
In contrast, when the Commission reviews and affirms a staff noaction letter, there is at least an arguable claim of final agency action.
For example, in 1970, the D.C. Circuit asserted jurisdiction over a reg13
ulatory interpretation in a Commission-approved no-action letter.
However, the weight of recent authority seems to forestall direct review at the federal appellate level on the grounds that even Commission-approved no-action letters are not "final -orders" within the
4
meaning of the federal securities statutes."
Section 706 of the APA permits a federal district court to reverse
final agency action that is, among other things, "arbitrary" or "capricious."1 1 5 Therefore, under the APA, district courts may review regulatory interpretations in no-action letters that have been reviewed and
approved by the Commission. One must read this section, however,
111 5 U.S.C. § 702.
112

See Kixmiller v. SEC, 492 F.2d 641, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that court has

no jurisdiction under Exchange Act section 25 (a) to review staff position in no-action letter
where Commission has refused either to examine the staff's view or to express a view of its
own); Potomac I, supra note 104, at 96,327 (citing Kixmiller and noting that there would be
no jurisdiction under the APA to review a staff no-action letter that had not been reviewed
and affirmed by the Commission). But see Vickery, supra note 81, at 356 (arguing that
"[d]irectjudicial review should be available where the head of an agency refuses to review
informal staff action and the practical detriment imposed on the plaintiff outweighs the
costs to the agency").
113 Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding
that Commission-approved no-action letter was an SEC order under Exchange Act section
25(a) and was ripe for review because it constituted the agency's "final word" on its interpretation of SEC Rule 14a-8's exception for ordinary business activities), vacated as moot
404 U.S. 403 (1972).
114 Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
1994) (holding that because no-action letters lack binding "legal effect," the Commissionapproved no-action letter containing an interpretation of Rule 14a-8 was not a "final order"
within the meaning of Exchange Act section 25(a)); see also Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d
525 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the Commission-approved no-action letter was tentative,
not final, as would be necessary for the court to assert jurisdiction under Exchange Act
section 25 (a), but disclaiming jurisdiction because, even if it were a final order within the
meaning of section 25(a), the no-action letter was a "refusal to prosecute" which, under
the APA, is committed to agency discretion by law) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702(1)).
115 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A); see Potomac I, supra note 104, at 96,327 (reviewing SEC noaction letter pursuant to APA section 706).
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against the backdrop of section 704, which limits judicial review to
instances where "there is no other adequate remedy in a court."'116
Litigants seeking direct judicial review of Commission-approved regulatory interpretations in no-action letters therefore must overcome
two hurdles to be heard in federal district court. First, they must
demonstrate that the regulatory interpretation constitutes final
agency action that is "ripe" for review.1 7 Second, they must demon118
strate the absence of an alternative legal remedy.
Thus, whether an individual or entity seeks review at the federal
appellate level through the federal securities laws, or at the district
court level through the APA, they are unlikely to succeed in challenging a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter in a direct action
against the SEC. Rather, market participants and public investors who
disagree with regulatory interpretations in no-action letters are generally forced to challenge such interpretations indirectly-either in the
course of enforcement actions initiated by the SEC or in private litigation. The individual or entity opposing the regulatory interpretation
in the no-action letter therefore places tremendous faith in the judiciary that independent review will be accorded. Yet, practical-rather
than legal-reasons often forestall opportunities for such indirect judicial review.
C.

The Practical Impact of SEC No-Action Letters on the
Regulatory Process

If the SEC's no-action letter process functioned in practice the
way it was designed to in theory, its public impact would be largely
limited to the particular individuals and entities who seek and receive
the informal regulatory advice regarding a specific transaction. Yet
116
117

5 U.S.C. § 704.
In Abbott Laboratoriesv. Gardner,387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Supreme Court articu-

lated standards for determining whether an agency's regulatory interpretation was "ripe"
for pre-enforcementjudicial review. Id. at 148. In PotomacI, the court applied these ripeness standards to a regulatory interpretation in a Commission-approved no-action letter
and concluded that the balance of interests favored prompt adjudication. Potomac I, supra
note 104, at 96,328. However, in a subsequent proceeding, the court found that the statutory interpretation conveyed in the no-action letter was not arbitrary or capricious. See
Potomac Fed. Corp. v. SEC, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,815, at 96,720 (D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter Potomac 11].
118 In New York City Employees'Retirement System v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit categorized a regulatory interpretation in a noaction letter that had been reviewed and approved by the Commission as an "interpretive
rule" within the meaning of section 553 of the APA. Id. at 13. The challenged no-action
letter contained a regulatory interpretation that purportedly interpreted Rule 14a-8 to permit the exclusion of a shareholder proposal. Id. at 10. The court rejected the shareholder's claim for review of the rule under APA section 706 because it found that the
plaintiff shareholders had an effective alternative legal remedy to suing the SEC-it could
sue the company under a private right of action for the company's violation of Rule 14a-8.
Id. at 14.

1998]

SEC NO-ACTION LET9

947

few would dispute that the no-action letter process in existence today
substantially affects the behavior of all market participants, rather
than merely the particular no-action letter recipients. Indeed, by announcing regulatory interpretations through the vehicle of no-action
letters, the SEC has both encouraged favored conduct and discouraged, and in some cases eliminated entirely, disfavored actions and
practices. In other words, the SEC has been able to use its no-action
letter process as an effective policymaking tool." 9
This Section analyzes how no-action letters have come to play this
important role in the regulatory process. It first explains how changes
in the public availability of no-action letters, coupled with the SEC's
retreat from its theoretical "addressee-only" position, 120 have facili-

tated the SEC's ability to shape general conduct through the issuance
of these letters. It then identifies reasons why the SEC uses no-action
letters to announce generally applicable regulatory interpretations
and examines why securities law practitioners and their clients often
regard these interpretations as law. This Section concludes by discussing many of the consequences that result from SEC policymaking
through the no-action letter process.
Analyzing the practical implications of the SEC's no-action letter
process serves three corresponding purposes. First, it helps explain
why so many courts have been willing to accord great deference to
regulatory interpretations in no-action letters despite the SEC's characterization of these letters as "unofficial" and "informal." 1 1 Second,
it demonstrates why clarification of the legal status of no-action letters
is so important. Finally, this analysis highlights the judiciary's critical
role in ensuring that the SEC's no-action letter process does not diminish the legal rights of either the regulated community or the investing public.
Indeed, as Professor Donald Langevoort has
recognized in a broader context, "understanding the process of policy
formulation at an administrative agency says a good deal about the
deference we ought to give to agencies in such matters as statutory
12 2
interpretation."
119

For a general discussion of why the process of interpreting statutes and rules often

requires that an agency make policy choices, see infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
121
See supra notes 5--56, 92-98 and accompanying text.
122 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy:Public Choice, InstitutionalRhetoric,
and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 527, 539 (1990). Professor
Langevoort's essay examines the SEC as a bureaucratic institution and offers insightful
explanations for what he perceives as the agency's risk aversion, its biases against the adoption of bright-line rules, and its tendency to adopt rhetorical conventions which become
increasingly influential in shaping the SEC's future behavior. Id. at 530-33. Of particular
importance for purposes of this Article is Professor Langevoort's caution that, due to the
great force of SEC institutional rhetoric, the SEC's regulatory interpretations "may well
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The SEC's Use of the No-Action Letter Process as a Policymaking
Tool
a.

Changes Regarding the Public Availability of No-Action Letters

In the early years of the SEC's no-action letter process, the regulatory interpretations announced therein were generally available only
to the particular requestors. Beyond that, as one commentator has
recalled, "knowledge of the letters' very existence was a professional
advantage limited (outside the ranks of the staff) to a few cognoscenti."12 3 This public unavailability of no-action letters significantly
curtailed the SEC's ability to shape general conduct through no-action letters.
In 1968, the SEC invited public comment on the advisability of
making no-action letters public, even though the agency took the position that such disclosure was not required under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 124 Two years later, the SEC reported that
"[t] he overwhelming majority of commentators favored public disclo125
sure of the matters treated in no-action and interpretative letters."
tend to be the product of assumptions from the past rather than thoughtfil deliberation in
a contemporary setting." Id. at 539.
123
Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 28,990, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
84,718, at 81,391, 81,392 (Mar. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman]. The SEC's position opposing public availability of no-action letters
sparked the law/lore debate discussed supra text accompanying notes 1-2. As an administrative law scholar, Professor Davis was particularly concerned with what he characterized
as the development of "secret law" at the SEC. See ABA Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at
29.
124 Request for Comments on Publication Release, supra note 47, at 83,293. Subject to
a number of enumerated exceptions, the FOIA requires agencies to make available for
public inspection and copying "interpretations which have been adopted by the agency
and are not published in the Federal Register." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (B). In 1968, the
SEC took the position that disclosure of no-action letters was not required because any
regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter was not one "adopted by the agency." Request for Comments on Publication Release, supra note 47, at 83,293. However, based on a
number of federal court decisions reviewing efforts on the part of other agencies to avoid
public disclosure of advisory letters that agency staff members drafted, the SEC appears to
have rested its position under the FOIA on rather weak interpretive ground. See Taxation
with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (subjecting "General Counsel Memoranda" prepared by attorneys at the IRS to disclosure under FOIA); Coastal States
Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (subjecting memoranda
that the Department of Energy regional counsel generated in response to requests for
interpretation by field auditors to disclosure under the FOIA); Tax Analysts &Advocates v.
IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973) (subjecting "private letter rulings" prepared by IRS
attorneys in response to requests from members of the public to FOIA disclosure); see also
Jeffrey D. Bauman, Loss and Seligman on Securities Regulation: An Essay for Don Schwartz, 78

GEo. L.J. 1753, 1758 (1990) (book review) (noting that the FOIA "required the SEC to
make public an immense number of staff 'no-action' letters that previously had been the
private preserve of the members of the established securities bar who had received them").
125 Notice of Proposal to Adopt Section 200.81 Concerning Public Availability of Requests for No-Action and Interpretative Letters and the Responses Thereto by the Commis-
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In response to this majority sentiment, the SEC announced that beginning December 1, 1970, requests for no-action letters, interpretive
letters, and staffs responses would be available for public inspection
and copying thirty days after the staff has given or sent its response to
the requestor. 12 6 The SEC further amended its rules in 1988 to provide for expedited publication of no-action and interpretive letters ex12 7
cept in cases where it has granted confidential treatment.
Modem technology has also played a substantial role in ensuring
widespread public availability of the thousands of no-action letters
that the SEC issues each year. Today, practitioners may retrieve most
no-action letters through the legal databases of Lexis and Westlaw, as
well as through CCH and BNA loose-leaf services. Thus, interested
persons can now access and research regulatory interpretations in noaction letters in a manner similar to the formal and official SEC pronouncements embodied in SEC rules, orders, and releases.
b.

The SEC's Retreat from a Theoretical "Addressee-Only" Position

While certainly a prerequisite, public availability of no-action letters alone cannot explain how the SEC has come to use these letters as
a general policymaking tool. Even publicly available letters would
have little utility if the advice contained therein were applicable only
to the specific facts and circumstances described by the individual resion's Staff, Securities Act Release No. 5073, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 77,838, at 83,979 (July 14, 1970). Securities law practitioners and commentators
were not unanimous about the advisability of public disclosure. Professor Louis Loss, for
instance, cautioned the SEC against permitting public access to all no-action letters. Louis
Loss, Summary Remarks, 30 Bus. LAw. 163, 164-65 (1975) (special issue). Moreover, shortly
after the public availability decision was made, he expressed the rather animated view that:
If there is anything worse than not having precedent, it is being drowned in
it. We all know that ninety percent of these letters are sheer, unadulterated, repetitious garbage. That was predictable. It is a fact. One can't possibly read even the letters that are occasionally digested in CGH or
elsewhere. Perhaps one could read the headnotes. If you try to read everything that is going on in this field and those letters, those letters are very
definitely the straw that breaks the camel's back.
Id Professor Loss also suggested that the SEC "ought to come to grips with this and take
the lawyer off the hook of a possible malpractice suit by ... inaugurating the practice of
publishing perhaps fifty or a hundred of these letters per year-the ones that are meaningful and that could possibly be digested." Id at 165.
126
Public Availability Release, supra note 94, at 80,051.
127 Expedited Publication Release, supra note 86, at 89,383. Pursuant to the SEC's
Procedural Rules, individual requestors may seek "confidential treatment" of their requests
and the staffs response thereto for a reasonable period of time, not exceeding 120 days.
17 C.F.R. § 200.81(b) (1997). However, the SEC has noted that the burden is on the requestor to establish the need for confidential treatment and that it would not grant confidential treatment unless a requestor clearly demonstrated such need. Public Availability
Release, supra note 94, at 80,051. The SEC has further advised counsel and market participants that "requests for confidential treatment should be limited to the minimum period
necessary under the circumstances. Only in exceptional situations, such as mergers or
acquisition programs, will the full 90-day period be allowed." Id.
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questor. Thus, the increased public availability of no-action letters
must be viewed in conjunction with the SEC's willingness, over the
years, to depart from the theoretical "addressee-only" limitation
1 28
placed upon these letters.
Significant empirical evidence suggests that both the Commission
and its staff fully expect most regulatory interpretations in no-action
letters to extend beyond the specific factual contexts in which they
were issued. For example, in 1975, the SEC began to include in the
SEC News Digest a list of "significant" no-action letters. 129 Publication
of such a list would serve little purpose if these letters did not indicate,
however informally, staff views that are generally applicable to similarly situated third parties.' 30 Additionally, most SEC divisions have
identified certain regulatory issues that prior no-action letters have resolved, and they have announced their intention not to respond to
no-action requests in those areas unless the request raises novel or
unique issues.' 3 ' This practice makes sense only if the prior letters
contain regulatory interpretations that are generally applicable to
others in similar situations.' 3 2 Furthermore, SEC officials participate
in numerous programs and symposia that are designed, in part, to
publicize their most recent no-action positions and interpretations. 3 3
They also prepare annual outlines and memoranda summarizing, for
34
the public's benefit, the year's most important no-action letters.
Yet, if regulatory interpretations in no-action letters were not generally applicable to similarly situated persons, staff efforts to educate the
public about recent no-action letters would be meaningless. Finally,
the Commission frequently references no-action letters in SEC orders
and releases, a practice that also indicates the general applicability of
no-action letters. 133
See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
List Release, supra note 7, at 13,682.
130 See Rowe, Paper Tigers, supra note 16, at 22. Rowe specifically notes that
[t]he only rational explanation for giving special prominence to no-action
positions is that they are intended to be relied upon and that those affected
conform their conduct appropriately. Reference to these letters... cannot
be intended only to provide guidance to those wishing to submit their own
requests for no-action letters. Such a position would ... lead to a waste of
resources and inefficiencies ....
Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
131
See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1034; Rowe, Paper Tigers, supra note 16, at 22.
132
See Rowe, PaperTigers, supranote 16, at 22 (contending that a strict addressee-only
position "would be inconsistent with SEC public statements and letters such as those of the
'don't bother us anymore' type").
133
See Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman, supra note 123, at 81,393.
134
See, e.g., Division of Corporation Finance, Significant No-Action and InterpretiveLetters,
1 THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1996, at 196 (1996).
135
See Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman, supra note 123, at 81,393; see
also Small Entities Release, supra note 50, at 15,606 (noting that "when proposing or adopting rules and rule amendments the Commission may cite with approval letters issued by
128
129
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Former Commissioner Fleischman once colorfully characterized
the SEC's vacillation between a theoretical "addressee-only" position
and its practical "general applicability" position as a "kind of institutional schizophrenia."13 6 In addition to some of the examples mentioned, he also pointed out that:
In rulemaking proceedings, in prosecutorial briefs, in its Annual Reports to Congress, in its amicus program, in settlement orders, and
in its adjudicated opinions, the Commission has cited to no-action
letters[;] ...in each case implicitly accepting those letters as statements of the relevant Division's view of a generally applicable position and in no case limiting the cited letters to their addressees (in
fact, only occasionally
even reciting the underlying facts for explan37
ative purposes).'
In that same public statement, former Commissioner Fleischman
strongly encouraged the SEC to "utter a new mantra, bespeaking a
proper perception."' 3 8 Thus far, however, the SEC has not explicitly
adopted this mantra.
c.

Regulatory Advantages Attached to the No-Action Letter Format

Although the SEC initially resisted the public's call for access to
no-action letters and may have intended to maintain a strict "addressee-only" position, the agency soon recognized the regulatory advantages of announcing generally applicable regulatory
interpretations in no-action letters. For instance, unlike SEC rules,
which the SEC may issue only following a notice and comment period, 3 9 the SEC can immediately issue no-action letters, without justifying its policies before a well-informed and often skeptical public.' 40
Moreover, as Professor Langevoort has observed, policymaking
the staff in the area"). The SEC has also argued in litigation that a no-action letter issued
to a similarly situated third party evidenced that the defendant had prior notice, for purposes of constitutional due process, of the SEC's interpretation of a particular regulatory
provision. See General Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 39 F.3d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994).
Although the court did not rule on this issue, the SEC's suggestion that publication of an
interpretive view in a no-action letter constitutes constitutionally adequate notice to an
unrelated third party is diametrically opposed to any contention that an "addressee-only"
limitation applies to no-action letters.
136
Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman, supra note 123, at 81,392-93.
137
Id. at 81,393 (footnotes omitted).
138

Id. at 81,394.

See supranote 32 (discussing the APA's notice and comment requirements for legislative rules).
140
For example, ProfessorJ. Robert Brown, Jr. maintains that many of the substantive
standards and obligations imposed by the SEC on U.S. investment adviser advertising stem
not from SEC rules but from informal no-action letters. Brown, supra note 11, at 279-89.
He contends that if SEC rules had embodied these ostensible requirements, they "would
have required notice and comment at both adoption and amendment. By relying on noaction letters, however, the staff could simply abandon earlier positions through updated
pronouncements with little fanfare or procedural safeguards for the public." Id. at 279.
139
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through these informal mediums "limits the opportunity for post hoc
criticism based on the perception that, as a result of the particular line
that it drew, the agency failed to prevent, if not encouraged, some
141
activity that turned out to be socially harmful."
The availability of the no-action letter process also provides the
SEC with an escape hatch from the fuzzy standards often set out in
SEC releases or announced through litigated proceedings. This, in

turn, alleviates some of the pressure placed on the SEC by market
participants calling for additional safe harbor rules. 142 In other
words, the SEC can use no-action letters to focus on and delineate
specific-and sometimes minute and mundane-criteria for complying with the law. 143 Although commentators disagree as to whether
this aspect of the process constitutes a positive attribute,'4 this approach clearly preserves maximum flexibility in the shaping of future
policy. 145 Such flexibility, in turn, encourages innovative ideas during
the period before the staff and Commission have fully crystallized

See Langevoort, supra note 122, at 531.
See supra notes 43-44. The SEC acknowledged as much in its often cited 1971 Release on gun-jumping. See Guidelines for Registration Release, supra note 44, at 80,579.
The Release explicitly noted that "[i]t ha[d] been suggested that the Commission promulgate an all inclusive list of permissible and prohibited activities in this area." Id. at 80,580.
Yet the Release focused instead on broader guidelines for issuers, reasoning that brightline rules were "not feasible for the reason that determinations [of legality] are based upon
the particular facts of each case." Id. The Release "then recogniz[ed] that questions may
arise from time to time" regarding "whether an item of information or publicity could be
deemed to constitute an offer.., in violation of Section 5." Id. It emphasized, however,
that "the staff will be available for consultation concerning such questions." Id. Thus, in
the area of gunjumping, the SEC seems to have used the promise of no-action letters to
quell issuers' demands for additional safe harbor rules.
143 To be sure, in many areas of securities regulation the development of such criteria
through the no-action letter process has occurred at a glacial pace. See HAFr, supra note
11, § 7.02 (noting that Rule 144 has been interpreted by the staff "in great detail over the
course of more than twenty years in over 5,000 no-action letters"); id. § 1.02 (discussing the
definition of "investment contract" in Securities Act section 2(1) and emphasizing the
hyper-technical nature of many of the inquiries posed by counsel in no-action letter
requests).
144 Compare id, §7.02 (contending that the lack of litigation is "perhaps the best measure of the tremendous success" of SEC Rule 144 and attributing this in part to the Rule's
interpretation in great detail by the SEC staff) with Campbell, supra note 11, at 1340 (critically observing that "the rules governing resales are unnecessarily complex and contradictory," and that "many of the resale 'rules' have been generated through no-action letters, a
procedure that is ill-suited for the development of important Commission policy and thus
directly related to the substantive deficiencies").
See Langevoort, supra note 122, at 531. For example, Professor Therese Maynard
145
maintains that, in the late 1980s, the SEC relied primarily on the no-action letter process to
define the regulatory treatment of the proprietary trading systems (PTSs) that were beginning to emerge as a competitive, low-cost alternative to traditional exchanges. Maynard,
supra note 11, at 876-82. She contends that this no-action letter approach "afford[ed] the
SEC administrative flexibility." Id. at 877.
141

142
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their interpretive views. 146 Policymaking through the no-action letter
process also permits the SEC to modify or retract previously issued
letters in response to feedback from the regulated community. 14 7 Finally, because direct judicial review of SEC no-action letters is, as a
practical matter, generally foreclosed, policymaking through the issuance of no-action letters effectively shields these regulatory interpretations from judicial oversight. 148
Thus, a number of practical reasons explains the SEC's decision
to make announcements in an informal and unofficial format. And
provided regulatory interpretations in no-action letters command the
same public respect as formal and official pronouncements, the SEC
has little to lose.
2.

Public Reaction to Regulatory InterpretationsAnnounced in NoAction Letters

Although securities law practitioners and their clients are well
aware of the SEC's position that no-action letters constitute only informal and unofficial authority, many nonetheless treat the regulatory
interpretations in no-action letters on par with SEC rules, orders, and
releases. That is, securities law practitioners and their clients gener146
Professor Maynard further contends that while the SEC's decisions to issue
favorable no-action letters to PTSs seemed to assume that these systems were not exchanges, it could also have been "that the SEC had not resolved this central question and
deliberately decided to be vague, pending future analysis." Id. In subsequent commentary,
Professor Maynard provided the following insight into the SEC's motivations for initially
adopting a favorable no-action approach to transactions involving PTSs: The SEC used the
no-action letter process to set PTSs policy primarily because "the SEC was fearful: fearful of
committing a regulatory misstep that would drive further development of PTSs offshore to
a more hospitable climate; fearful as well of taking any definitive regulatory action that
would undermine the effective functioning of the established markets for secondary trading in the U.S." Therese H. Maynard, Another Perspective on the SEC's Market 2000 Study,
INSIrGHTS, July 1993, at 2, 30.
147 Although no-action letters are generally issued without opportunity for public comment, the SEC staff often considers feedback from the regulated community in determining whether to modify or retract previously stated no-action letter positions. See Stanley
Keller, Current Issues in PrivatePlacements: Private/PublicOfferings, in PRVrATE PLACEMENTS
1996, at 9, 11 (1996) (noting that "[a] dialog between the staff and the private bar has
resolved some of the issues [relating to private placements] and clarified others, while
some issues remain outstanding"); Diane E. Ambler, ParticipantDirectedDefined Contribution
Plans and Reliance on the PrivateInvestment Company Exception, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1996, at 12, 13
(noting that in response to sharp industry criticism of the staff's PanAgorano-action letter
that restrictively interpreted section 3(c) (1) of the Investment Company Act "the SEC staff
delayed the effective date of the PanAgora letter ... and requested industry submissions to
clarify the circumstances in which PanAgora would apply").
148
See Barbara Franklin, SEC's Informal Advice, N.Y. L.J., July 22, 1993, at 5 (quoting
Former SEC General Counsel Ralph Ferrara that "the Commission, like all administrative
agencies, likes to create nonreviewable actions"); see also 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supranote 28,
§ 6.2 (contending that agencies may announce rules in informal formats to avoid "the kind
of 'searching and careful' judicial review courts typically apply to legislative rules").
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ally regard the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters as a
source of law. 149 Several factors contribute to this practice.
First, the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters are often
the only available guidance regarding the meaning of particularly
complicated provisions of securities statutes or the SEC rules promulgated thereunder. 5 0 Thus, as Professor Robert Haft contends, certain areas of the federal securities laws "have become almost
exclusively topics for staff interpretation . . . in the sense that there

are few court cases and few authoritative interpretations by the Commission itself. '151 This dearth of authority gives rise to the following
paradox: the public generally regards no-action letters as a source of
law in part because the SEC frequently eschews official rulemaking in
favor of announcing important regulatory interpretations through the
vehicle of no-action letters. But if no-action letters did not command
such significant public respect, the SEC undoubtedly would hesitate
to announce important regulatory interpretations in that format, and
it would instead promulgate a greater number of SEC rules or
releases.
In addition to their frequent status as the only available guidance,
the public often treats regulatory interpretations in no-action letters
as authoritative because, while the full Commission is not legally
bound to adhere to these letters, the SEC's actions demonstrate that it
is bound honorably. That is, on the occasions-however seldomwhen the Commission's views diverge from those of its staff, the Commission generally communicates such disagreements to the public by
announcing that the public may no longer rely on the previously expressed staff views. 15 2 Therefore, many securities law practitioners are
See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
150 See Lemke, supra note 10, at 1019 (emphasizing that "on a significant number of
the more complex aspects of the federal securities laws, no-action letters are the sole body
of precedent").
151
HAFr, supra note 11, at vii. Professor Haft offers two explanations for why certain
areas have become the "special 'turf' of the staff." First, "because the Commission has
delegated these subjects, usually involving expertise and 'hands-on' experience, to the staff
persons involved," and second, "because private parties have been reluctant to litigate
these issues in light of the unusually high liability contexts in which they arise and the need
for relatively quick decisions." Id. Professor Haft also identifies a number of areas as the
staff's turf. See, e.g., id. § 3.03 (noting that Regulation D "has become a special preserve for
SEC staff interpretation."); id. § 7.02 (explaining that SEC Rule 144 "has been clarified
almost exclusively by the staff of the SEC"); id. § 11.01 (noting that the grounds for the
exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 are quite ambiguous, and that "it is
the staff, through its many letters each year, that has given the Rule its substantive scope
and meaning").
152
See 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 69, at § 1.13 n.5 (noting that the Commission's
concern over staff advice in a particular no-action letter prompted it to publish a subsequent letter more than a year later, which advised the public-notably not just the company recipient-that the staff had been instructed not to issue further no-action letters
with respect to that type of transaction, and that reliance should not be placed on the prior
149
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not deterred by the Commission's statement that it "reserves the right
to act contrary to the staff,"153 because they view this statement as an
option that the SEC will never exercise.
Moreover, although the SEC's theoretical addressee-only position
may still caution some attorneys against relying on third party no-action letters to their client's advantage, 5 4 many consider even third
party no-action letters as reliable authority. 15 5 Practitioners often consider as particularly reliable those no-action letters that the staff has
identified as "significant,"' 5 6 or that staff officials or Commissioners
have referenced in speeches, articles, or SEC releases. 157 The staff's
frequent willingness to grant blanket "permission" for similarly situ-

no-action letter by the Company or others contemplating similar offerings); 10 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supranote 10, at 4543; Rowe, Paper Tigers, supra note 16, at 21 n.6 (noting that
the Commission or the staff often acts to modify or withdraw previous regulatory interpretations in no-action letters).
153 Small Entities Release, supra note 50, at 15,606.
154 Some commentators maintain that the SEC's 1991 administrative proceeding
against Morgan Stanley, see supra note 123, manifested an intention on the part of the full
Commission to adhere to a strict addressee-only position. See, e.g., Pitt & Johnson, NoAction, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasizing in light of the Morgan Stanley proceeding that "no
matter how certain the SEC's position appears to be, do not look to SEC Staff articulations
as an indication of how the Commission itself will respond to your conduct, unless the
Staff's articulation is addressed to you"). These commentators argue that Morgan Stanley
asserted reliance on favorable third party no-action letters as a defense against the institution of an SEC enforcement action, and that the SEC rejected this defense with an "addressee-only" claim. See id.; see also HAZEN, supra note 4, § 1.4, at 19 (maintaining that the
Morgan Stanley proceeding reinforced the limited precedential effect of third party noaction letters); Rowe, Paper Tigers, supra note 16, at 23 n.1 (noting that concerns about an
addressee-only position may have prompted Commissioner Fleischman to issue his separate statement, cited supra note 123). Because the Morgan Stanley proceeding was settled
rather than litigated, the Commission never publicly revealed its position on this issue, but
at least one SEC Division Director was quick to point out that the incident was "being made
into something it just isn't" and that it was "getting blown out of proportion." Kevin G.
Sawen, SEC ChargesAgainst Morgan Stanley Create Dispute over Agency's Policies, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 8, 1991, at B7G (quoting statements by Richard Ketchum, Director of the Market
Regulation Division).
155 - See Rowe, PaperTigers, supranote 16, at 22 ("In appropriate circumstances, similarly
situated third-parties ought to be able to rely on no-action letters addressed to others
156 Although the SEC has never stated overtly that letters labeled as "significant" carry
increased weight or authority, many practitioners have drawn precisely that inference from
the SEC's efforts to highlight certain letters. See id. at 25 n.25 ("[T]he fact that 'significant'
letters are given some added prominence should increase the degree of their reliability...
They also are more likely to be given 'precedential' weight by the staff, if cited in support
of a request for a 'no action' letter.").
157 See id at 23, 25 n.25; see also Small Entities Release, supra note 50, at 15,606 (noting
that "the Commission may cite with approval [no-action] letters issued by the staff, and
that, "[i]n each of these cases, the Commission effectively adopts the staff positions as its
own"); infra note 420 (discussing an SEC release that cited no-action letters with approval
in the course of announcing interpretive views regarding electronic delivery of
documents).

956

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:921

ated market participants to rely on a third party letter, 158 and to issue
no-action letters to professional associations or industry groups requesting no-action advice on behalf of their membership, has somewhat mooted concerns about the reappearance of the addressee-only
position. 159
Finally, when no-action letters identify certain conduct as impermissible or outline ostensible regulatory requirements, securities law
practitioners generally advise their clients to treat these unbinding interpretations as the law.16 0 They provide this advice because these letters reflect the standards and obligations that the staff will apply in the
course of regulatory reviews and compliance examinations. 16 1 Furthermore, the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters will likely
constitute the interpretations that the full Commission will use not
only to determine whether to institute enforcement actions, but also
to adjudicate actions in the course of litigated proceedings. 62 Thus,
the time, money, and negative publicity associated with defending
against an SEC enforcement action, possibly through an appeal to a

158

Small Entities Release, supra note 50, at 15,606 n.20 (noting that, in certain in-

stances, the staff of the Divisions of Corporation Finance and Market Regulation may approve reliance by third parties, and that the "Division of Investment Management generally
permits third parties to rely on no-action or interpretive letters to the extent that the third
party's facts and circumstances are substantially similar to those described in the underlying request").
159 The SEC frequently issues "generic" no-action letters to professional associations
and industry groups such as the American Bar Association ("ABA"), the Securities Industry
Association ("SIW"), and the Investment Company Institute ("ICI"), with the understanding that both the enforcement positions and any explicit regulatory interpretations in its
responses will be relied upon by the entire membership of the group. See Rowe, Paper
Tigers, supra note 16, at 21. My own research reveals that during the fifteen year period
between 1971-1996, the SEC issued at least fifteen no-action letters to the ABA, thirty-five
no-action letters to the SIA, and seventy-five no-action letters to the ICI. Search of LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Noact File, (July 8, 1996).
160 See Lowenfels, Conflicts, supranote 12, at 319-21; Lowenfels, Problems, supra note 12,
at 1257; see also Edward H. Fleischman .... Appropriate in the Public Interest, Address to the
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of Business Law of the ABA,
Aug. 12, 1991 ("[Llet me put it to you short and clear: you can-nay, you must-take into
consideration in advising your clients any staff no-action or interpretive position (written
or oral) that rejects a proffered argument or position reasonably close to your own, and
you can reason from it to your disadvantage(that is, respond to its implications)."), quoted
in Rowe, Highlights, supra note 17, at 86.
161
See Brown, supra note 11, at 287 (contending that "[n]o-action letters have represented the vehicle of choice for articulating broad interpretations [of the Investment Adviser's Act], while periodic inspections of investment advisors and their advertisementsrepresent the
primary mechanismfor ensuringcompliance") (emphasis added).
162
As one commentator recently noted, "the burden of overcoming an adverse 'no
action' letter issued to another person in substantially similar circumstances is great, and in
an SEC administrative proceeding nearly insurmountable." Rowe, Reliance supra note 16,
at 677.

1998]

SEC NO-ACTION LETTERS

federal appellate court, often dictate that compliance with staff inter163
pretations will be the least costly alternative.
3.

Consequences Resultingfrom Policymaking Through the No-Action
Letter Process

The SEC can often command the same respect from the regulated community regardless of whether it proceeds officially, through
the issuance of SEC rules, orders, or releases, or unofficially, through
the no-action letter process. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
SEC often chooses the flexible and expedient no-action letter process
to convey to the public generally applicable regulatory interpretations, particularly those that embody controversial or otherwise difficult policy choices. On such occasions, the SEC's no-action letter
process enables the SEC to have it both ways: the SEC can enjoy the
enforcement benefits of promulgated rules and standards, but can
also easily depart from those norms without promulgating new SEC
rules or even formally explaining in an SEC release its change in position.'6 Yet a host of problems emerges when the SEC uses the noaction letter process as a policymaking tool.
First, announcing regulatory interpretations in no-action letters,
rather than in SEC rules or releases, produces a dearth of authoritative pronouncements on which the public and, by extension, courts,
can rely for guidance. Market participants are particularly disadvantaged by the SEC's reluctance to issue safe harbor rules that set out
criteria specifying when compliance with statutory provisions will be
presumed. 16 5 Safe harbor rules are tremendously popular with market participants because the federal securities statutes insulate from
liability any person who in good faith conforms with an SEC rule, even
163 For comprehensive studies demonstrating that the SEC is by no means alone
among government agencies in using informal formats to bind the public practically, even
when these formats cannot bind the public legally, see Anthony, supra note 43; Robert A.
Anthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements, Guidances,Manuals, and the Like-Should Federal
Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?41 DuxE L.J. 1311 (1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements]; Robert A. Anthony, "We4 You Want the Permit, Don't You?"
Agency Efforts to Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public 44 ADMIN. L. Rxv. 31 (1992)
[hereinafter Anthony, You Want the Permit?].
164 SeeAnthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements, supra note 163, at 1319 (emphasizing
that "[i]t is easier for [an] agency to deviate from or change positions taken in policy
statements, memoranda and the like than it is to deviate from or change those adopted
through legislative processes"); Separate Statement of Commissioner Fleischman, supra
note 123, at 81,394 (acknowledging the Commission's appreciation of the administrative
ease that the no-action process begins). But see supra note 143 and accompanying text
(recognizing that most no-action letters involve mundane and technical issues and therefore affect regulatory change "at a glacial pace").
165
See Langevoort, supra note 122, at 530-31 (criticizing the SEC for "its disinclination
to adopt or endorse bright-line rules, notwithstanding the obvious value of such an approach in promoting planning and reducing the incidence of litigation").
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if a court subsequently determines that the rule is invalid. 166 But as
the Second Circuit recently made clear, good faith reliance on a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter does not fall within the
167
meaning of these statutory provisions.
Second, the use of no-action letters to announce generally applicable regulatory interpretations is often a highly inefficient method of
policymaking. As Professor Thomas Hazen has pointed out, the process is "time-consuming and cumbersome." 168 Moreover, the ad hoc
development of rules in the context of particular transactions often
generates a barrage of follow-up requests from similarly situated third
parties seeking clarification of the position's or interpretation's general applicability, or requesting a modification in the context of
slightly different facts. 169 Clients and the SEC could certainly put
their resources to better use.
Third, announcing new and important regulatory interpretations
through no-action letters fails to capitalize on the benefits of public
participation. 170 Notifying the public about proposed regulatory
166 See, e.g., Securities Act § 19(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994) (providing that no Securities Act provision "imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good
faith in conformity with any rule, or regulation of the [SEC]" even if the rule or regulation
is subsequently determined by a court to be invalid); Exchange Act § 23(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78w(a) (1) (1994) (specifying that no Exchange Act provision imposing any liability shall
apply "to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or
order of the [SEC]," even if such rule, regulation, or order is subsequently determined by a

court to be invalid).
167 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 54
F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) (an SEC no-action letter does not constitute a "rule, regulation,
or order of the SEC" within the meaning of Exchange Act section 23(a)); see also 10 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 10, at 4545 (maintaining that "the immunity provisions do not apply
to mere interpretations"). But see Rowe, Reliance, supra note 16, at 749-60 (arguing that, in
many cases, courts may be willing to consider reliance on SEC no-action letters for purposes of the good faith immunity provision set out in Exchange Act section 23(a) and
Securities Act section 19(a)).
168
HAZEN, supranote 4, § 1.4, at 19; see also Loss, supra note 125, at 164-65 (bemoaning
the fact that securities lawyers are "drown[ing] in" no-action letter precedent and emphasizing that "ninety percent of these letters are sheer, unadulterated, repetitious garbage").
169 See supranotes 95-96 and accompanying text.
170 The benefits and costs of public participation in agency rulemaking have been examined at length by a number of administrative law scholars. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note
43; Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, supra note 163; Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE LJ. 381; Michael Asimow, On Pressing
McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory Costs, 57 LAW & Co'mas. PROBS., Winter
1994, at 127 [hereinafter Asimow, Regulatory Costs]; Michael Asimow, Public Participationin
the Adoption ofInterpretiveRules and Policy Statements, 75 MCH. L. REv. 520 (1977) [hereinafter Asimow, Public Participation];Arthur Earl Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public
Participationin the Making ofInterpretive Rules and GeneralStatements ofPolicy Under the A.P.A.,
23 ADMIN. L. REv. 101 (1971). Securities law scholars have recognized the benefits of public participation in SEC rulemaking and have criticized the agency for pursuing strategies
that develop law without such participation. See e.g., KARMEL, supra note 34, at 96 (criticizing the SEC for pursuing many of its policy goals through the initiation of enforcement
actions rather than through the formal rulemaking process).
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changes, and soliciting public comments before regulatory interpretations become "'chiseled into bureaucratic stone,""z7 ' furthers democratic values by including all SEC constituencies in the policy
formation process.' 72 In contrast, policymaking through the no-action letter process often involves a private negotiation between the
SEC staff and the requestor (frequently a professional association or
industry group lobbying on its membership's behalf). This private arrangement substantially increases the likelihood of agency capture' 73
and special interest decisionmaking 74 Indeed, requesting that an
SEC division announce a favorable regulatory interpretation in a noaction letter is far easier than convincing the full Commission to promulgate that view in an official SEC release or rule for all to see-not
75
to mention to challenge in court.
171 Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 610 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
172
SeeAsimow, Regulatory Costs, supra note 170, at 129 (emphasizing that "rulemaking
procedures are refreshingly democratic: people who care about legislative outcomes produced by agencies have a structured opportunity to provide input into the decisionmaking
process").
173
Agency capture occurs when certain constituencies subject to regulation successfully influence governmental processes to obtain favorable outcomes for group members.
SeeJonathan R. Macey, AdministrativeAgency Obsolescence and Interest GroupFormation:A Case
Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 909, 922 (1994). According to Professor Macey, "[t]he predictable phenomenon of agency 'capture' by special interest groups has led
to [SEC] subsidies to favored constituencies, particularly securities analysts, institutional
investors, market professionals (traders and market makers), and retail brokerage firms."
Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Macey observes that many of these subsidies take the
form of particular SEC rules or regulations, citing, for example, a subsidy of over $1 billion
dollars when the SEC issued a regulation requiring securities issuers to supply data in particular formats that the securities analysts and institutional investors would have had to pay
to obtain. Id. n.31. Professor Macey's concerns about capture would only be heightened
in the case of no-action letters which, unlike rules and regulations, are generally issued
without any prior notice or opportunity for public comment. For the viewpoint that Professor Macey exaggerates the agency capture problem at the SEC, see David L. Ratner, The
SEC at Sixty: A Reply to ProfessorMacey, 16 CAmwozo L. Rxv. 1765, 1776 (1995) (arguing that
"[u] nlike the regulators of banks, thrift institutions, and insurance companies, which have
acted principally as protectors and advocates for their constituents, the SEC has frequently
been at loggerheads with some of the most powerful organizations in the securities industry, particularly the New York Stock Exchange").
174 See Asimow, Public Participation,supra note 170, at 574 (contending that public input in rulemaking works to offset "institutional biases that may exist in favor of or against
the regulated group").
175 See Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, supranote 163, at 1319 (observing
that "nonlegislative documents often are less clear and definite than legislative rules, and
may enable the agency to operate at a lower level of visibility"). Moreover, regulatory
changes announced by an agency in legislative rules would be subject to judicial review
under the so-called "hard-look" doctrine. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (holding that a reasoned explanation must accompany an agency's changes in policy and that a court may invalidate a legislative rule if it is
not assured adequately of its reasonableness). It is unclear, however, whether courts would
apply the "reasoned explanation" requirement in State Farm to interpretive changes announced in formats other than legislative rules such as SEC releases. See Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, supra note 163, at 1319 n. 30.
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Moreover, the lack of public participation in the no-action letter
process may result in regulatory interpretations that suffer in quality.
Public participation in the rulemaking process enhances the SEC's
policies by ensuring that "the agency will have before it the facts and
information relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well as
suggestions for alternative solutions.' 176 By excluding the regulated
and protected public from the process, the SEC deprives itself of pertinent information and insight from those most interested in and informed on the subject matter. 177 In addition, ad hoc development of
regulatory interpretations through no-action letters relieves the SEC
of the need to justify its policies to both the regulated and protected
public.' 7 8 This may lead to regulatory interpretations that are inconsistent with each other or with the broader statutory framework. 179
Finally, using no-action letters as a policymaking tool frequently
contravenes the spirit, and arguably the letter, of the APA's notice and
comment provisions.'8 0 This concern somewhat dissipates when the
SEC limits its regulatory interpretations announced in no-action letters to interpretations that one could reasonably and fairly imply from
existing statutes or SEC rules. These no-action letter interpretations
fall squarely within the APA's provision exempting "interpretive rules"
from notice and comment requirements.' 8 ' The SEC's choice to announce these regulatory interpretations in no-action letters necessarily means that the staff will formulate them without the
aforementioned benefits of public participation. 18 2 But when the SEC
staff is truly interpretinga previously enacted statute or legislative rule,

176 American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted).
177 See Asimow, Public Participation,supra note 170, at 574 (contending that "It]he primary reason that public participation leads to better rules is that it provides a channel
through which the agency can receive needed education").
178 See, e.g., New Jersey v. Department of HHS, 670 F.2d 1262, 1281 (3d Cir. 1981)
(discussing values served by imposing on agencies the obligation to hold their policies out
for public scrutiny).
179 See Campbell, supra note 11, at 1350 (contending that the resale rules developed
through no-action letters "are confusing, ephemeral, poorly promulgated, and flout both
the language of the 1933 Act and proper administrative procedure"); Maynard, supra note
11, at 838 n.23 (contending that the SEC's "development of the definition of an exchange,
through the ad hoc approach of the no[-]action letter process, is not supported by the
language of the statute"); see also Lowenfels, Conflicts, supra note 12, at 304 (contending
that "[n]o-action letters have often represented positions inconsistent with established substantive law" which result in "not only confusion but occasionally a de facto overruling of
formal legislative, judicial, or administrative policies").
180 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) & (c) (1994); see also supra note 32 (discussing the APA).
181 See supra notes 32, 41-43 and accompanying text.
182
See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.

19981

SEC NO-ACTION LETTERS

its ability to essentially bind the public in an unforeseen way is significandy curtailed by the specific terms of the provision.' 8 3
Unfortunately, many of the so-called regulatory interpretations in
no-action letters go far beyond reasonable and fair explanations of
existing statutes or SEC rules. Rather than employing the no-action
letter process as a vehicle to announce regulatory interpretations, the
SEC has, on occasion, used the no-action letter process to graft new,
substantive standards and obligations onto existing statutes or SEC
rules.'8 4 For example, the SEC will often impose on investment advisers, broker-dealers, and other market participants substantive obligations that do not originate out of any specific language in a statute or
SEC rule. 185 The SEC then applies these grafted norms in the course
of its regulatory reviews, compliance examinations, and enforcement
decisions as if they were regulatory requirements.' 8 6 For the practical
183 SeeAnthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements, supranote 163, at 1313-14. Professor
Anthony argued forcefully that:
An agency may nonlegislatively announce or act upon an interpretation
that it intends to enforce in a binding way, so long as it stays within the fair
intendment of the statute and does not add substantive content of its own.
Because Congress has already acted legislatively, the agency need not exercise its own delegated legislative authority. Its attempts to enforce an interpretation can be viewed as simply implementing existing positive law
previously laid down by Congress.... The same is true where the agency
interprets its own previously promulgated legislative rules.
Id. (citations omitted).
184 See Brown, supra note 11, at 287; Campbell, supra note 11, at 1349-50; Lowenfels,
Conflicts, supra note 12; see also HAFr, supra note 11, § 11.01 (noting that the grounds for
the exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(c) are quite ambiguous and that
the Rule's substantive scope and meaning have been shaped largely by the staff through
the issuance of no-action letters). On some occasions, substantive standards and obligations embodied in no-action letters are eventually codified into SEC rules and regulations
through the formal rulemaking process. The criteria for "foreign offering exemptions"
contained in Regulation S under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1997), constitute well known examples. See Samuel Wolff, Offshore DistributionsUnder the Securities Act
of 1933: An Analysis of Regulation S, 23 LAw & POL'Y INTr'L Bus. 101, 114-23 (1992) (noting
that before commencing the formal rulemaking process for Regulation S, the SEC staff
began effecting a new territorial philosophy through no-action letters and describing certain no-action letters that the SEC staff wrote prior to Regulation S that outline significant
positions subsequently taken in Regulation S).
185 See Brown, supra note 11, at 276 (contending that "[t]he staff has used [Investment
Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-i's] prohibition on false and misleading statements to implement
a number of substantive requirements not supported by the language of the rule"). Professor Rutheford Campbell launches similar criticism in the area of securities resales under
the Securities Act. He maintains:
Procedurally, many of the resale "rules" have been generated through noaction letters.., often with little regard for statutory language, theoretical
consistency, or sound process. As a result, de facto regulations have been
generated without any meaningful opportunity for public comment. In
short, the Commission has dramatically reduced its own accountability by
pursuing its rulemaking through no-action letters.
Campbell, supra note 11, at 1340.
186 See Brown, supra note 11, at 287; Campbell, supra note 11, at 1340; see also Lowenfels, Problems, supra note 12, at 1266 (maintaining that the SEC staff often uses the no-

962

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:921

reasons discussed above, 187 many market participants grudgingly accept the fact that they are bound, in effect, by the substantive standards and obligations the SEC has announced in the guise of
regulatory interpretations in no-action letters.
Similarly, the SEC has used the no-action letter process to rescind, as a practical matter, provisions in existing statutes and SEC
rules that were originally intended to operate for the benefit of the
investing public. For example, as one securities law scholar has observed, in several no-action letters issued in 1994 and 1995, the staff
"quietly ... re-interpreted" the free-writing prohibition in section 5 (b)
of the Securities Act' 8 8 to permit the use of written term sheets prior
to the delivery of a final prospectus in certain specialized offers.'8 9
Although this small revision did not "dismantle" the Securities Act, it
did represent a "paradigm shift" toward a regulatory model more concerned with capital formation, and less concerned with "protection of
the individual investor and fidelity to the statutory language of the federal
securities laws." 9 0
The SEC's ability to use the no-action letter process to articulate
new substantive standards and obligations or to change existing ones
is extremely troubling because it allows the SEC to accomplish indirectly what the APA forbids it to accomplish directly. That is, the SEC
is able to announce in no-action letters what are, in effect, new regulatory requirements or obligations without providing prior notice or the
opportunity for public comments. 19 1 Yet, under current law, it seems
action process "in effect to enact into law their own personal interpretations of certain
provisions of the securities acts and rules").
187
See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
188 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994).
189 SeeJohn C. Coffee Jr., Is the Securities Act of 1933 Obsolete?, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 4, 1995,
at B4 (citing two no-action letters: Distribution of Certain Written Materials Relating the
Asset Backed Securities, 1995 SEC No-Action Letter, Lexis 369 (Mar. 9, 1995) and Mortgage and Asset Backed Securities, 1994 SEC No-Action Letter, Lexis 525 (May 20, 1994)).
190 Id. at B4, B6 (emphasis added). Professor Maynard has also criticized the SEC's use
of no-action letters to rescind, as a practical matter, certain statutory protections. Maynard,
supra note 11, at 837. In the context of her observation that the SEC initially used noaction letters to establish regulatory policy regarding proprietary trading systems, she maintained that:
[C]ontinued reliance on administrative development of the definition of
an exchange, through the ad hoc approach of the no-action letter process,
is not supported by the language of the statute nor in the best interests of
the investing public from a policy perspective. Rather, the SEC should be
required to apply and enforce the statutoiy definition of the term "exchange" as written by Congress-unless and until Congress takes action to modify this definition.
Id. at 838 n.23 (emphasis added); see also infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text (discussing the so-called CrackerBarrel controversy).
191 See Brown, supra note 11, at 277; Campbell, supranote 11, at 1340; Lowenfels, Conflicts, supra note 12, at 320; Lowenfels, Problems, supra note 12, at 1266.
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that the public can do little to directly challenge these "spurious rules"
192
as a violation of the APA.
In New York City Employees' Retirement Systems v. SEC,193 shareholders in Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. ("Cracker Barrel")
sought a declaratory judgment, stating that the SEC had violated the
APA by effectively amending the "ordinary business operations" exception in Rule 14a-8's shareholder proposal rule to include proposals
raising important social or political issues regarding a company's employment matters. 19 4 The shareholders maintained that the SEC vio192 Professor Anthony developed the term "spurious rules" to describe those agency
rules that go beyond mere interpretation of existing statutes or rules, and that have practically binding effects, but nonetheless were promulgated without adhering to APA notice
and comment procedures. Anthony, supra note 43, at 9-10, 14. According to Anthony,
spurious rules
fit within the APA's definition of "rules" but are not legislative rules, because they were not promulgated by use of the APA's legislative rulemaking
procedures. They are not exempt interpretive rules, because they do not
interpret And, although they are a subset of policy statements, they are not
exempt policy statements, because they should have been made legislatively.
Such rules have no legal force, but because they are treated as binding by
the agency, they are spuriously given the appearance of legal force.
Id at 10. Under this taxonomy, many purported regulatory interpretations in no-action
letters would fall within Professor Anthony's category of spurious rules. For example, one
can approximately describe the investment adviser "rules" that Professor Brown noted,
supranote 11, at 263-89, and the resale "rules" that Professor Campbell noted, supranote
11, at 1340, 1350, as spurious rules.
193 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
194 Id. at 9-10. The NYCERS shareholders requested that Cracker Barrel include in its
1992 proxy material a proposal that the company implement an employment policy
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. M NYCERS submitted this
proposal in response to a specific announcement by Cracker Barrel that it would no longer
employ individuals in its operating units "whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate
normal heterosexual values which have been the foundation of families in our society." Id.
at9.
As Rule 14a-8 required, Cracker Barrel notified the SEC of its intention to omit the
NYCERS proposal. In so doing, counsel for Cracker Barrel opined that the proposal was
properly excludable under Rule 14a-8(c) (7), which provides an exclusion for proposals
that implicate "ordinary business operations." Id. Cracker Barrel's counsel also sought a
no-action letter from the SEC. Id. at 9-10.
The SEC staff's interpretation of the "ordinary business operations" exclusion in its
favorable no-action letter to Cracker Barrel marked a dramatic departure from the manner
in which it had previously interpreted this exclusion. In 1976, after a period of notice and
comment, the SEC modified Rule 14a-8(c) (7) to provide a "significant political or social
issue exception" to the rule's "ordinary business" exclusion. Adoption of Amendments
Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,812, at 87,123, 87,130-31 (Nov. 22, 1976)
[hereinafter Proposals by Security Holders Release]. This 1976 modification to Rule 14a-8
restricted the exclusion to cover only those proposals that "involve business matters that
are mundane in nature" and do not involve matters that have "significant policy, economic
or other implications inherent in them." Id. at 87,131. The SEC administered this aspect
of the proxy rule's "ordinary business operations" exclusion throughout the next seventeen years, and the staff issued numerous no-action letters expressing the view that a shareholder's proposal could not be excluded under Rule 14a-8(c)(7) because it raised a
significant policy issue. See HAFr, supra note 11, § 11.04[7] (discussing examples ofnonex-
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lated the APA when it used a no-action letter to announce this
substantive change to Rule 14a-8 without first subjecting the proposed
change to the APA's required notice and comment procedures.
Although the shareholder-plaintiffs prevailed at the district court
level, 195 the Second Circuit subsequently reversed the decision. 19 6 According to the court, because no-action letters are not legally binding,
the CrackerBarrel no-action letter necessarily fell within the APA's exemption for "interpretive rules."'19 7 The SEC therefore was not required to provide notice and comment prior to announcing its
changed policy regarding Rule 14a-8.19 8 The Second Circuit treated
as insignificant the explicit contradiction between the purported interpretation in the no-action letter and the pre-existing formal and
official interpretation of this SEC rule. 199 Indeed, rather than focuscludable policy issues including: nuclear power and safety, withdrawing business from
countries with poor human rights records and increasing business in countries working to
improve human rights, and health and environmental hazards).
What made the CrackerBarrelno-action letter so noteworthy was its complete repudiation of the "significant policy implications" exception to Rule 14a-8's "ordinary business
operations" exclusion in instances where a shareholder proposal concerned employment
matters. Indeed, after stating that "the line between includable and excludable employment-related proposals based on social policy considerations had become increasingly difficult to draw," the no-action letter, addressed to Cracker Barrel, communicated to the
public the following ostensible interpretation:
"The Division has reconsidered the application of Rule 14a-8(c) (7) to employment-related proposals in light of these concerns and the staff's experience with these proposals in recent years. As a result, the Division has
determined that the fact that a shareholder proposal concerning a company's employment policies and practices for the general workforce is tied
to a social issue will no longer be viewed as removing the proposal from the
realm of ordinary business operations of the registrant. Rather, determinations with respect to any such proposals are properly governed by the employment-based nature of the proposal."
NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 10 (quoting Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
76,418, at 77,284, 77,287
(Oct. 13, 1992)) (emphasis added). At the request of the NYCERS shareholders, the Commission exercised its discretion to review the staff's position in the no-action letter and
affirmed the position of the Division of Corporation Finance. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 10.
195 See NYCERS v. SEC, 843 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting declaratory judgment and enjoining the SEC from issuing any no-action letter inconsistent with the SEC's
initial interpretation of Rule 14a-8 without first submitting the rule for notice and comment), rev'd in para 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995).
196 NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 9.
197 Id. at 11-12.
198 See id. at 12. The Second Circuit expressly held that "insofar as the CrackerBarrel
no-action letter does not affix any legal relationships, it is an interpretive rule." Id. at 13
(emphasis added).
199 See id. (recognizing that the CrackerBarrelletter was "not a garden variety no-action
letter" because "it expressly abandoned a previous SEC rule"). The Second Circuit's holding that the CrackerBarrelletter constituted an interpretive rule is all the more extraordinary in light of its correlative holding that the "significant policy implications" rule
announced in the SEC's 1976 Release was a legislative rule because it "create[d] a basis for
an SEC enforcement action." Id. It is difficult to understand how a rule that "expressly
abandon[s]" a prior legislative rule can be properly characterized as "interpretive." In-
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ing on the substance of the CrackerBarrelno-action letter's interpretation, the Second Circuit viewed as dispositive the letter's legal status as
200
a nonbinding, informal expression of the agency's views.
The Second Circuit, however, pointed out that the shareholders
remained free to challenge the SEC's regulatory interpretation of
Rule 14a-8 indirectly. They could have, according to the court, instituted a private suit in federal district court against the company for
improperly omitting the shareholder proposal in violation of Rule
14a-8. 20 1
The CrackerBarrelno-action letter controversy therefore stands as
an important reminder that while grudging acceptance of the SEC's
de facto regulatory requirements may often be the least costly option
available to public investors and market participants, it is not the only
alternative. Some recalcitrants may look to courts-rather than to
SEC no-action letters-for definitive statements of their obligations
and rights under the federal securities laws.2 0 2 In looking to the
deed, where agencies have promulgated ostensible interpretations that contradict interpretations announced in prior legislative rules, courts have invalidated the ostensible
interpretations for failure to adhere to APA notice and comment requirements. See, e.g.,
National Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (explaining that where an agency has initially promulgated a statutory interpretation
in a legislative rule, the agency may not subsequently repudiate its announced interpretation of that rule without proceeding through the notice and comment procedures required under the APA for amendments of a rule); Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen,
832 F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen an agency gets out the Dictionary of Newspeak
and pronounces that for purposes of its regulation war is peace, it has made a substantive
change for which the APA may require procedures."); see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l
Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (noting briefly that notice and comment would be required
if any agency rule "adopted a new position inconsistent with any of the [agency's] existing
regulations" or if it "'effect[ed] a substantive change in the regulations'") (citations omitted). The district court's decision to enjoin the SEC from issuing any further no-action
letters on that issue until submitting the new rule to notice and comment therefore seems
to be more in line with prior precedents. See NYCERS, 843 F. Supp. at 880-81.
200
NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14 ("Because the CrackerBarrelno-action letter was not legislative, the APA did not require notice and comment.").
201
See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 13-14. This is exactly what other shareholder proponents
did in Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). See infra text accompanying notes 304-12 (discussingJudge Kimba Wood's
refusal to defer to the regulatory interpretation in the Cracker Barrelno-action letter).
202
Litigation, however, is by no means the only recourse when public investors or
market participants disagree with a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter-administrative and legislative arenas are also available. The Cracker Barrel no-action letter, for
instance, triggered a strong and almost immediate public outcry from institutional and
individual shareholder activists, who vowed to fight a multi-fronted battle to ensure that
the Commission reversed its CrackerBarrdposition. See CourtRules SEC Failedto Comply with
APA in Gay Rights Proxy Dispute, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1420, 1421 (Oct. 22, 1993)
(quoting NewYork City Comptroller Elizabeth Holtzman that if the SEC fails to reconsider
its view, "Congress should vote to change the law to prevent such situations as the Cracker
Barrel employee discrimination from continuing unchallenged in the future"). To that
end, after NYCERS lost in the Second Circuit, 30 institutional investors, whose combined
portfolios were worth approximately $100 billion, submitted to the Commission a formal
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courts, the protected and regulated public expects ajudiciary that will
do more than merely rubber-stamp the disputed regulatory interpretation. Indeed, these individuals and entities clearly depend on ajudiciary that will review the record and form its own conclusions regarding
the meaning of any ambiguous regulatory provisions.
II
JuDiciAL TREATMENT OF REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS IN

SEC No-ACrION

LETTERS

Like market participants and members of the investing public,
federal courts presented with ambiguous provisions in securities statutes and SEC rules often face situations where reliance on regulatory
interpretations in SEC no-action letters appears warranted. However,

regulatory interpretations in no-action letters pose particular
problems for courts. On the one hand, courts are bound by princirulemaking petition "urg[ing] that the SEC reverse its Cracker Barrel interpretation." See
Petition for Rule Change, Letter from the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility,
Calvert Group, Ltd. and the City of New York, Office of the Comptroller, to Jonathan G.

Katz, Secretary, SEC 3 (July 27, 1995) (copy on file with author). Shareholder groups also
successfully lobbied Congress, resulting in legislation requiring the SEC to study "whether
shareholder access to proxy statements... has been impaired by recent statutory,judicial,
or regulatory changes" and to evaluate "the ability of shareholders to have proposals relating to corporate practices and social issues included as part of proxy statements." National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 510(b) (1), 110 Stat.
3416, 3450 [hereinafter NSMIA].
In September 1997, in partial response to its congressional mandate, the SEC proposed a number of changes to SEC Rule 14a-8, including one that would "[r]everse the
Cracker Barrel policy, making it easier for shareholders to include in companies' proxy
materials employment-related proposals that raise significant social policy matters."
Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 39,093, 62
Fed. Reg. 50,682 (Sept. 26, 1997) [hereinafter September 1997 Release]. Although shareholder groups are clearly enthusiastic about the SEC's proposals to rescind the Cracker
Barrel policy, they have mounted substantial opposition to a number of other proposed
changes to Rule 14a-8 that the SEC included in its September 1997 Release. See Cornish F.
Hitchcock, SEC Moves to Silence Shareholders, LEG-AL TIMEs, Nov. 17, 1997, at 27, 28 (stating
that "[the proposed changes, if implemented, would mark a major step backward" in
advancing "the goals of shareholder democracy and corporate accountability"). Reacting
to this storm of protest, the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance Director recently announced that the staff will likely revise certain proposals included in the September 1997
Release, and that the Commission will likely consider these modified proposals during the
summer of 1998. See Lane PredictsPersonalGrievanceExemption in ShareholderProposalRules to
Change, 30 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 359, 359 (Mar. 6, 1998) (reporting statements by
Corporation Finance Division Director Brian Lane).
It therefore appears probable that the SEC eventually will resolve the Cracker Barrel
controversy, which has lasted more than five years, through an amendment to Rule 14a-8
specifying that employment-related proposals raising significant social policy matters will
not be excludable from proxy materials pursuant to the "ordinary business operations"
exception in Rule 14a-8(c) (7). If the SEC ultimately adopts this amendment, its ultimate
irony should be acknowledged-the SEC will have utilized the legislative rulemaking process (including APA procedures of notice and comment) to formally and officially revoke a
purportedly informal and unofficial interpretation of Rule 14a-8 that was articulated
through the vehicle of a no-action letter.
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pies the Supreme Court developed in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.203 and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co.20 4 that generally require judicial deference to an administrative

agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous regulatory provision, even if a court would have arrived at an alternative interpretation
using its own methods of statutory construction. 20 5 On the other
hand, if Chevron's and Seminole Rock's principle of "automatic deference" does not extend to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters, judicial reliance on no-action letters as authoritative statements
of securities law may result in an abdication of the judiciary's interpre20 6
tative responsibilities.
Part H briefly reviews the automatic deference principles that the
Supreme Court established in Chevron and Seminole Rock. It then discusses the various ways in which courts have relied on no-action letters
in the course of resolving securities law disputes. After identifying a
number of problems with this current jurisprudence, Part II contends
that automatic judicial deference to regulatory interpretations in noaction letters is never warranted. This Part also articulates important
normative reasons why courts should subject no-action letters to independent and meaningful scrutiny before relying on them as interpretive authority.
A. Judicially Crafted Principles of Automatic Deference
The Supreme Court's decisions in Chevron,20 7 decided in 1984,
and Seminole Rock,208 decided in 1945, set out similar mandates for
automatic deference to agency interpretations, and grounded those
mandates in similar rationales. Yet judicial application of the automatic deference principle sometimes varies. This variance is in part
due to "format requirements" which many courts impose when applying Chevron, but seldom impose when applying Seminole Rock. In other
words, some courts require administrative agencies to express their
interpretations in particular formats in order to qualify for Chevron's
20 9
automatic deference principle.
203

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

204
205
206

325 U.S. 410 (1945).
See infra notes 206-54 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.1.

207

467 U.S. 837 (1984).

208

325 U.S. 410 (1945).
See infra notes 239-40 (citing related cases). CompareAnthony, Which Interpretations

209

Bind Courts2,supra note 18, at 40-42 (contending that courts should apply Chevron's deference principle only when an agency promulgates a regulatory interpretation in a format
that was specifically authorized by Congress to have the force of law) with Weaver, Format
Requirements, supra note 18, at 610-18 (contending that the format requirements advocated
by Professor Anthony are not a precondition for Chevron deference and are ill advised as a
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The Decisions in Chevron and Seminole Rock

In the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 210 the Supreme Court considered the standards
that federal courts must apply to settle interpretive issues in connection with agency-administered statutes. In so doing, it formulated
what is generally regarded as a two-step approach. 21 1 At step one, a
reviewing court must determine whether Congress has specifically addressed the interpretive question at issue. 2 12 If the court discerns a
clear congressional intent regarding the meaning of the statute, then
"that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
213
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."
The question of deference to the agency's interpretation, therefore,
214
arises only at step two.

matter of policy). For a more extensive discussion of format requirements, see also infra
Part IIA3.
210 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
211
Then-Judge Kenneth Starr appears to have coined the "two-step" phraseology.

Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron ErM, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 287-88
(1986) (analyzing the "Supreme Court's Two-Step Framework"); Panel Discussion, Judicial
Review ofAdministrativeAction in a ConservativeEra, 39 ADMiN. L. REv. 353, 360 (1987) [hereinafter, Chevron Panel Discussion] (Judge Starr's comments) ("[T]hus was born ... the
'Chevron two-step.'").
212 In making this determination, a court is to use "traditional tools of statutory construction" to ascertain whether Congress spoke to the "precise question at issue." Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843 n.9. However, strong disagreements amongJustices as to which "traditional
tools" are appropriate, as well as differences over the way in which those tools should be
utilized, have often resulted in inconsistent application of the Chevron doctrine by the
Supreme Court. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Futureof the Chevron Doctrine,72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court'sNew Hypertextualism:An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the AdministrativeState, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 750
(1995); see alsoAntonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to AdministrativeInterpretationsof Law, 1989
DuKE LJ. 511, 521 (contending that most statutes can be declared unambiguous by analyzing the statute's text and its relationship with other laws); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United
States Supreme Cour4 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 281 (1990) (noting the controversy among
Supreme Court Justices as to whether legislative history is an appropriate tool of statutory
construction); cf. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1073, 1091-99 (1992) (discussing the wide variety of materials
that courts review and consider in ascertaining congressional intent).
213 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
214 As Professor Richard Pierce recently has noted, if Justice Scalia's strict textualist
approach to statutory construction captures acceptance by other members of the Supreme
Court, the Court will be far less likely to reach step two in its Chevron analysis because the
Court will be far less likely to find a statute ambiguous. Pierce, supra note 212, at 752
(contending that if the "hypertextualist" movement persists, it may have the "effect of virtually emasculating the Chevron doctrine"); see also Merrill, supra note 212, at 354 (noting that
"the general pattern in the Court appears to suggest something of an inverse relationship
between textualism and use of the Chevron doctrine"). Indeed, Justice Scalia has acknowledged explicitly this inverse relationship. Scalia, supra note 212, at 521 ("One who finds
more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its
relationship with other laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for
Chevron deference exists.").
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When a court determines that Congress has not spoken on the
meaning of a particular statutory term, it proceeds to Chevron's second
step. Under this analysis, if an agency has proffered a statutory
interpretation,
the court does not simply impose its own [statutory] construction
.... as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
agency's [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of
215
the statute.
Thus, unless an agency's statutory interpretation is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unreasonable, a court must accord that interpretation "controlling weight," even if the court believes that other, and
potentially better, interpretations exist.2 16 It is in this sense that judi217
cial deference may be characterized as "automatic."
Whereas Chevron sets out the revolutionary principle of automatic
deference to address situations involving ambiguities in congressional
statutes,2 18 a well-aged and far less disputatious Supreme Court deci-

215

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (citations omitted).
Id. at 844.
Other commentators have described Chevron's mandate of judicial deference in
similar terms. See, e.g., Anthony, JudicialDeference, supra note 18, at 122 (explaining that
"Chevron requires outright acceptance" of reasonable agency interpretations); Manning,
supra note 18, at 617 (stating that both Chevron and Seminole Rock require "binding deference": a reviewing court must "accept an agency's reasonable interpretation of ambiguous
legal texts, even when a court would construe those materials differently as a matter of first
impression"); Merrill, supra note 39, at 971 ("Chevron rests on a principle of mandatory
deference: courts are compelled to defer to agency interpretations ..
").
218
See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 456-57 (1989) (arguing that Chevron "defined
deference in a way that ... was far more extreme than earlier articulations of the model
had been"); Merrill, supra note 39, at 971 (contending that Chevron marks "a significant
transformation"); Starr, supra note 211, at 284 (describing the Chevron decision as "revolutionary"); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 2075 ("Chevron promises to be a pillar in administrative law for many years to come."). Many of these scholars also have launched profound
criticism at Chevron's mandate of automatic deference. See Farina, supra, at 525-26 (contending that the Chevron doctrine undermines separation of powers in favor of the executive branch); Merrill, supra note 39, at 971, 1003-1212 (suggesting that the Court should
replace Chevn's doctrine of mandatory deference with a principle of discretionary deference, treating agency interpretations as "executive precedent" that would be entitled to
more or less deference depending on various contextual factors); Chevron Panel Discussion, supra note 211, at 366-68 (comments by Professor Sunstein) (arguing that Chevron
undermines the judiciary's traditional role as statutory interpreter and accords too much
discretion to administrative agencies); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 2091 (arguing that Chevron should be inapplicable "when the particular context suggests that deference would be a
poor reconstruction of congressional desires"). But Chevron'smandate of automatic deference also has its supporters. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAnD. L. REv. 301, 303-04 (1988);
Starr, supra note 211, at 307-09; Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1117-29 (1987). There is also substantial debate among scholars as
216
217
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sion previously called for automatic deference to agency interpretations when the interpretations related to an ambiguity in an agency's
own rule or regulation. 219 In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 220 the
Court maintained that "the ultimate criterion" for a court's construction of an ambiguous rule or regulation is the agency's administrative
interpretation of that rule or regulation. 2 21 Thus, "provided an
agency's interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the
Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given 'controlling weight
' 2 22
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."'
As long as the agency's interpretation is reasonable, the reviewing
court must automatically defer, even though the agency's interpretation may not be "the best or most natural one by grammatical or other

to whether Chevron has, in fact, produced the "revolution" that was anticipated. At the
Supreme Court level, the answer appears to be no. See Merrill, supra note 211, at 355-63;
Pierce, supra note 212, at 750, 752-62. However, scholarly assessment of Chevron's impact at
the federal appellate and district court levels varies substantially. Compare Linda R. Cohen
& Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, 65,
103 (concluding that, post-Chevron, the federal appellate court affirmation rate of agency
interpretations has decreased) and Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 Mo.
L. Rxv. 129, 131 (1993) ("Chevron's importance has been exaggerated. Chevron did not
profoundly alter either the Supreme Court's conduct, or that of the lower federal
courts."), with 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 28, § 3.6, at 55 (Supp. 1996) (analyzing recent
cases and concluding that "It]he inconsistency and controversy apparent in the Supreme
Court's treatment of Chevron are not typical of circuit court treatments of Chevron"), and
Pierce, supra note 212, at 749-50 (asserting that "[a] ppellate courts routinely accord deference to agency constructions of ambiguous language"), and Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes,
73 TEX. L. REv. 83, 94 (1994) (contending that lower courts have been applying Chevron's
dictates with "unusual consistency" and "an almost alarming rigor").
219 In contrast to the plethora of scholarship critiquing and often criticizing Chevron
deference, see supra note 218, Professor John Manning has observed that "Seminole Rock
deference . .. has long been one of the least worried-about principles of administrative
law." Manning, supra note 18, at 614; see also id. at 613 ("The Chevron and Seminole Rock
principles, which are functionally similar, could not have garnered more disparate reactions from the legal community."). Professor Manning attributes the paucity of academic
commentary and criticism regarding Seminole Rock to the "'common sense' idea that an
agency 'is in a superior position to determine what it intended when it issued a rule, how
and when it intended the rule to apply, and the interpretation of the rule that makes the
most sense given the agency's purpose in issuing the rule.'" Id. at 614 (quoting I DAvis &
PIERCE, supra note 28, § 6.10). But see infra note 223 for Professor Manning's and other
recent commentary challenging this "common sense" idea.
220 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
221 Id. at 414.
222 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at
414); see alsoShalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 95 (1995) (concluding that the
Secretary of HHS's interpretation of an HHS regulation "is a reasonable regulatory interpretation, and we must defer to it"); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512
(1994) ("Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best
serves the regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency's interpretation must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'") (quoting
Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414).
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standards." 2 23 Both Seminole Rock and Chevron therefore impose on
courts the obligation to accept all but unreasonable interpretations of
ambiguous provisions-even in circumstances where, as a matter of
first impression, courts would have construed those provisions
2 24
differently.
2.

Rationalefor Automatic Deference

The Court predicated the deference principle in Chevron and
Seminole Rock on a similar rationale. As the Supreme Court recently
reminded us, Chevron's automatic deference doctrine is founded on
the "presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute
meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired
the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows." 225 Thus, while many courts prior to
Chevron stressed an agency's superior expertise as the basis for deferring to an agency's statutory construction, 226 the Chevron Court
223 Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991). The Supreme Court
appears to view the "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" inquiry under
Seminole Rock interchangeably with a "reasonableness" standard. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514
U.S. at 103; see also Anthony, Supreme Court and the APA, supranote 18, at 5 (noting that the

Court's formulation of Seminole Rock deference "contains no expressed element of review
for reasonableness," but recognizing the possibility that "the term 'plainly erroneous' embraces a reasonableness component because otherwise it is hard to conceive a meaning for
that phrase that is not already comprehended in the 'inconsistent' test").
224 See Manning, supranote 18, at 617. Seminole Rock's doctrine of automatic deference
recently has come under fire for raising problems and concerns that possibly may trump
those that Chevron created. See id. (contending that Seminole Rock accords agencies the
power of self-interpretation, which encourages agencies to promulgate vague and imprecise regulations, and which contradicts a major separation of powers premise "that a fusion
of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties"); see also Anthony,
Supreme Court and the APA, supra note 18, at 8-11 (arguing that Seminole Rock's mandate
allows an agency to act asjudge in its own interpretive cause and, therefore, is inconsistent
with "[s]ection 706 of the APA [which] declares that 'the reviewing court... shall determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action'" (quoting APA section 706)). DissentingJustices in two recent Supreme Court opinions have also begun to
question the theoretical underpinnings of Seminole Rock. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. at
110 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (contending that by interpreting its regulations in a manual, the HHS deprived the public of "avaluable opportunity to comment on the regulation's wisdom and .. . [t]he chance to challenge the ultimate rule in court"); Thomas
Jefferson University, 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (contending that deference to
an agency's construction of its own "hopelessly vague" regulation "disserves the very purpose behind the delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to
resol[ve] ...ambiguity in a statutory text") (citations and internal quotations omitted).
225 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), NA. 116 S.Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996) (citing Clievron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)); see 1 DAvis &
PIERCE, supra note 28, § 3.6, at 50 (Supp. 1996) (maintaining that the Supreme Court's
unanimous opinion in Smiley "can only be interpreted as a ringing reaffirmation of a strong
version of Chevron deference").
226 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the AdministrativeState, 133 U. PA. L. R.v.
549, 574-78 (1995) (discussing administrative expertise as a factor ofjudicia deference);
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grounded the concept ofjudicial deference more directly in the democratic processes of representative government.2 2 7 As stated in
Chevron:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.... [F]ederaljudges-who have no constituency-have a duty
to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and
resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibili228
ties in the political branches."
Chevron therefore marks the Court's explicit recognition that the process of statutory interpretation often involves, and in many instances
requires, policymaking.2 2 9 And the Court held that by leaving statutes
ambiguous, Congress expresses its intention that politically accountable administrative agencies-rather than unelected and unaccounta2 30
ble courts-are to fill any gaps.
Unlike in Chevron, the Supreme Court in Seminole Rock did not
provide an explicit rationale for the automatic deference principle set
out therein.2 3 1 In more recent decisions, however, the Court has elabMerrill, supranote 39, at 973 & nn.15-17 (citing cases). The Supreme Court also cited the
EPA's expertise as a factor for deference in Chevron, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, and continues to reference expertise as an additional supporting rationale for Chevron's mandate. See,
e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990) ("Indeed, the
judgments about the way the real world works that have gone into the PBGC's anti-followon policy are precisely the kind that agencies are better equipped to make than are courts.
This practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron
deference.").
227 See Merrill, supranote 39, at 978 (contending that Chevron "broke new ground by
invoking democratic theory as a basis for requiring deference to executive interpretations"); Seidenfeld, supra note 218, at 97 ("Chevron comports with a more recent model of
administrative authority that derives from the political theory of pluralistic democracy.").
228 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
195 (1978)).
229 See id.; see also Pauey v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) ("[Tlhe
resolution of ambiguity in a statutory text is often more a question of policy than of law.");
Pierce, supra note 218, at 303 (noting that Chevron recognizes that "agencies are the best
equipped institutions to resolve policy questions in the statutes that grant the agency its
legal power"); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 2087-88 ("Chevron is best understood and defended as a frank recognition that sometimes interpretation . . . includ[es] judgments
about how a statute is best or most sensibly implemented. Chevron reflects a salutary understanding that these judgments of policy and principle should be made by administrators
rather than judges.").
230 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
231 See Manning, supra note 18, at 629, 630 n.107.
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orated on why courts owe such great deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own rule. In Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.,
for example, the Court pointed out that an agency's interpretation of
its own rule or regulation may, like statutory construction, "entail the
exercise ofjudgment grounded in policy concerns. '23 2 Automatic deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules and regulations
further reflects the presumption that Congress intended to call on the
"agency's unique*expertise and policymaking prerogatives." 23 3 Thus,
as with Chevron, Seminole Rock adopts a form of deference that is predicated on a congressional delegation of "interpretive lawmaking power
'23 4
to the agency rather than to the reviewing court.
3.

FormatRequirements for Agency Interpretations

Although courts have focused much attention on format requirements for Chevron deference, judicial discussions of format requirements for Seminole Rock deference have been rare. In Chevron, the
regulatory interpretation at issue was embodied in a regulation that
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") promulgated after a
notice and comment period, pursuant to congressionally delegated
rulemaking authority.23 5 While the Supreme Court noted these facts,
the Chevron opinion did not indicate whether its automatic deference
principle was limited to agency interpretations articulated in that format. In the nearly fourteen years since Chevron, the Court has declined to specify whether Chevron deference is preconditioned on an
agency announcing its statut6ry interpretation in a particular format.2 36 As Professors Davis and Pierce have observed, "[t] he absence

of a definitive pronouncement by the Supreme Court on that issue
232
BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. at 697; see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512
U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (stating that broad deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation "is all the more warranted" when the interpretation "'entail[s] the exercise of
judgment grounded in policy concerns'") (quoting BethEnery Mines, 501 U.S. at 697).
233
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).
234 Id. at 153; see also Manning, supra note 18, at 627. Similarly, Professor Russell
Weaver has contended that:
[W]hen an agency interprets its own regulations, it acts under discretionary
authority delegated by Congress. Although an agency's express authority
may only allow it to promulgate, amend, and/or enforce regulations, that
authority carries with it the implied authority to interpretregulations as necessary to
the effectuation of the agency's authorized duties.
Russell L. Weaver, JudicialInterpretationofAdministrativeRegulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 587, 610 (1984) (emphasis added). But see Manning, supra note 18, at 631
(pointing out that "Seminole Rock takes the further step ofjustifying its approach by reference to the agency's role in drafting a regulation, which is thought to give it unique competence to discern the meaning of the text being construed").
235 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 855-59.
236 See 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 28, § 3.5, at 28 (Supp. 1996) (noting that the
Supreme Court seems "unable or unwilling to say whether a court should accord Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of statutes contained in interpretive rules").
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has created... both intercircuit divisions and, in some circuits, in237
tracircuit divisions."
The restrictive reading of Chevron that some courts have adopted
holds that Chevron deference applies only to agency interpretations
issued in legislative rules or final adjudicative decisions. 23 8 Based on
this narrow reading, when an agency's interpretation is embodied in
another format, such as an "interpretive rule" or a "policy statement"
exempted from the APA's notice and comment provisions, 23 9 many
courts have held that automatic deference is unwarranted. 240 Instead,
courts adopting a restrictive version of Chevron independently evaluate
the agency's statutory interpretation, and accept it only if the court
finds it persuasive.2 41 In other words, a court may defer to an agency's
237 Id. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text for discussion of the Supreme
Court's conflicting indications of how to resolve this format issue.
238 The theory is that because Chevron deference is predicated on a congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, an agency's statutory interpretation "qualifies" for such

great deference only when the agency is actually exercising that authority in a format that
Congress intended to have the force of law. See Anthony, Which InterpretationsBind Courts?,
supra note 18, at 42-61 (highlighting legislative rules and adjudicative decisions as clear
examples of formats sufficient for issuing interpretations that can bind courts, and contrasting them with interpretive rules and policy statements that cannot bind courts even if
they are reasonable and consistent with the statute); see also Michael Herz, Deference RunningRiot: SeparatingInterpretationand Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMrN. LJ. AM. U. 187,
232-33 (1992) (maintaining that courts should accord Chevron deference only when the
agency interpretation involves delegated lawmaking as opposed to interpretive pronouncements regarding congressional intent); Sunstein, supra note 18, at 2093 n.106 (contending
that "an agency that has been given power to make rules, but that simply announces a view
one way or another without going through the rulemaking process, would not receive deference" under a restrictive reading of Chevron).
239 See supra notes 32, 41-44 (discussing exemptions from APA notice and comment
requirements).
240
See, e.g., Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that program statements not subject to notice and comment are only "entitled to some deference"); Freeman v. National Broad. Co., 80 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1996) (refusing to give
Chevron deference to an agency interpretation because "[u]nlike regulations, interpretations are not binding and do not have the force of law"); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. Pefia, 44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting that it is the notice and
comment process that "entitles the administrative rules to judicial deference" under Chevron), affd on other grounds sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe R.R Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996); Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d
836, 841 (6th Cir. 1994) (declining to accord Chevron deference to an "agency's policy
statements and interpretative rulings, which, unlike agency regulations, are not published
for comment and do not have to endure other rule-making formalities"); Nalle v. Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating Chevron deference is not appropriate
for an IRS interpretive regulation); Reich v. Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023,
1026 (10th Cir. 1993) (explaining that high level of Chevron deference is not appropriate
when an interpretation is embodied in an agency manual); Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441,
1445-47 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to afford Chevron deference to HHS interpretive documents not subject to notice and comment).
241 The Supreme Court acknowledged the fact that an agency's statutory interpretation may be persuasive, even though it is not controlling in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944). The Court held that an agency's statutory interpretation articulated in bulletins and informal rulings may offer "guidance" in instance where Congress did not dele-
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statutory interpretation embodied in a format other than a legislative
rule or adjudicative decision, but a court is not required to do so.
Professor Robert Anthony is the administrative law scholar most often
associated with the view that such format requirements operate to
2 42
limit Chevron deference.
Under the more expansive reading of Chevron, automatic deference applies to various types of statutory interpretations promulgated
by agencies charged with administering federal statutory schemes.
Under this reading, even if an agency chooses to announce a statutory
interpretation in the form of an interpretive rule or policy statement
that is exempt from APA notice and comment requirements, the reviewing court must give the interpretation, if reasonable, controlling
weight. 243 This interpretation of Chevron has also commanded accept244
ance by a number of scholars.
gate rulemaking or adjudicatory power to the agency. Id. at 140. Today, many courts
follow Skidmorewhen the automatic deference principles of Chevron are found inapplicable.
See, e.g., Freeman, 80 F.3d at 83-84 (stating that "interpretations are not binding and do not
have the force of law," but "are entitled to some deference" under the dictates of Skidmore);
Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 587 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Skidmore to the Secretary of
Labor's interpretative regulations); ParkerFireProtectionDist., 992 F.2d at 1026 (applying
Skidmore to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Reivitz,
830 F.2d at 1447 (stating that Skidmore analysis is appropriate for an agency's interpretive,
rule). Skidmords "persuasive authority" approach is discussed extensively infra Part IIlA.
242 Anthony, Which Interpretations Bind Courts?, supra note 18, at 4 (explaining that
under Chevron, "[t] he threshold issue for the court is always one of congressional intent:
did Congress intend the agency's interpretation to bind the courts? The touchstone in
every case is whether Congressintended to delegate to the agency the power to interpretwith theforce of
law in the particularformat that was used."); see alsoAnthony, Supreme Court and the APA, supra
note 18, at 18 (Interpretations set forth in nonlegislative rules "should not automatically be
accepted by the courts, and thereby made binding, even assuming they are reasonable.
Rather, a reviewing court should itself interpret the statute. In doing so, it should give
careful attention and respectful consideration to the agency's position." (citing Skidmore)).
243 See United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1404 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "Chevron deference is the proper criterion for determining whether a guideline (or, for that
matter, commentary that suggests how a guideline should be read) contravenes a statute"
and that "It]he Chevron two-step approach fits that type of inquiry like a glove"), rev'd, 117
S. Ct. 1673, 1679 n.6 (1997) (finding statute unambiguous, and, therefore, not deciding
whether deference was owed under Chevron); Warren v. North Carolina Dep't of Human
Resources, 65 F.3d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating Chevron deference is appropriate for
an agency's interpretation of a statute published in the USDA's Administrative Notices,
although not "formally enacted in the form of regulations"); Elizabeth Blackwell Health
Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir. 1995) (according Chevron deference to a
statutory interpretation embodied in an HHS letter), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996);
Johnson City Med. Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 975-77 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Chevron and according "some deference" to statutory interpretation set forth in IRS Revenue
Ruling); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 921-22 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating, with
respect to an EPA rule issued in a decision letter rather than by notice and comment
rulemaking, that "itsimply is not the law of this circuit that an interpretive regulation does
not receive the Chevron deference accorded a legislative regulation").
244 See Weaver, FormatRequirements, supra note 18, at 627 (advocating a position that is
"diametrically opposed to" Professor Anthony's, and thereby contending that "Chevron deference should be extended to interpretive rules"); see also Farina, supra note 218, at 471
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As noted above, 245 the Supreme Court has declined to extend

Chevron deference to statutory interpretations by administrative agencies lacking congressionally delegated rulemaking or adjudicatory
powers. 24 6 However, the Court has not yet resolved the question of
whether courts must accord Chevron deference when an agency with
congressionally delegated rulemaking or adjudicative authority does
not in fact use that authority, but instead announces its statutory interpretation in an alternative format.247 In some cases, the Court appears to distinguish between the weight that a reviewing court must
accord to legislative rules, on the one hand, and interpretive rules or
policy statements on the other.248 Nonetheless, in a number of other
cases, the Court has cited Chevron and appears to have deferred to
statutory interpretations that agencies did not promulgate under APA
24 9
notice and comment procedures.
Whereas commentators have hotly debated Chevrons applicability
to regulatory interpretations embodied in formats other than legislan.79 (observing that "Chevron's articulation of the deferential model appears to be indifferent to the 'legislative'/'interpretive' rule construct"); Kevin W. Saunders, InterpretativeRules
with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposalfor Public Participation,1986 Durm L.J. 346,
357 (noting that interpretations of Chevron appear to have caused a "blurring of the distinction between legislative and interpretative rules"); Weaver, FormatRequirements, supra note
18, at 617 ("[I~f deference is premised on general assessments of agency authority, courts
justifiably might defer to a wider range of interpretations including those contained in
interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines. After all, each such interpretation is issued
pursuant to delegated authority."); see also infra note 378 (discussing Justice Scalia's view
that the legislative rule/interpretive rule distinction for purposes of deference is an
"anachronism").
245
See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
246 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ("ARAMCO"), 499 U.S. 244, 257-58 (1991) (holding
that the Court need not defer to the EEOC's statutory interpretation of Title VII because
the agency was not the recipient of congressionally-delegated lawmaking power under Titie
VII); see also infra note 378 (discussing ARAMCO more extensively).
247 City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339 & n.5 (1994)
(stating that because it found clear congressional intent, the Court "need not consider
whether an agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the Administrator's in
this case is entitled to any less deference under Chevron than an interpretation adopted by
rule published in the Federal Register, or by adjudication").
248 See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993) (noting that commentary
by the Federal Sentencing Commission is not entitled to Chevron deference because
"[c]ommentary, unlike a legislative rule, is not the product of delegated authority for
rulemaking"); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (commenting that although
interpretive rules and enforcement guidelines are "not entitled to the same deference as
norms that derive from the exercise of the Secretary's delegated lawmaking powers, these
informal interpretations are still entitled to some weight on judicial review," and citing
cases including Skidmore).
249 See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1995) (citing Chevron and adopting an
agency interpretation articulated in a Bureau of Prisons' program statement); Lukhard v.
Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 376-79 (1987) (citing Chevron and deferring to an HHS statutory interpretation expressed in a manual and letters); FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S.
426, 439 (1986) (citing Chevron and deferring to an FDIC interpretation of a statute, even
though the interpretation had "not been reduced to a specific regulation").
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tive rules or adjudicatory decisions, doctrinal controversy regarding
Seminole Rock's applicability has been rare. 250 The Supreme Court and
lower federal courts routinely accord controlling weight to an
agency's interpretation of its own rules, even when the agency
promulgated the interpretation without the benefit of a notice and
comment period. In Seminole Rock, for example, the regulatory interpretation of an informal interpretative bulletin was at issue. 25 1 More
recently, the Supreme Court has applied Seminole Rock's principle of
automatic deference to interpretations contained in a Department of
Labor enforcement citation,2 5 2 commentary to the Federal Sentenc2 53
ing Guidelines authored by the Federal Sentencing Commission,
and agency guidelines set forth in an HHS manual, 254 none of which
the respective agencies promulgated pursuant to the notice and comment process. Thus, the decision in Seminole Rock affords administrative agencies great latitude in selecting the formats in which they may
announce controlling interpretations of their own rules and
255
regulations.
B. Judicial Decisions Regarding Regulatory Interpretations in
No-Action Letters
When the SEC announces interpretations of securities statutes or
SEC rules in formal and official formats,2 56 application of the
Supreme Court's deference principles is relatively straightforward.
Courts should accord automatic deference to a reasonable regulatory
interpretation articulated in an SEC rule or order regardless of
whether the interpretation clarifies an ambiguity in a securities statute
or in an SEC rule.257 Moreover, under the principle of Seminole Rock,
See supra note 219; infra note 255.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock and Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417 (1945).
Martin, 499 U.S. at 157.
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44. In Stinson, the Court unanimously reversed an Eleventh
Circuit decision that declined to follow a particular commentary interpreting a Federal
Sentencing Guideline because the commentary, while potentially "persuasive," was "ofonly
'limited authority' and not 'binding' on the federal courts." Id. at 39 (quoting Eleventh
Circuit opinion). After analogizing the Sentencing Guidelines to legislative rules, the
Court proceeded to view the commentary accompanying the Guidelines as interpretive
rules. Citing Seminole Rock, the Court concluded that a commentary interpreting a Guideline binds a federal court unless it is inconsistent with the Guideline, violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is clearly erroneous. Id. at 45.
254 Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 90 (1995).
255
SeeAnthony, Supreme Court and the APA, supranote 18, at 6 (bemoaning the fact that
the Supreme Court and lower courts "appear to be willing to accept any 'interpretation'
that is not inconsistent with the regulation, and to give it 'controlling weight' under [Seminole Rock], regardless of the format in which it is issued, and regardless of agency failure to
observe notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures").
256
See supra Part I.A.1.
257
See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2217-18 (1997) (citing Chevron and
according "controlling weight" to SEC Rule 14e-3 which interpreted the ambiguous phrase
250
251
252
253
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all courts should accord automatic deference to a reasonable regulatory interpretation articulated in an SEC release, provided that the
interpretation seeks to clarify an SEC rule.258 The unresolved issue is

whether courts should apply automatic deference to reasonable statutory interpretations articulated in SEC releases. Courts that restrict
Chevron-type deference to legislative rules or adjudicative decisions
would appear to answer no. 259 Conversely, courts that apply Chevron's

mandate to interpretive rules and policy statements might well accord
automatic deference to reasonable statutory interpretations conveyed
in SEC releases.
When the SEC announces a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter, application of the Supreme Court's deference principles
becomes far more difficult. In that case, application requires answering a number of questions. For example, are Commission-approved
no-action letters similar enough to SEC releases to warrant automatic
deference under either Seminole Rock or Chevron? How should a court
regard a regulatory interpretation in a staff no-action letter that was
never presented to the Commission or that the Commission refused
to review? Moreover, if a court concludes that automatic deference is
not required, should the court nonetheless consider the regulatory
interpretation in the no-action letter? If so, how much weight should
it accord the letter? And by what standards should a court make this
determination?
"reasonably designed to prevent.., acts and practices [that] are fraudulent" in Exchange
Act section 14(e) to include acts of insider trading that the Rule proscribed) (omission and
alteration in original); Board of Trade v. SEC, 923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying the principle in Chevron and deferring to an SEC order interpreting Exchange Act
section 3(a) (1)); see also Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 38 (8th Cir. 1959) (noting that Congress's grant of legislative and regulatory power to the SEC in connection with proxy solicitation "requires general judicial acceptance of any properly adopted rule, regulation or
general order, unless it undebatably is unrelated to, non-facilitative of, or in conflict with,
the policy of the Act, or unless it otherwise is so arbitrary or burdensome as to be legally
unreasonable").
258 See Perine v. William Norton & Co., 509 F.2d 114, 119-21 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying
principle in Seminole Rock and deferring to SEC interpretation of SEC Rule 16b-2 that was
embodied in numerous SEC releases and in an amicus brief that the SEC filed upon request from the court, and specifically noting that "[tihe S.E.C. is charged with supervising
the enforcement and application of the nation's federal securities laws . . . and is thus
uniquely suited to determine what interpretation of its rule best effectuates the purpose of
[section] 16(b) and of the other securities statutes"); United States v. Yeaman, No. Crim.
A.96-51-03, 1997 WL 117002, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1997) (acknowledging automatic
deference principle in Seminole Rock but refusing to defer to an interpretation in an SEC
release because the SEC's interpretation of Regulation S-K was "inconsistent with the plain
language of Regulation S-K itself"); Greene v. Dietz, 143 F. Supp. 464, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(applying deference principle in Seminole Rock to interpretation of SEC Rule 16b-3 articulated in numerous SEC releases), aft'd, 247 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1957).
259 See SEC v. R.G. Reynolds Enters., 952 F.2d 1125,1132 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing
Skidmore and stating that an interpretation of Exchange Act section 3(a) (10) expressed in
an SEC Release, although "entitled to substantial weight," is "not conclusive").
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Although federal courts disagree about how to treat regulatory
interpretations in no-action letters, courts consistently evade answering these difficult questions. The result is sheer confusion, both at the
appellate and district court levels.
1. FederalAppellate Court Views Regarding No-Action Letters
Thus far, no federal appellate court has directly confronted the
issue of whether regulatory interpretations in no-action letters warrant
the type of automatic deference prescribed in Seminole Rock The D.C.
Circuit and the Second Circuit have, however, addressed this question
in the context of Chevron deference, but only with a rather cursory
analysis.
In Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 2 60 the D.C. Circuit
offered the first federal appellate court view on the weight that courts
should accord to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters in litigation. In that case, the court assumed without elaboration that a noaction letter containing a Rule 14a-8 interpretation imposed on the
shareholder-plaintiffs the "added burden in a private action of overcoming [that interpretation] in face of the principle that the agency is
2 61
entitled to judicial deference in the construction of its proxy rules."
Years later in Roosevelt v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2 6 2 the D.C.
Circuit indicated that, for purposes of deference, courts could draw a
distinction between SEC views expressed in no-action letters and those
expressed in more formal and official formats. Accordingly, the court
maintained that "the principle of deference described in Chevron" was
inapplicable to a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter because the letter did not "rank[ ] as an agency adjudication or
263
rulemaking."
Two recent decisions by different Second Circuit panels also reveal variations on the issue of judicial deference to no-action letters.
In Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC,264 the Second
Circuit noted with approval the SEC's contention that no-action let432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
Id. at 667. To support its contention that a regulatory interpretation in a no-action
letter would command judicial deference, the Medical Committee court cited Union Pacific
1964), a case
RailroadCo. v. Chicago &North Western Railway Co., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill.
involving the SEC's proxy solicitation rules, where the court held that "the determinations
and positions of the responsible authorities of the SEC carry significant weight and command deference in the courts." Id. at 406.
2C2 958 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 427 n.19. The D.C. Circuit cited a collection of no-action letters in C.L.
263
Grimes v. CenteriorEnergyCorp., 909 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1990), although in that case
(also a private lawsuit under Rule 14a-8), the court gave no indication as to why or how it
was relying on the cited no-action authority. The Grimes court's ruling, however, was consistent with the SEC's position in its no-action letter to the defendant. Id. at 532-33.
264
15 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 1994).
260
261
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ters are "not entitled to the high level of judicial deference afforded

' 265
Sevformal policy statements or rule-making orders of the SEC.

eral months later, another panel of the Second Circuit referenced this
statement in NYCERS v. SEC.26 6 In that case, the Second Circuit main-

tained that although a "court would treat [a] no-action letter as persuasive, [a] court need not give it the same high level of deference
2 67
that is accorded formal policy statements or rule-making orders."
Because the issue of judicial deference to no-action letters was
not central to the holdings in these D.C. Circuit and Second Circuit
cases, the courts' unsupported conclusory statements are somewhat
understandable. 268 Yet, interestingly, the Roosevelt court and both Second Circuit panels noted the inapplicability of Chevron deference in
cases where the regulatory ambiguity at issue involved SEC Rule 14a8.269 A more thoughtful analysis of the deference issue would have
considered and reconciled the automatic deference principle articulated in Seminole Rock, because the ambiguity existed in the SEC's own
rule rather than in a statutory provision. 270 It is also noteworthy that
the full Commission reviewed and affirmed the no-action letters at
issue in NYCERS and Amalgamated. Yet, both Second Circuit decisions
concluded that automatic deference to the letters was unwarranted
without first distinguishing an interpretation of an SEC rule in a Commission-approved no-action letter from an interpretation of an SEC
27
rule set forth in an SEC release. '
Id. at 257-58 n.3 (citing Chevron).
266 45 F.3d 7 (2d Cir. 1995). For further discussion of this opinion, see supra notes
193-202 and accompanying text.
267
Id. at 13.
268 The legal issue in both Medical Committee and Amalgamated involved whether Commission approved no-action letters were "orders" within the meaning of the judicial review
provision in Exchange Act section 25(a). See supra notes 11-14. The principal issue in
NYCERS involved whether the SEC had violated the APA when it promulgated the Cracker
Barrelno-action letter without providing the public with prior notice and the opportunity
for public comment. See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text. And while the disputes in Grimes and Roosevelt required the court to rule on the substantive meaning of SEC
Rule 14a-8 (c) (7)'s exclusion for "ordinary business operations," both courts ruled in a matter that was consistent with the position that the SEC took in the no-action letters it sent to
the defendants. Roosevelt, 958 F.2d at 429; Grimes, 909 F.2d at 532.
269
See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 12; Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257; Roosevel4 958 F.2d at 427
n.19.
270 See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
271 See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 13; Amalgamated, 15 F.3d at 257-58. The Second Circuit's
failure in NYCERS to properly address the dictates of Seminole Rock is even more pronounced in a later section of its opinion. See NYCERS, 45 F.3d at 14. The court acknowledged the NYCERS shareholders' "warning" that judicial validation of the SEC's action in
the CrackerBarrelletter would encourage the SEC "to skirt the entire notice and comment
process by using no-action letters to amend legislative rules." Id. However, in the courts
words, it was "not persuaded by their prophecy of doom," in part because "[a]gency rules
that have not undergone notice and comment receive much closer scrutiny from the
courts than do those that have cleared the procedural hurdles." Id. Focusing entirely on
265
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The Second Circuit's statement in NYCERS that a court "need not"
accord no-action letters the "same high level of deference" that it accords formal SEC pronouncements is similarly troublesome.2 72 While
appearing to liberate courts from the obligation of automatic deference that Seminole Rock and Chevron impose, this statement may also
encourage district courts to regard independent judicial review of noaction letters as an option rather than an obligation. Had the Second
Circuit maintained its Amalgamated formulation-that no-action letters are not entitled to high level deference-it would have provided
lower courts with far clearer direction.
2.

FederalDistrict Court Views Regarding No-Action Letters
a. District Court Decisions Deferring to No-Action Letters

The conflicting signals that federal appellate courts have sent on
the judicial deference issue have forced district courts to resolve their
dilemmas ad hoc. And most federal district courts presented with regulatory interpretations in no-action letters have, in fact, deferred to
that authority in resolving interpretive issues. 273 On some occasions,
courts explicitly have cited to Seminole Rock or Chevron as the reason for
according a regulatory interpretation "controlling weight." 274 More
frequently, however, courts have simply treated no-action letters as definitive interpretations of the law and have failed to perform independent inquiries as to the meaning of the disputed regulatory
2 75
provision.
A number of courts that have accorded no-action letters controlling weight appear to have based this determination on the grounds
that the no-action letter both reflects the Commission's views and is
equivalent to an SEC order-a formal adjudicative decision that
would properly trigger automatic deference. For example, in Brooks v.
Standard Oil Co., 2 7 6 the court considered a Division of Corporation Finance no-action letter that agreed not to recommend enforcement
action against Standard Oil for omitting the shareholder-plaintiff's
proposed resolution from its proxy materials.2 77 The no-action letter
expressed the staff's opinion that Standard Oil could omit the propothe Supreme Court's holding in Chevron, the court apparently did not consider that the
Supreme Court and lower courts have construed Seminole Rock to mandate automatic deference to reasonable constructions of an agency's own rule, regardless of whether the agency
first subjected the interpretations to notice and comment. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
272 IVYCERS, 45 F.3d at 13 (emphasis added).
273 See cases discussed infra notes 276-99 and accompanying text.
274 See cases discussed infra notes 276-88 and accompanying text.
275
See cases discussed infra notes 290-99 and accompanying text.
276 308 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
277 Id. at 812.
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sal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c) (1)278 because the resolution was not a
proper subject for shareholder action under the law of the state of
incorporation. 279 Citing Seminole Rock, the court concluded that the
regulatory interpretation in the no-action letter was entitled to "'controlling weight."' 28 0 The Brooks court offered the following
explanation:
"Rules and regulations adopted by administrative agencies pursuant
to Congressional authorization are best interpreted, in the first instance, by the agency which has been entrusted with the power and
authority to write them. Here, the Commission has interpreted and
construed its own rule contrary to that which plaintiff contends is
the proper interpretation. This court cannot hold, on the proof
before it, unaided as it is by the vast experience of daily contact with
the practical workings of this rule (which the Commission has had),
28
that the interpretation should be set aside." '
The court's analysis, however, failed to distinguish between the staff
and the Commission, and then compounded that error by analogizing
the no-action letter to an SEC order.28 2 Further, the Seminole Rock citation suggests that deference to the no-action letter was automatic
283
rather than discretionary.
Other courts have acknowledged the difference between staff and
Commission views, but appear to have granted no-action letters automatic deference despite this distinction. For example, in United Mine
Workers of America v. Pittston Co., 284 the court explicitly recognized that
278
279
280
281

17 C.FR. § 240.14a-8(c) (1) (1997).
Brooks, 308 F. Supp. at 812.
Id. at 813. (quoting Seminole Rock 325 U.S. at 414).
Id. at 813-14 (quoting Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y.

1951)).
282 Id. at 813.
283
See id. at 813. A number of courts subsequently followed the Brooks approach. See,
e.g., NYCERS v. Dole Food Co., 969 F.2d 1430, 1435-36 (2d Cir. 1992) (Pollack, J., concurring) (vacating lower court decision for mootness but citing Seminole Rock and chastising
the lower court for disregarding what was a "classic case for deferral to the SEC"); NYCERS
v. Brunswick Co., 789 F. Supp. 144, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting that "the SEC" had recently issued five no-action letters on proposals similar to plaintiffs; that the SEC had
"upheld" the exclusion of each proposal; and, citing Brooks, concluding that it should "defer to the SEC's interpretation of its rule"); see also Strougo v. Bear Steams & Corp., No. 95
CIV. 6532 (RPP), 1997 WL 458667, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997) (contending that the
defendants' compliance with a generic no-action letter issued to the Investment Company
Institute "would be sufficient for purposes of satisfying Rule lOb-10," and that if the defendants could prove compliance with the no-action letter "as a matter of law such compliance would not support an inference of fraudulent intent in a securities fraud pleading");
SEC v. Burns, 614 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (maintaining that interpretive statement by the Director of Trading and Markets Division must be upheld unless it "is unreasonable" and declining to accept defendant's argument that "judicialdeference is only due
formal opinions adopted by the Commission").
284 United Mine Workers of America v. Pittston Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder], Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,946, at 95,266 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989).
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the regulatory interpretation articulated in a letter from the Chief
Counsel of the Division of Corporation Finance was "not a decision
made by the agency itself or its commissioners." 285 Nonetheless,
rather than independently determining whether the defendant properly claimed "discretionary authority" over the shareholder-plaintiff's
proposal pursuant to SEC Rule 14a-4(c), 28 6 the court gave "a considerable degree of deference" to the Division's determination that the defendant did not possess such discretionary authority.28

7

Citing both

Brooks and Chevron, the court contended that deference to the Division's letter was appropriate in the absence of official agency action,
"because the opinion nevertheless emanate[d] from the cognizant
28 8
agency entity and its chief legal advisor."
The above cases notwithstanding, courts seldom explicitly reference the holdings in Seminole Rock or Chevron to justify deferring to a
regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter. Rather, most courts relying on no-action letters have done so without specifying why-let
alone how-they are relying on that authority. 28 9 In such cases, it is
difficult to discern whether the court has actually granted controlling
weight to a no-action letter, or whether the court independently considered the regulatory ambiguity and arrived at an interpretation that
comported with the one articulated in the no-action letter. But good
reasons exist for suspecting that the former scenario more accurately
describes the process.
The opinion in Shearson Lehman Hutton Holdings Inc. v. Coated
Sales, Inc. 290 provides an illustration of the problem presented when
courts cite no-action letters, but fail to specify how and why they are
relying on that authority. In that case, the court addressed, among
Id. at 95,270 n.8.
17 C.F.R § 240.14a-4(c) (1997).
Pittston, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 95,270.
288 Id. at 95,270 n.8. In Pittston, the court's decision to defer to the staffs judgment
raises particular concerns because the staff "applie[d] the law to the facts of [the] case."
Id. at 95,274 (citing International Union v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
That is, the court accepted the staff's determination that the defendant knew of the plaintiffs proposal within a "reasonable time," and it therefore accorded deference to a factual
finding made in the course of an informal exchange between the SEC staff and a company
seeking advice regarding compliance with an SEC rule. Id. The Pittstoncourt's decision to
accord substantial deference to a staff no-action letter was later cited in Larkin v. Baltimore
Bancorp,769 F. Supp. 919, 927 (D. Md. 1991), af/'d, 948 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1991). Noting
that "the SEC approved" the specific transaction at issue in a staff letter sent to defendants,
the court stated, citing Pittston, that "[the SEC's action in this respect is entitled to deference." Larkin, 769 F. Supp. at 927; see also Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. RR.
Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 406 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (stating that "[w]here, as here, circumstances
assure that agency consideration has been given to the merits of a question, the determinations and positions of the responsible authorities of the SEC carry significant weight and
command deference in the courts").
289
See cases discussed infra notes 290-99 and accompanying text.
290
697 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
285
286
287
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other issues, whether provisions in SEC Rule 144291 operated as a limitation on Shearson-Lehman's ability to liquidate restricted stock that a
customer had pledged as collateral for a loan. 292 In resolving this in-

terpretive issue, the court relied on interpretations of Securities Act
Rule 144(k) that the SEC staff had issued many years earlier in noaction letters to other brokerage firms. 29 3 After noting that the no-

action letters posited "the very circumstances here presented," and
without offering independent analysis of the SEC rule or the applicable statutory exemption under which the SEC promulgated it, the
court appeared to accept the SEC staff's position on the meaning of
Rule 144.294 Thus, the court appeared to have accorded these noaction letters controlling weight without explicitly acknowledging it.
The dearth of case law and formal SEC interpretations regarding
the more complex areas of securities regulation undoubtedly has
caused other courts to treat no-action letters as effective substitutes for
full Commission interpretations articulated in formal and official formats. For example, in Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens,295
the court sought to resolve whether the limited partnership defendants qualified for an exemption from registration as an investment
company pursuant to section 3(c) (1) of the Investment Company
Act.296 The court appears to have grounded its decision on regulatory

interpretations in no-action letters, expressly noting that "there [was]
scarce case law on arcane issues such as beneficial ownership for [section] 3(c) (1) purposes" and that "instead, much of the 'law' in such
areas is found in the informal SEC interpretations contained in the
no-action letters." 297 Other courts have described no-action letters as

SEC "holdings" or "rulings" that are entitled to deference. 2 98 In addition, a number of courts have relied on regulatory interpretations in
291 17 C.F.R. § 230.144.
292 Coated Sales, 697 F. Supp. at 640-41.
293 Id.
294 Id. at 640.
295 705 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
296 Id. at 964; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (1994).
297
Clemente Global, 705 F. Supp. at 965 n.2.
298 See, e.g., SEC v. Smith, No. 92-CO 811, 1992 WL 67832, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26,
1992) (characterizing a no-action letter issued to an unrelated third party as an SEC holding and applying the regulatory interpretation set out in the letter to determine whether
defendant is an "investment adviser" within the meaning of section 2(a) (11) of the Investment Advisers Act); Fulco v. American Cable Sys., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,980, at 95,485, 95,489-90 (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 1989) (relying on several SEC
"rulings" in no-action letters that permitted companies to avoid Exchange Act section

12(g) class registration of similar, but distinct, classes of securities); Peck v. Greyhound
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (deferring to a no-action letter that permitted
defendant to exclude plaintiff's shareholder proposal and noting that while not formal
agency action, the Division of Corporation Finance's "ruling" should be followed because
of the Commission's "vast experience of daily contact with the practical working of this
rule").
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no-action letters without expressly characterizing their status, but apparently deferring to them as if they were official interpretations embodied in SEC releases. 29 9 These judicial practices serve as further
evidence that courts may be automatically deferring to no-action letters without acknowledging, and in some cases even disclaiming, that
they are doing so.
b. District Court Decisions OptingAgainst Deference to No-Action
Letters
Although most courts that have considered regulatory interpretations in no-action letters have deferred to that authority, a minority of
courts have explicitly rejected no-action letter authority in favor of
their own interpretation of the regulatory ambiguity at issue in the
litigation.3 0 0 Some of these courts appear to have done so because
they accepted the SEC's characterization of these letters as "advisory
only," and therefore considered themselves unconstrained to depart
from them.3 0 ' On other occasions, courts have referenced a "no legal
conclusion" disclaimer that the SEC staff made, and consequently refused to extract an underlying interpretive rationale from a "pure" noaction letter.30 2 Furthermore, at least two courts have rejected liti299
See, e.g., Bormann v. Applied Vision Sys., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 800, 808 (D. Minn.
1992) (relying on no-action letters as authority for determining whether defendant's acts
were manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of SEC Rule lOb-9); Austin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 788 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (deferring to long standing interpretation of Rule 14a-8 as reflected in more than 50 no-action letters published over a tenyear period); Walker v. Montclaire Hous. Partners, 736 F. Supp. 1358, 1364-65 (M.D.N.C.
1990) (relying on no-action letters as interpretive authority regarding the five "integration"
factors set out in Securities Act Regulation D); SEC v. Wall ISt Publ'g Inst., Inc., 591 F.
Supp. 1070, 1081 (D.D.C. 1984) (referring collectively to regulatory interpretations in noaction letters and SEC releases, and stating that "the Commission's interpretation[s] ...
are entitled to substantial deference"), rev'd on other grounds,851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
300 See cases discussed infra notes 304-14.
301
See, e.g., NYCERS v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 795 F. Supp. 95, 100-01 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(stating that although no-action letters "are entitled to deference, they do not bind this
Court" and rejecting the no-action letter authority because the SEC "shifted rationales" for
excluding shareholder proposals on national health insurance pursuant to Rule 14a-8),
vacated as moot 969 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1992); NYCERS v. American Brands, Inc., 634 F.
Supp. 1382, 1389 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that the "SEC staffs views on shareholder
proposals are only rendered as an informal convenience to both management and proponents" and refusing to defer to a favorable no-action letter issued to defendant, in part,
because the issue involved an interpretation of foreign antidiscrimination law, an area in
which the SEC lacks "expertise").
302 See, e.g., Bradford v. Moench, 809 F. Supp. 1473, 1498 (D. Utah 1992) ("The fact
that the SEC issued no-action letters in regard to specific requests does not mean that all
industrial loan corporations fall within the banking exemption. Each letter represents the
decision of the SEC not to enforce the securities laws in that particular case."); Pargas, Inc.
v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 239 (D. Md. 1976) (stating that pure no-action
letters do not "'reflect the opinions of the' SEC" and that "'citation of those letters as
precedent for interpreting the federal securities laws ...is inappropriate'" (quoting SEC
letter to court)), affd,546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); cf Board of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525,
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gants' requests for deference in situations where the no-action letter
appeared to be inconsistent with case law or other formal authority
interpreting the regulatory provision at issue.30 3 Thus, although there
have been instances where courts have refused to defer to regulatory
interpretations in no-action letters, these courts do not appear to have
consistently followed any particular approach to the deference issue.
To date, Judge Kimba Wood's opinion in Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 30 4 provides the most

thoughtful judicial analysis of deference issues with respect to no-action letter authority. Consistent with the regulatory interpretation articulated in its Commission-approved and highly controversial Cracker
Barrel no-action letter,3 05 the SEC staff advised Wal-Mart that it would
not recommend enforcement action if Wal-Mart excluded from its
proxy materials a shareholder proposal that the Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union ("ACTWU") submitted pursuant to Rule
14a-8 (c) (7) 's exception for "ordinary business operations," even
though the proposal raised important social and political issues regarding the company's employment and retail practices. 30 6 Acting in
reliance on both its no-action letter and the more extensive regulatory
interpretation articulated in the CrackerBarrel letter, Wal-Mart distrib3 07
uted its proxy materials without including ACTWU's proposal.
Shortly thereafter, ACTWU filed a lawsuit against Wal-Mart in federal
district court. Wal-Mart subsequently requested that the court defer
to the Commission-approved regulatory interpretation of Rule 14a8(c) (7) articulated in both its no-action letter and the CrackerBarrel
letter.3 08
530 (7th Cir. 1989) (characterizing a "pure" no-action letter issued by the staff and af-

firmed by the Commission as a "prosecutorial decision").
303 SeeAmalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. Energy Group of America, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1234, 123841 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (noting that "SEC positions" in no-action letters are entitled to substantial, but not conclusive, weight, and rejecting regulatory interpretations in no-action letters
issued to similarly-situated individuals, because two recent Supreme Court decisions established the controlling test for whether an instrument is an "investment contract" within the
meaning of section 2(1) of the Securities Act and section 3(a) (10) of the Exchange Act).
304 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
305 See supra note 193.
306 See Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. at 888. ACTWU sought to submit to a shareholder vote a
request for Wal-Mart's directors to prepare and distribute reports about: (1) Wal-Mart's
equal employment opportunity ("EEO") and affirmative action policies and programs, and
(2) Wal-Mart's efforts to both publicize its EEO policies to suppliers and purchase goods
and services from minority and female owned suppliers. See id. at 879.
307 See id. at 888.
308 See Defendant Wal-Mart's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint at 14, Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (No. 92-5517) (asserting
that "[b] ecause Rule 14a-8 and the rights created thereby are exclusively a creature of the
SEC, that agency's [no-action letter] views concerning the Rule's meaning and application
are entitled to substantial deference").
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Judge Wood first contended that an individual no-action letter is
"not an expression of agency interpretation to which the court must
defer." 30 9 She recognized, however, that no-action letters often can
provide substantial insight into the meaning of the SEC's "ordinary
business exception" to Rule 14a-8's requirement that companies indude shareholder proposals in their proxy materials.3 10 Yet in this
case, the CrackerBarrel regulatory interpretation that the staff echoed
in its no-action letter to Wal-Mart sharply deviated from the standard
that the SEC had previously expressed in the official SEC Release that
accompanied amendments to Rule 14a-8. 3 11 Accordingly, Judge
Wood refused to defer to the no-action letter because upon weighing
the two conflicting regulatory interpretations, she considered herself
31 2
obligated to follow the one articulated in the official SEC Release.
Although Judge Wood reached the light result in Wal-Mart for
apparently the right reasons, her analysis of the deference issue left a
number of issues unresolved. For example, Judge Wood did not offer
analysis to support her contention that automatic deference is not required when regulatory interpretations are articulated in no-action
letters. Rather, she cited Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. in
which the D.C. Circuit made the conclusory statement that "no-action
letter[s] do[ ] not 'rank[ I as an agency adjudication or rulemaking."' 31 3 Moreover, Judge Wood's analysis is of little guidance to a
court presented with a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter
that is not diametrically opposed to an "official" interpretation that
the SEC previously issued. Because no-action letters frequently constitute the only interpretive guidance available to a court,31 4 a broader
framework for considering the question of deference requires
development.
309

310

Wal-Mart, 821 F. Supp. at 885.
Id. at 884.

311
Id. at 890 (emphasizing that the SEC Release specifically stated that the exclusion
for "'ordinary business operations'" applies only to proposals that are "'mundane in nature,'" and that do not involve any "'substantialpolicy or other considerations'" (quoting Proposals by Security Holders Release, supra note 194, at 52,998) (emphasis added)); see also
supranote 194 (discussing the SEC staff's interpretation of the "ordinary business operations" exclusion).
312
Wal-Mar, 821 F. Supp. at 890. At the outset of her analysis, Judge Wood maintained that "[w]hen a court interprets an administrative regulation, the 'ultimate criterion'
is the agency's interpretation of the regulation, which becomes of controlling weight unless that interpretation is 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.'" Id. at
883 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Thus, it
appears that Judge Wood accorded automatic deference to the regulatory interpretation
embodied in the 1976 SEC Release which accompanied the newly amended Rule 14a-8. See
supra note 194.
313 Id. at 885 (second alteration in original) (quoting Roosevelt v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 427 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
314
See supra notes 150-51, 164 and accompanying text.
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Analysis of Automatic Deference in the Context of No-Action
Letters

The preceding discussion of the judiciary's treatment of regulatory interpretations in no-action letters reveals three distinct problems
with current jurisprudence. First, doctrinal uncertainty exists regarding whether the dictates in Chevron and Seminole Rock apply to regulatory interpretations articulated in no-action letters. Second, even
courts that have correctly answered this doctrinal question generally
fail to articulate-and presumably to recognize-the normative reasons why independent judicial review of no-action letters is so critical.
Finally, courts tend to evaluate regulatory interpretations in no-action
letters on an ad hoc basis, and have yet to develop an appropriate
framework for addressing the competing considerations. In particular, courts lack guidelines by which to evaluate the persuasiveness of
regulatory interpretations in no-action letters.
1.

The Doctrinal Case Against Automatic Deference

As previously discussed, automatic deference principles are
grounded in congressional grants of authority to create law through
agency rulemaking or adjudication.3 1 5 Such grants of authority evidence Congress's desire to place an administrative agency in the role
of national policymaker-within the bounds set out in the statutory
scheme.3 16 Agencies fulfill this policymaking role, in part, by announcing interpretations of statutes or their own rules. Courts must
therefore give reasonable regulatory interpretations controlling
weight; any lesser degree of deference would substitute the judiciary
31 7
for the administrative agency as national policymaker.
This analysis reveals why courts are never required to defer automatically to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters that the
Commission has neither approved nor affirmed. While staff analysis
of a regulatory ambiguity may offer insight and guidance as to what
the Commission regards as the law, only the SEC's five commissioners-whom the President appoints and the Senate confirms-possess
the authority to "speak" for the regulatory agency.3 18 Although the
SEC staff may in fact engage in policymaking through announcing
regulatory interpretations in no-action letters,3 19 these policy choices
See supraPart II.A.2.
SeeAddison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 619 (1944) (holding that
agency rulemaking cannot exceed the scope of rulemaking authority in the statutory provision); see also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (holding that the
SEC's authority to proscribe certain fraudulent acts in Rule 10b-5 is limited by the scope of
the terms of the enabling provision in Exchange Act section 10(b)).
317 See supra notes 225-30 and accompanying text.
318
See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994).
319
See supra text accompanying notes 119, 141-48, 182.
315

316
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lack the political legitimacy of those that the full Commission makes
when acting under its congressionally delegated authority.320 Thus,
while democratic theory may require courts to defer to policy choices
that the full Commission has made, it most certainly does not demand
deference to SEC staff choices.32 1 As Professor Russell Weaver has recognized, "[d] eference principles assume that the responsible administrative agency has authoritatively interpreted a regulatory
provision."3 2 2 Therefore, neither Chevron nor Seminole Rock mandate
judicial deference to regulatory interpretations in staff no-action letters that the Commission has neither reviewed nor affirmed.
A recent Supreme Court opinion, Heintz v. Jenkins,32 3 confirms
the validity of this analysis. In that case, the Court addressed the ques320 This is not to say that the Commission is prohibited from sub-delegating its authority to officials on the SEC staff. Indeed, Congress explicitly authorized sub-delegations. See
Exchange Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1 (a) (providing that the Commission "shall have the
authority to delegate, by published order or rule, any of its functions... with respect to
hearing, determining, ordering, certifying, reporting, or otherwise acting as to any work,
business, or matter"). But by promulgating an SEC procedural rule specifying that staff
opinions in no-action letters "do not constitute an official expression of the Commission's
views," 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1997), and by announcing to the public that the "Commission
is not bound by these staff responses," List Release, supranote 7, at 13,682, the Commission
has explicitly disclaimed any intention to delegate to the staff the function of announcing
authoritative regulatory interpretations in no-action letters. Moreover, the remainder of
Exchange Act section 4A suggests that such a delegation would be impermissible. 15
U.S.C. § 78d-1 (a) (stating that nothing in the section "shall be deemed to... authorize the
delegation of the function of rulemaking with reference .. . to general rules as distinguished from rules of particular applicability").
321
Cf Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (noting that "[t]he legislative
power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative
authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such
power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes"); International
Paper Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 438 F.2d 1349, 1359 (2d Cir. 1971) ("'There is no
organization designated 'the Staff' nor any justification for the capital letter; there are
employees of the Commission called collectively 'the staff' but they have no authority individually or collectively to make 'orders.' Only the Commission makes orders.'" (quoting
district court opinion)).
It should be recognized, however, that Congress does, albeit on infrequent occasions,
empower the staff of an administrative agency to issue regulatory interpretations that have
binding effect on the public. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,
566-68 (1980) (noting that Congress has conferred "special status upon official staff interpretations" that the Federal Reserve Board staff promulgated regarding provisions in the
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified, as amended, at
15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667e), and regulations by the Federal Reserve Board promulgated thereunder, and that this special status "signals an unmistakable congressional decision to treat
[staff interpretations] under TILA as authoritative"). But Congress clearly has not accorded such "special status" to regulatory interpretations by the SEC staff. See supra note
320 (discussing section 4A of the Exchange Act).
322 Weaver, IndividualStatements, supra note 18, at 991; see also id. at 1005 (emphasizing
that "if courts defer to individual statements, they can do so only because the particular
official exercised delegated authority").
323 514 U.S. 291 (1995)..

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:921

tion of whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 324 applied to an
attorney regularly engaged in consumer debt collection litigation on
behalf of his creditor client.3 25 The attorney-defendant pointed to a
"Commentary" on the Act by the Federal Trade Commission's
("FTC") staff that interpreted the Act not to cover attorneys engaged
in the defendant's type of activities. 326 The Court maintained that it
could not give "conclusive weight" to this statement, specifically noting the Commentary's disclaimer that it was "not binding on the
[FTC] or the public." 327 Thus, as Heintz's analysis suggests, the SEC's
distinction between "staff views" and "Commission views" excludes
most no-action letters from the automatic deference principle in Chevron and Seminole Rock.
Yet, because the full Commission reviews and affirms some noaction letters, additional analysis of the judicial deference issue is necessary. Indeed, when the Commission indicates approval of a staff noaction letter, a more compelling case for automatic deference arisesthe agency officials possessing congressionally delegated policymaking
authority have now authorized the regulatory interpretation. 328 Moreover, interpretations of SEC rules announced in SEC releases command automatic deference pursuant to Seminole Rock. 329 Some courts

also consider themselves bound under Chevron to accord controlling
330
weight to statutory interpretations embodied in SEC releases.
Those advocating judicial deference may therefore argue that courts
should treat the regulatory interpretations in Commission-approved
no-action letters like SEC releases.
Yet further analysis reveals why automatic deference is unwarranted even in instances where the Commission has reviewed and affirmed the regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter. The logical
starting point is the Commission's own characterization of its action as
an "informal statement."331 This stance demonstrates the Commission's consistent position that it may reconsider the regulatory interpretations articulated in no-action letters. Similarly, the "informal"
label attached to Commission-approved no-action letters highlights
the tentative nature of the policy choices the SEC announces in those
letters. Thus, a doctrine demanding automatic deference to Commission-approved no-action letters would undermine the flexibility that
the SEC has sought to maintain, and could yield a litigation result that
324
325
326
327

328
329
330
331

15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a)-1692o (1994).
Heintz, 514 U.S. at 292.
See id at 298.
Id.
See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Commission review of no-action letters).
See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 257.
See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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the SEC does not intend. In other words, automatic deference to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters would elevate those interpretations to law, regardless of the SEC's intentions.3 32
Applying the principles in Chevron and Seminole Rock to the regulatory interpretations in Commission-approved no-action letters would
also produce a paradoxical result. That is, a regulatory interpretation
that is generally too tentative and informal for purposes of direct preenforcementjudicial review3 33 would nonetheless be authoritative and
definitive enough to warrant automatic judicial deference. As a
number of courts have previously recognized, the doctrine of automatic judicial deference, on the one hand, and the doctrines of ripeness and finality of agency action, on the other hand, are often related
sides of the same administrative coin.3 3 4 However, according automatic deference to the tentative and informal interpretations in noaction letters produces far greater problems than premature judicial
review. Specifically, it binds courts and the public to a reasonable
agency interpretation even though that agency has yet to officially
adopt that interpretation.
Finally, the argument that even Commission-approved no-action
letters are too informal to warrant automatic deference finds support
in another recent Supreme Court decision. In Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A.,3 3 5 a unanimous Court noted that a statutory interpretation articulated in a letter from the Comptroller of Currency to the
President's Committee on Consumer Interests did not establish "bind332 Cf Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 189-90 (3d
Cir. 1995) (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (stating that once a reviewing court defers to an agency
interpretation embodied in an informal format, "itbecomes law").
333
See supranote 114 and accompanying text; cf.Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
149-51 (1967) (drawing a distinction between "definitive" agency regulations, which are
reviewable even if they are not yet enforced, and "tentative" agency positions, which are
not usually reviewable).
334
See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. SEC, 15 F.3d 254, 257 n.3
(2d Cir. 1994) (denying petition for judicial review of a Commission-approved no-action
letter and endorsing SEC counsel's statement at oral argument that when the "full Commission comments on staff no-action positions, these views and positions are not entitled to
the high level of judicial deference afforded formal policy statements or rule-making orders of the SEC or other administrative agencies"); Medical Comm. for Human Rights v.
SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 673-76 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding Commission-approved no-action letter
"ripe" for review and noting that the doctrine ofjudicial deference would operate to prejudice plaintiffs if review were not permitted), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); see also
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that letter authored
by the head of the EPA's Pesticide Division was "ripe" for pre-enforcementjudicial review
and noting that it could "divine no reason why the letter... would not be entitled to
deference"); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 702
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that an interpretive letter authored by the head of an agency was
"final" for pre-enforcementjudicial review, in part, because the letter would be "entitled to
deference ... as a matter of law from a court reviewing the question").
335
116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
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ing agency policy" because it was "too informal." s3 6 Although it did
not elaborate on why it classified the letter as "too informal," the
Court's observation is nonetheless noteworthy for suggesting that the
doctrine of judicial deference may not operate below a base level of
formality. The Court also acknowledged that even an agency head
37
can engage in actions that are informal.
Thus, automatic deference by the courts is warranted as a doctrinal matter only when the SEC has announced a regulatory interpretation in a formal and official format such as an SEC rule, order, or,
perhaps, release. 3 38 The announcement and publication of a regulatory interpretation in one of these formats carry with it the presumption that the full Commission has made an affirmative and carefully
considered decision regarding the course of its regulatory policy.
Courts should, therefore, never read Chevron and Seminole Rock as requiring deference to a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter,
regardless of whether the letter has been subjected to Commission
review.
2.

Normative Reasons Impelling Independent Review

Eliminating the doctrinal uncertainty as to whether courts must
accord no-action letters automatic deference will significantly reduce
judicial confusion regarding the status and legal significance of noaction letters. But even a court confident that it need not defer to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters may not fully appreciate why
it should not merely rubber-stamp these interpretations in the course
of resolving a securities law dispute. Courts undoubtedly would be
more inclined to regard independent review as an obligation if they
were more fully aware of the numerous values served by subjecting noaction letters to meaningful scrutiny.
First, unlike SEC rules, which adhere to APA procedures for notice and comment, the Commission generally develops regulatory interpretations in no-action letters without participation from the
general public. 33 9 While a similar lack of participation occurs when
the agency articulates interpretive views in SEC releases, the nature of
the no-action letter process exacerbates concerns about the fairness
and quality associated with the regulatory interpretations announced
therein. In other words, particularly with respect to those no-action
letters that reflect controversial or otherwise difficult policy choices,
Id. at 1734.
Id.
See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text.
339
See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text; see also supra note 147 (recognizing
that the SEC staff often considers feedback from the regulated community in determining
whether to modify regulatory interpretations set out in prior no-action letters).
336
337
338
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the informal nature of the no-action letter process increases the possibility that groups with substantial power and influence will drive the
agency's decisions.3 40 Furthermore, this process simultaneously decreases the likelihood that the SEC will have before it all relevant data
and views regarding the best direction for its regulatory policy.34 ' Independent judicial review of regulatory interpretations in no-action
letters therefore serves as an important check against special interest
decisionmaking and hasty adoption of policies that fail to adequately
balance the statutory aims.3 42 It also restores fairness to the administrative process by ensuring that the public will not be "'bound by a
proposition they had no opportunity to help shape.' 3 43
The lack of public participation in the development of the regulatory interpretations announced in no-action letters also raises concerns relating to the congressional policy behind the APA's notice and
comment requirements: Congress intended to exempt from these requirements only those rules that actually interpret provisions in previously enacted statutes or legislative rules.3

44

While the vast majority of

no-action letters that the SEC issues may fall squarely within this exemption, a significant number do not.345 Independent judicial scru-

tiny of all regulatory interpretations in no-action letters therefore
helps ensure that the SEC does not use the informal no-action letter
process to amend, as a practical matter, provisions in statutes or SEC
rules. Indeed, even if the full Commission has reviewed and approved
a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter, the courts should
never permit such an interpretation to vitiate provisions in securities
statutes that Congress enacted or rules the SEC promulgated for investors' benefit or protection. If the SEC concludes as a matter of sound
policy that such protections are no longer necessary and thus wishes
to change them, the Commission must do so formally, through the
adoption of new rules following the requisite notice and comment period.3 46 Courts should simply not allow the no-action process to cre340
See supra notes 173-75 (contending that the no-action letter process increases the
risk of agency capture).
341
See supra note 177 and accompanying text (contending that the no-action letter
process fails to capitalize on insights and expertise possessed by those shut out of what is, in
effect, a private negotiation between the SEC staff and the individual or entity requesting
the letter).
342
Cf.Seidenfeld, supra note 218, at 129-33 (emphasizing the benefits that would be
gained if Chevron's deferential approach were substituted with one that focused more on
an agency's reasoned decisionmaking).
343 National Family Planning & Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227,
240 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Anthony, Which InterpretationsBind Courts?, supra note 18, at
58).
344
See supra notes 32, 40-44.
345 See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
346 See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text. Until recently, if the SEC believed
that a statutory requirement under either the Securities Act or the Exchange Act was no
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ate informal "adjustments" that effectively amend regulatory
provisions. 347 However, the judiciary can ensure that it is not giving
legal effect to what is clearly improper agency conduct only by carefully scrutinizing the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters.
Similarly, independent judicial scrutiny of regulatory interpretations in no-action letters helps ensure that substantive obligations or
standards that one cannot reasonably and fairly imply from existing
statutes or rules will not bind the regulated community.3 48 Indeed, if
the SEC had promulgated as SEC rules many of the practical requirements that no-action letters currently impose, the APA would have obligated the SEC to provide the public with prior notice and an
opportunity for comment.3 49 Thus, thejudiciary's refusal to give legal
effect to regulatory "requirements" that one cannot reasonably and
fairly imply from existing provisions curtails the SEC's ability to circumvent the APA's notice and comment requirements by announcing
3 50
spurious rules via no-action letters.
Finally, considerations of fundamental fairness impel courts to
carefully scrutinize regulatory interpretations in no-action letters. Inlonger necessary for the protection of investors, its sole choice was to approach Congress
with its suggestions for statutory amendment. Today, however, through provisions in the
NSMIA, supra note 202, the SEC has an alternative avenue for regulatory change: it now
has the authority to provide broad exemptions from these statutory provisions. Specifically, under newly added section 28 of the Securities Act, the SEC may now by rule or
regulation
exempt any person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions from any provision or provisions of [the
Securities Act] or of any rule or regulation issued [thereunder], to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
and is consistent with the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (Supp. I 1996). Exchange Act section 36 now contains a similar provision, though under the Exchange Act, the SEC may act by issuing orders, as well as by rules
and regulations. See id. § 78mm(a) (1). Although the extent to which the SEC intends to
act upon this new exemptive authority is far from clear, the existence of this alternative
avenue for regulatory change heightens thejudiciary's important role in ensuring that de
facto exemptions are granted through the rulemaking or order vehicles specified in the
statute-rather than through the informal no-action letter process.
347 As noted previously, see supra notes 304-12 and accompanying text, Judge Wood's
independent scrutiny of the CrackerBarrelno-action letter in Amalgamated Clothing& Textile
Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), worked to ensure
that the shareholders were not bound by the SEC's attempt to use the no-action letter to
amend, as a practical matter, the regulatory provisions in Rule 14a-8 that required WalMart to include the proposal. In contrast, judicial "rubber-stamping" of the regulatory
interpretation of Rule 14a-8 set out in the CrackerBarrel no-action letter would have given
that regulatory change the force of law without requiring the SEC to take any formal
rulemaking action. In short, that approach would have upheld a "spurious rule." See supra
notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
348 See supra notes 140, 161, 185 (discussing observations by Professor Brown regarding
"rules" applied to investment adviser advertising); supra notes 142, 177, 185 (noting observations by Professor Campbell regarding "rules" applied to resales of registered securities).
349 See supra note 32.
350
See supra note 192 for a discussion of spurious rules.
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deed, individuals and entities submitting no-action letter requests, as
well as certain third parties (such as shareholders in Rule 14a-8 cases),
all have strong interests in the enforcement positions and interpretive
advice provided in no-action letters.3 5 1 However, because the regulatory interpretations articulated in those letters lack binding legal effect, the Constitution generally does not obligate the SEC to provide
those parties with a full and fair opportunity to be heard.3 52 This becomes a concern if courts treat no-action letters as SEC orders or rulings and accept the agency's conclusions on factual and legal issues
without meaningful review. When this treatment occurs, no-action
letters will practically bind recipients and interested third parties,
even though such persons lacked a full and fair opportunity to present their arguments at the time the SEC effectively decided the issue.
3.

The Need for a Framework

The preceding discussion of the consequences that result when
courts rely on no-action letters brings to light why the judiciary should
undertake more thoughtful review of the regulatory interpretations
announced therein. Yet a judicial approach that would ignore no-action letter authority would impose a remedy perhaps worse than the
malady. Indeed, as the "persons who are continuously working with
the provisions of the statute involved," 353 SEC staff officials have developed particular expertise that may assist courts with the interpretation
of ambiguous regulatory provisions. Moreover, as noted in Part I of
this Article, securities law practitioners and their clients often shape
their advice and actions around the regulatory interpretations that the
SEC articulates through the no-action letter vehicle.3 5 4 Thus, while a
court should never treat the views that the SEC staff expresses in a noaction letter as dispositive, it would be both inefficient and unwise for
a court to cast those interpretive views aside without considering their
potential validity.
The Second Circuit's suggestion in New York City Employees' Retirement System v. SEC that courts may treat no-action letters as "persuasive" authority therefore seems entirely appropriate.3 55 But how do
See supranotes 78-85 and accompanying text.
352 A constitutional obligation of due process applies to informal agency adjudications
if agency action will deprive a person of "liberty" or "property," U.S. CoNsr. amend. V, as
those terms have been defined by the Supreme Court. Because staff determinations in noaction letters (or even Commission determinations on review) lack any binding legal effect, the individual requestor or an interested third-party would be hard pressed to demonstrate the potential deprivation necessary for due process rights to attach. See generally
RcHAm J. PiERCE, JR. Er AL., ADMiNsTRATVE LAw & PRoCESS § 6.3 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the Due Process Clause as a source of procedural requirements for agency actions).
353
17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (1997).
354
See supra notes 50-52; supra Part I.C.2.
355
NYCERS v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 13 (2d. Cir. 1995).
351
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courts, generally unfamiliar with the workings of specific provisions in
securities statutes and SEC rules, determine whether a particular noaction letter is, in fact, persuasive? Once again, in the specific context
of judicial reliance on no-action letters, the case law generally fails to
articulate sufficient standards. The final Part of this Article seeks to
fill this void.
III
A

PROPOSED

FRAMEWORK

INTERPRETATIONS IN

FOR EVALUATING REGULATORY

SEC No-ACTnON

LETTERS

As long as there are litigants seeking to win securities cases, federal courts will be urged to defer to regulatory interpretations in noaction letters. Like all attorneys, securities law practitioners are
trained to make full use of the legal methods available to them, including the tried and true method of citation to "authority," even authority that is not binding. 356 In appropriate cases, this legal method
may prove very useful to courts. Although regulatory interpretations
in no-action letters are never appropriate formats for the automatic
deference articulated in Chevron or Seminole Rock, regulatory interpretations in no-action letters may nonetheless enlighten a court struggling with ambiguous provisions in federal securities statutes or SEC
rules. Courts should therefore regard no-action letters as potentially
relevant, albeit noncontrolling, authority.
But the fact that a court has unfettered discretion in the deference/no deference debate provides little practical assistance to the
judge who must determine the appropriate weight to accord a regulatory interpretation in a no-action letter, particularly when the judge is
faced with a dearth of formal and official SEC interpretive authority.35 7 Recognizing this conundrum, Part III proposes a solution that
balances a court's need for expertise and regulatory insight with the
regulated and protected public's right to obtain meaningful judicial
review. Initially, this Part reviews the Supreme Court's decision in
356 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pefia, 44 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (noting that although "we certainly do not defer to them," Seventh Circuit practice involves careful consideration of the opinions of "sister circuits"), affd on other grounds
sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 1-R. Co., 516
U.S. 152 (1996); Caron, supranote 19, at 669 (contending that "taxpayers and the [Internal Revenue] Service ... cite letter rulings in their arguments, and courts often refer to
letter rulings in the course of their opinions," even though the IRS Code specifies that
private letter rulings " ' may not be used or cited as precedent'" (quoting I.R.C. § 6110(0) (3)
(1988)); Arthur B. Spitzer & Charles H. Wilson, The Mischief of the Unpublished Opinion,
LITIGATION, Summer 1995, at 3-4 (noting that litigants routinely cite unpublished federal
court opinions as " ' persuasive authority'" except in those circuits that flatly prohibit any
citation to such opinions).
357 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,358 one of the first cases in which the Court

explicitly recognized that an agency interpretation may be persuasive
even though a court is not required to defer to it. After explaining
why Skidmords "persuasive authority" approach is particularly wellsuited for resolving issues of judicial deference to no-action letters, it
discusses some correlative benefits that could accrue from judicial adherence to this approach. This Part concludes by applying the persuasiveness factors suggested in Skidmore and its progeny to the specific
context of no-action letters.
A. The "Persuasive Authority" Approach
When courts speak of "deference" to an agency's regulatory interpretation, rather than using the term to describe the principle of automatic deference set out in Chevron or Seminole Rock,3

9

they may

mean only that the agency's interpretation deserves "consideration,"
and that the final interpretation of a regulatory pr9vision's meaning
rests with the court.3 60 Indeed, a number of courts have acknowledged that the term "deference" is susceptible to multiple meaningssometimes courts use it in the automatic sense, but on other occasions, courts use it to indicate discretion based on the degree to which
a particular interpretation is persuasive. 3 61 The concept that an administrative interpretation may be persuasive, even when it is not controlling, has its roots in the Supreme Court's decision in Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.3 62
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
Skidmore involved a lawsuit for overtime pay that a group of
firefighters brought against their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").363 The firefighters claimed that, under the FLSA,
they were entitled to overtime pay because time spent on-call at their
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
See supraPart II.Al.
360 See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 28, § 6.3 (describing two forms of judicial deference); Diver, supra note 226, at 565 (discussing multiple meanings of the term "deference"); Merrill, supra note 39, at 1016 (noting that whereas judicial practice has
traditionally treated deference on a sliding scale, Chevron makes "deference an all-or-nothing proposition").
361 See, e.g., Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 191 n.9
(3d Cir. 1995) (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (noting that many courts use the terms deference
and consideration interchangeably); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 44 F.3d at 445
(Easterbrook, J., concurring) (maintaining that "when judges speak of 'deference' to an
administrative decision or interpretation, they may mean any of three situations":
"[d] elegation," "[r]espect," or "[p]ersuasion"); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal.
Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1140-42 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing multiple
meanings of the term "deference").
362 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Id. at 135.
363
358
359
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employer's premises counted toward "working time" within the meaning of the FLSA.3 64 The employer contended that the FLSA did not
3 65
require "waiting time" to be counted as "working time."

Recognizing this statutory provision's ambiguity, the Court noted
that "Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency"
to issue rules or adjudicate decisions under the FLSA.3 66 Congress
did, however, create an Office of Administrator of the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor, and charged that Administrator
3 67
with the duty to bring injunctive actions for violations of the Act.
Accordingly, the Court recognized that the Administrator had to draw
conclusions about the meaning of the FLSA to properly enforce it.368
The Court also noted that the Administrator, in connection with
his enforcement duties, "set[s] forth his views of the application of the
Act under different circumstances in an interpretive bulletin and in
informal rulings."3 69 The Administrator intended these bulletins and
informal rulings to "provide a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in its enforcement will seek to apply it."370 The Court also observed that some
of the circumstances discussed in the bulletin were analogous to the
3 71
firefighters' dispute with their employer.
Because the FLSA limited the Administrator's authority to enforcement power, the Court did not consider itself bound by his interpretation of the mandatory overtime provisions. 3 72 Yet the Court
recognized that the Administrator, in pursuance of his enforcement
duties, had "accumulated a considerable experience in the problems
of ascertaining working time in employments involving periods of inactivity and a knowledge of the customs prevailing in reference to
their solution."3 7 3 Accordingly, the Court concluded that "the rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act,
while not controllingupon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informedjudgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance."374 The Court then suggested that the
weight courts give to a particular interpretation should depend on a
variety of factors, including: "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
364

Id.

365

Id. at 135-36.

366
367

Id. at 137.
See id.

368
369
370

Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id. at 138-39.

371
372
373

374

Id. at 140.
Id. at 137-38.
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
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pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control."3 7 5
Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions citing Skidmore
have referred to its approach as a type of "deference,"3 76 the Skidmore
Court clearly intended only that lower courts should consider the Administrator's views when independently interpreting the statute. To
avoid this confusion, this Article will therefore use the term "Skidmoretype deference" to distinguish Skidmore's persuasive authority approach from the automatic deference approaches in Chevron and Seminole Rock.
2.

CurrentApplication of Skidmore

Today, courts typically use Skidmore-type deference in one of two
situations. First, like in Skidmore, and as the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 3 7 7 Skidmore-type deference governs a court's analysis of an agency's statutory interpretation
when that agency was not the recipient of congressionally delegated
rulemaking or adjudicative authority.3 78 Second, as noted in Part II,
courts that read Chevron to apply only to legislative rules or to adjudicative decisions generally apply Skidmore's persuasiveness factors to the
statutory interpretations that an agency announces in alternative formats, such as interpretive rules or policy statements.3 7 9 Thus, many
lower courts have applied Skidmore-type deference to statutory interpretations that agencies promulgated in formats such as guidelines,
manuals, and bulletins3 8 0 In so doing, courts "respectfilly consider"
all regulatory interpretations that an agency advances in a nonlegislaId.
See, e.g, EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991) (citing Skidmore
factors in ascertaining the "level of deference" that is due Title VII interpretive guidelines
promulgated by the EEOC); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-46 (1976)
(same).
377 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
378
Id. at 257-59. In this case, the Supreme Court applied Skidmore rather than Chevron
to Title VII "guideline [s]" promulgated by the EEOC after explicitly noting that the agency
was not the recipient of any congressionally delegated lawmaking power under Title VII.
Id. at 258. Moreover, after concluding that the EEOC's interpretation did not fare well
under Skidmore's standards, the Court rejected the agency's statutory interpretation in favor
of the more narrow construction that the defendant advanced. Id. at 258-59. Although
Justice Scalia concurred with this result, he maintained that after Cheuron, the " ' legislative
rules vs. other action' dichotomy.., is an anachronism." Id. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia therefore proposed replacing the
Skidmore approach with a mandate according Chevron deference to all reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, regardless of whether they are classified as legislative
or interpretive. Id. Justice Scalia, however, appears to stand alone in this view. SeeJamie A.
Yavelberg, Note, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: JudicialDeference to Agency Interpretations
After EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DuKE L.J. 166, 191-95 (1992).
379 See cases cited supranote 241.
380 See cases cited supranote 241.
375
376
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tive rule or nonadjudicative format, but accept only those interpretations that are persuasive.3 8 1 This approach leaves a court free to
choose among competing regulatory interpretations.
Because Skidmores flexible approach allows courts to retain independent interpretive authority over regulatory ambiguities, administrative law scholars have often touted Skidmore-type deference in a
variety of additional situations. Professors Robert Anthony and John
Manning, for instance, each have recently advocated reconsideration
of Seminole Rock's automatic deference principle, and they have asserted that courts should follow Skidmore's superior approach when
presented with regulatory interpretations purporting to clarify an
agency's own rule.38 2 Professor Ronald Weaver has also suggested

Skidmore as an appropriate approach for courts to follow when
presented with interpretive statements made by individual agency employees.3 83 Thus, in administrative law circles at least, stock in Skidmore-type deference seems to be trading at an all time high.
3.

Skidmore's Relevance to Cases Involving No-Action Letters

Skidmores flexible principles ofjudicial deference are particularly
well-suited for courts trying to determine whether and how to rely on
regulatory interpretations in no-action letters. In many ways, the particular situation at issue in Skidmore recurs whenever the SEC announces regulatory interpretations in no-action letters.
First, like the Administrator in Skidmore, the SEC staff lacks congressionally delegated power to promulgate legislative rules and adjudicatory orders. Instead, the SEC staff performs the day-to-day
381 Anthony, Which InterpretationsBind Courts?, supra note 18, at 13 ("Under [the Skidmore] approach, the agency interpretation is a substantial input and counts for something,
much as legislative history may count. But the authoritative act of interpretation remains
with the court. The court considers the agency view, and approves it only if it is deemed
correct."); Yavelberg, supra note 378, at 197-201 (arguing that Skidmore applies to all agency
interpretations embodied in nonlegislative rules).
382 Anthony, Supreme Court and the APA, supra note 18, at 10 (contending that substantial injustice results when an agency acts as judge in its own interpretive cause, and asserting that courts should apply Skidmore's respectful consideration doctrine when "agency
interpretations of their own regulations are set forth in informal rulemaking formats" (emphasis omitted)); Manning, supra note 18, at 686-87 (contending that the categorical presumption adopted by Seminole Rock conflicts with the constitutionally inspired norm against
the combination of lawmaking and law-exposition, and that the Skidmore model "is a particularly appropriate standard of judicial review for agency interpretations of agency
regulations").
383 Weaver, IndividualStatements, supranote 18, at 1021 (maintaining that courts might
respect individual statements in situations where those statements do not "qualify" for Chevron or Seminole Rock deference). Additionally, Professor Merrill has advocated a replacement of Chevron's mandatory deference model with an "executive precedent" approach,
affording courts greater discretion to accept or reject agency interpretations depending on
a number of factors including: agency expertise, agency consistency with prior interpretations, and the persuasiveness of the agency's reasoning. Merrill, supra note 39, at 1016-22.
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administration of the securities laws, a function that includes the enforcement of those laws. 38 4 And while the securities laws provide that

only the full Commission may institute enforcement proceedings, 8 5
the SEC staff, particularly division directors and other high level officials, clearly has broad investigative powers, and its enforcement action recommendations carry significant weight. 38 6 Accordingly,
through the performance of its investigative and administrative responsibilities, the SEC staff, like the Administrator in Skidmore, has
amassed considerable expertise with respect to the administration of
the relevant regulatory scheme.
Second, the Administrator in Skidmore and the SEC staff utilize
similar vehicles for announcing their interpretive views to the regulated and protected public. Skidmore's description of the interpretive
bulletin and informal rulings as "a practical guide to employers and
employees as to how the office representing the public interest in [the
statute's] enforcement will seek to apply it,"38 7 strikingly resembles the
SEC's description of, and its intention behind, the no-action letter
process.3 8 Thus, like the Administrator's views in Skidmore, the SEC
staff's interpretive views provide practical guidance to the regulated
and protected public regarding how officials responsible for administering the federal securities laws will seek to enforce them. In both
cases, however, these interpretive views are not legally binding and
must be tested in subsequent proceedings.
Finally, like no-action letters, the rulings and interpretive bulletins that the Skidmore Administrator used to announce regulatory interpretations were informal vehicles developed without the public
participation that generally accompanies the promulgation of legislative rules. Thus, in both instances, independentjudicial review serves
as a check against regulatory interpretations that an agency may have
articulated either without full information or to the advantage of only
38 9
one particular constituency.
Despite this congruence, however, courts faced with requests for
deference to regulatory interpretations in no-action letters have
largely ignored the import of the Skidmore decision. Indeed, no court
thus far has cited the decision to justify reliance on no-action letter
authority, and no court has explicitly cited Skidmores factors as a
means of determining the persuasiveness of a no-action letter. And
384
385
386

See OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRs, supra note

4, at 26-34.

See 17 C.FR. § 202.5(d) (1997).
See supra text accompanying note 162.
387 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944).
388 See supranote 44 and accompanying text.
389 See supranotes 170-79 and accompanying text (discussing the inverse relationship
between formality of regulatory interpretations and success in achieving high quality
interpretations).
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even though some courts presented with no-action letter authority
may already follow a Skidmore-type deference approach, they could significantly enhance the clarity of their decisions by explicitly recognizing it as the Skidmore approach.
B. Advantages of Skidmore's Persuasive Authority Approach
In addition to fostering dearer and more carefully reasoned judicial opinions, consistent use of the Skidmore approach in connection
with no-action letters may yield a number of correlative benefits that
exceed the general advantages of independent judicial review of regulatory interpretations in no-action letters discussed above in Part 11.390
For instance, the Skidmore approach may spur SEC staff members to
prepare no-action letters that more fully explain and justify their positions so that a court will find the regulatory interpretations contained
therein more persuasive. 3 91 Reasoned decisions of this nature, rather
than conclusory statements, would substantially assist not only courts
but also securities law practitioners and their clients. Indeed, the SEC
staffs tendency to grant no-action relief without expressing explicit
legal conclusions has consistently frustrated securities law practitioners. 392 No-action letters that include reasoned analyses would be of
far greater assistance to attorneys in fulfilling their dual roles as advisor and transaction-planner.3 93 By eliminating the need for many follow-up no-action letters requesting clarification in the face of
marginally different facts, well-reasoned no-action letters would also
3 94
reduce corporate transaction costs and preserve agency resources.
Finally, no-action letters that the staff prepares in the form of reasoned decisions may serve as a self-imposed check against special in395
terest decisionmaking.
The consistent application of a Skidmore-type framework in analyzing no-action letter authority might even generate qualitatively better
securities law. Indeed, the views of securities law practitioners who
See supra Part II.C.2.
Cf Manning, supra note 18, at 687-88 ("By emphasizing the 'thoroughness' of
agency reasoning, Skidmore gives an agency a clear incentive to supply a full explanation of
the way its action relates to the regulation on which it is premised." (quoting Skidmore, 323
U.S. at 140)); Seidenfeld, supra note 218, at 125-38 (highlighting important values served
when courts emphasize reasoned decisionmaking in reviewing agency interpretations of
statutes).
392 See Lowenfels, Problems, supra note 12, at 1277 (recommending that all no-action
replies "should be prepared in the form of reasoned decisions explaining and justifying the
positions taken"); see also HAFT, supra note 11, at viii (pointing out the conclusory nature of
most no-action letters).
393
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
394
See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
395 Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 218, at 134 (contending that, in general, "[r]equiring the
agency tojustify its interpretation in terms of the goals underlying the statute will make the
agency think twice before pursuing a special interest agenda").
390
391
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represent market participants and members of the investing public
could help a court resolve an interpretive issue. These attorneys,
many of whom are distinguished SEC alumni, provide their own expertise and regulatory insight into how particular regulatory provisions relate to the statutory framework and the overall policies and
purposes of the federal securities laws. 39 6 The Skidmore approach per-

mits a court to consider practitioner's views as well as the interpretive
views advanced by the SEC staff. Accordingly, it allows the court to
397
choose the best interpretation from several competing alternatives.
C.

Evaluating the Persuasiveness of a No-Action Letter

Skidmore and its progeny highlight several general factors that
courts should consider when evaluating the persuasiveness of an
agency's regulatory interpretation. Because application of these factors may not be immediately obvious to courts presented with no-action letter authority, the remainder of this Article discusses the
specific factors that a court should consider most seriously in determining whether and how to rely on regulatory interpretations in noaction letters.
1.

Is the Statute or Rule Ambiguous?

As a threshold matter, a federal court considering reliance on
regulatory interpretations in no-action letters must determine
whether the regulatory provision is, in fact, ambiguous. That is, questions of deference should arise only when the meaning of the words in
the agency's regulation is unclear,398 or when "the traditional tools of
statutory construction" fail to resolve the ambiguity. 399 Clearly, if
either Congress or the Commission has previously spoken on the pre396 See supra note 48 (discussing the "revolving-door" between the SEC and private
securities practice).
397 See Anthony, Which InterpretationsBind Courts?, supranote 18, at 62-63 (maintaining
that the Skidmore approach permits courts to deliberate their "own best estimate" as to the
meaning of regulatory provision); see also DAvis & PmRCE, supra note 28 (Supp. 1996),
§ 3.5, at 28 (noting that, in many cases, "the difference between Chewron deference and
Skidmore deference is outcome determinative"). Moreover, if the Commission disagrees
with a court's interpretation of an SEC rule, the Commission can always formally amend
the rule to more clearly reflect the policy it wishes to pursue. See Manning, supra note 18,
at 695 n.392 ("Agencies have the ability to amend regulations to correctjudicial error and
resolve conflicts among the circuits.").
398 See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see also Martin v.
OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991) (stating that a reviewing court must initially examine
the regulation's language to ensure that it "'is not free from doubt'" (quoting Ehlert v.
United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105 (1971))); National Family Planning & Reprod. Health
Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that "[d]eference to
agency interpretations is not in order if the rule's meaning is clear on its face" (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
399 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
n.9 (1984).
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cise regulatory issue, then the regulatory interpretation in the no-ac400
tion letter has no place in the dispute's resolution.
The importance of a court's careful consideration of this threshold question cannot be overstated. Some litigants, for example, may
urge judicial deference to a no-action letter even when the Commission has clearly set out its intentions in a release announcing the
adoption of an SEC rule. 40 ' Because a court is obligated to follow the
rules that the SEC promulgates during the rulemaking process, it
should look for guidance in no-action letters only after it has con40 2
cluded that the relevant rules do not address the interpretive issue.
Through this inquiry, a court reduces the risk of relying on a noaction letter that conflicts with the policy choices that either Congress
made when enacting the statutory provision, or the Commission made
in promulgating an SEC rule developed through a process that included public participation. Although the SEC staff, or the Commission itself, may later disagree with those choices and consequently may
be disinclined to prosecute activities that run afoul of those policies, a
court is still obligated to follow the law as stated in the existing statute
or SEC rule. As noted in Part I of this Article, any change in that law
must result from legislative action-either through a statutory amendment by Congress, or in the case of an SEC rule, via promulgation of a
40 3
new rule in accordance with APA rulemaking procedures.
2.

Quality of Reasoning

Once a court has determined that a regulatory provision is ambiguous, it should next examine the content of the no-action letter or
letters to which deference is urged. This examination requires consideration of several questions. For example, does the letter contain an
explicit interpretation of a statutory provision or an SEC rule? Or is
the letter a pure no-action letter which, by its terms, does not purport
to express any legal conclusions regarding the applicability of statu400
Of course, when Congress has spoken on statutory meaning, even an "official" interpretation by the SEC would be irrelevant, for "the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see
also Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368
(1986) ("The traditional deference courts pay to agency interpretations is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of Congress.").
401
See, e.g., supra notes 304-14 and accompanying text (discussing Wal-Mart's requests
for judicial deference to the Cracker Barrel no-action letter, even though the regulatory
interpretation that the no-action letter annunciated flatly contradicted the interpretation
set forth in the SEC Release that announced the adoption of revised Rule 14a-8).
402
SeeAmalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to defer to the CrackerBarrel no-action letter in the
face of contrary official authority from the SEC); see also SEC v. Energy Group of America,
Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1234 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (refusing to defer to no-action letter authority
because the Supreme Court, in two recent decisions, clarified congressional intent).
403
See supra note 32.
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tory provisions in the federal securities laws? If the former, does the
SEC staff support its regulatory interpretation with analysis based on
the statutory or regulatory text? Does the staff reference congressional or SEC policy goals? Can one reasonably and fairly imply the
regulatory interpretation from the text of the provision? And if the
staff's letter is a pure no-action letter, does the staff nonetheless appear to base it on an underlying interpretive rationale?
The answers to each of these questions should affect the weight
that a court accords a no-action letter cited as authority in litigation.
A no-action letter which contains a regulatory interpretation supported by lucid reasoning based on regulatory language would be, in
most instances, very persuasive. 40 4 For example, a no-action letter

could serve as persuasive authority by illuminating how the pieces of a
statute or SEC rule fit together. 40

5

Moreover, in some instances in-

volving ambiguous provisions of an SEC rule, the officials rendering
the interpretation in the no-action letter may be the same individuals
who drafted the rule. Such insight into the regulatory text typically
would be very useful to a court rendering a decision as to regulatory
meaning. 40 6 Alternatively, a staff no-action letter may assess the legal-

ity of particular transactions in light of the policy underlying the statutory or regulatory framework. 40 7 Or, in the case of a disfavorable noaction letter, the staff may refute or distinguish the alternative interpretations that counsel for the requestor advanced. 40 8 Under any of
404 Cf. Manning, supranote 18, at 688 (contending that, under the Skidmore approach,
an agency's "success in persuading a court exercising independent judgment will hinge
directly on the quality of the agency's expression of its understanding of the relevant text
and the way it fits within the regulatory and statutory scheme in issue").
405 Cf. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pefia, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1994)
(en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (discussing the persuasive value of agency interpretations in nonlegislative rules), afj'd on other grounds sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe RR. Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996).
406
See Manning, supra note 18, at 688-89 (contending that agency familiarity with the
technical words or terms of art in its own rules and regulations may assist courts in resolving ambiguities).
407 As Professor Diver has observed,
[A] correct identification of the enactor's intention .. . does not usually
complete the interpretive process. Rarely will the enactor have had in mind
the specific situation confronted by the interpreter. More likely, the enactor envisioned some general condition or idea, or perhaps some specific
ideals of a more general condition. The lawfinder must then take a final
and more avowedly creative step of determining which "interpretation" of
the statute will produce that general condition.
Diver, supra note 226, at 577 (citation omitted). As the officials who work with the regulatory provisions on a daily basis, the SEC staff may well be in a superior position to anticipate which regulatory interpretations would best work to produce the result that Congress
or the full Commission intended.
408
Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 218, at 129 (contending that under a deference approach that emphasizes reasoned decisionmaking, "Itihe agency should also respond to
any likely contentions that its interpretation will have deleterious implications").

1006

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:921

these scenarios, a reviewing court could reasonably conclude that the
staFs regulatory interpretation is entitled to Skidmore-type deference.
In contrast to no-action letters containing well-reasoned regulatory interpretations based on regulatory text or identifiable policy
goals, a pure no-action letter containing little, if any, rationale for the
enforcement recommendation would typically be far less persuasive.
Such a letter provides courts with little guidance in construing regulatory ambiguities. And while a court is certainly free to speculate about
the staffs reasons for adopting a favorable enforcement position, if it
chooses to extrapolate an interpretive rationale from a pure no-action
letter, the court risks setting a legal precedent based on a rationale
that the SEC never in fact advocated. 40 9 A court should also bear in
mind that the staff often intentionally leaves no-action letters vague to
allow the agency time to determine the direction it wishes its regula4 10
tory policy to take.
Least persuasive would be purported interpretations that one
cannot reasonably and fairly imply from the text of existing statutes
and SEC rules. These no-action letters represent particularly inappropriate candidates for deference because they announce spurious rules
that the SEC should have presented to the public for notice and comment.411 By refusing to defer to these no-action letters, courts can

ensure that the SEC's informal processes do not operate to effectively
circumvent the rulemaking provisions that Congress set out in the

APA.41 2

3.

Review and Approval by the Commission

As noted above, Commission review and approval of a no-action
letter does not transform a regulatory interpretation from informal
409
Recent commentary by two securities law practitioners emphasizes potential risks
when interpretive rationales are extrapolated from pure no-action letters. Susan P. Serota
& Edmond FitzGerald, Registration of Deferred Compensation Obligations: The SEC's New Position, INsIGHTs, July 1996, at 10. These commentators observed that, for many years, practitioners "reasonably inferred" from a series of no-action letters that acquiesced in the
nonregistration of certain deferred employee compensation plans that the staff interpreted these plans not to be "securities" within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Securities Act. Id. at 12. They then pointed out that, based on recent statements by the SEC staff,
it appears as though registration was not required because the transactions constituted a
.private placement" and that "contrary to popular belief, the staff ha[d] never relied on
the 'no security' theory." Id. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Ms. Serota and Mr. FitzGerald found this explanation "puzzling," they nonetheless recommended
that public companies reassess whether they can continue to offer such plans without Securities Act registration. Id. at 14-15.
410 See supra notes 145-46 (discussing likely reasons why the SEC used no-action letters
to set policy regarding proprietary trading systems).
411
See supra note 192 (discussing Professor Anthony's characterization of certain rules
as "spurious").
412 See supra note 32.
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advice into an official agency action meriting automatic deferencenor should it.413 Nonetheless, no-action letters that the Commission
has reviewed should generally be entitled to greater weight than those
regulatory interpretations lacking the Commission's approval. Such
review and approval help to ensure that the staffs policy choices are,
in fact, consistent with the Commission's overall goals. Thus, when
the Commission has reviewed regulatory interpretations, courts deferring to those interpretations are less likely to set legal precedents with
which the Commission disagrees. Furthermore, to the extent that
courts premise Skidmore-type deference on considerations of interbranch comity, they can feel more secure in respecting those regulatory interpretations that the Commission has reviewed and
414
approved.
4.

ConsistentApplication

The Court in Skidmore also identified "consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements" as a factor bearing on the persuasiveness of an
agency's regulatory interpretation. 415 Although the Skidmore Court
did not explain why consistency is relevant to an interpretation's persuasiveness, other courts subsequently have clarified the applicability
of this factor. 416 Consistency functions as a persuasiveness factor to
the extent that a regulatory interpretation is based on claims of "original meaning" or "drafters' intent."417 Thus, as Judge Easterbrook
pointed out, consistency matters "when the agency is seeking to persuade" by offering the court "a view into the understanding of the
original interpretive community. '4 18 Indeed, it is often argued that
consistency with contemporaneous interpretations of regulatory provisions constitutes the most reliable authority, because officials present
at the time the agency adopts a particular provision may have special
419
insight into the drafters' motivations.
Under this reasoning, when an interpretation is predicated on
drafters' intent, courts should view no-action letters that depart from
See supranotes 331-37 and accompanying text (contending that since the SEC has
chosen to characterize its review and approval of a no-action letter as an "informal action,"
courts should take the SEC at its word and treat its approval as such).
Cf Merrill, supranote 39, at 1014 (discussing the values served by grounding defer414
ence in norms of interbranch comity).
415 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
416 See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-43 (1976); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Pefia, 44 F.3d 437, 445-46 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring), afl'd on other grounds sub nom. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe P.R. Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996).
417 Atchison, Topeka & Santa FeRy. Co., 44 F.3d at 445-46 (Easterbrook,J., concurring).
418 Id. at 446 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
419 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 226, at 567 (asserting that contemporaneous constructions "may impress judges for the same reason that many people find eyewitness accounts
more reliable than subsequent reconstructions").
413
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prior interpretations as less persuasive than consistently maintained
positions. 4 20 However, when a regulatory interpretation in a no-action
letter is based on other factors, a change of position should not necessarily weigh against its persuasiveness. For example, changes in securities markets may justify a departure from the staff's previous
interpretation of a particular statute or SEC rule. Developments in
technology represent another source of change that may necessitate
reinterpretation of previously settled interpretive issues. 421 As one administrative law scholar has argued, "a constantly shifting policy may
indicate that the agency is doing its job, reflecting the expertise, accountability, and flexibility that justified placing the decision in its
hands." 42 2 In contrast, absent these intervening developments, no-ac-

tion letters that announce broad and sweeping interpretive changes
should prompt skepticism. Indeed, under such circumstances, a court
should consider whether the SEC had ulterior motives for conveying
those interpretations via no-action letters rather than through formal
and official SEC rules or releases.
420 Cf Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (noting that "an
agency's interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation is
'entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view'" (quoting INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted));
Gilbert 429 U.S. at 141-43 (citing Skidmore and refusing to defer to an EEOC interpretive
guideline in part because of the inconsistency in the agency's position over time); United
Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858-59 n.25 (1975) (refusing to defer to an

SEC interpretation articulated in an amicus brief because it was inconsistent with prior
SEC interpretations).
421
Innovations such as electronic delivery of prospectuses and company "bulletin
board" Internet trading systems certainly must now be assimilated into a statutory scheme
developed without such technology in mind. See, e.g., Brown & Wood, SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 67287, at *6 (Feb. 17, 1995) (interpreting the term "prospectus" in sections
2(10), 5, and 10 of the Securities Act to include a prospectus encoded in an electronic
format); Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,226, at 77,131 (June 24, 1996) (permitting a company to
establish a passive electronic bulletin board on the Internet, where investors could post
indications of interest to buy or sell company stock, without requiring a company to register as either a broker-dealer pursuant to section 15(a) of the Exchange Act or an investment adviser pursuant to section 203(a) of the Investment Advisers Act). Regulatory
interpretations that the SEC announces in no-action letters also can serve as gap fillers in
the period of time before the Commission determines to set forth new interpretations in
SEC releases. See Electronic Delivery Release, supra note 44, at 85,112 (announcing interpretive views on the electronic delivery of documents such as prospectuses, annual and
semiannual reports, and proxy solicitation materials under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Investment Company Act).
422 Herz, supra note 238, at 198; see also Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers
Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that "a
change in SEC position [in a no-action letter] does not necessarily reveal capricious action
by the agency; changes in conditions and public perceptions justify changes in the SEC's
construction" of certain regulatory provisions); David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron,
Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 64 U. CH. L. REv. 681, 702-08
(1997) (contending that changes in an agency's statutory interpretation may be warranted
to properly fulfill an agency's regulatory mandate).
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A court's analysis of whether the staff has consistently maintained
a particular regulatory interpretation in no-action letters over a long
period of time is relevant for an additional reason: consistent, longstanding staff positions may signal Commission approval of these positions. Typically, when the Commission disagrees with a no-action
letter, the Commission announces this disagreement and advises the
4 23
public that it may no longer rely on the letter as authority.
Although the Commission cannot be expected to inform itself of each
of the staff's thousands of no-action letters, the Commission is much
more likely to be familiar with the staff's frequently repeated and consistently applied interpretive advice. 4 24 Thus, no-action letters reflecting longstanding and consistent interpretive positions are likely to
represent views that the Commission in fact shares.
5.

Staff Expertise

Skidmore and its progeny have factored administrative expertise
into the determination of whether a regulatory interpretation is persuasive. 42 5 As the individuals who administer the federal securities
laws on a daily basis, the SEC staff can certainly claim particular expertise in applying often complex and technical regulatory provisions to
equally complicated transactions and undertakings. The extent to
which expertise becomes a factor favoring Skidmore-type deference
should therefore be a function of whether the particular regulatory
interpretation in the no-action letter does in fact draw on the staffs
administrative expertise.
In an increasingly technological world where investment products and business financing techniques change constantly, the SEC
staff will often be in the best position to evaluate how these new products and techniques fit into the regulatory framework that Congress
and the Commission may have developed without these changes in
mind. Accordingly, no-action letters that evaluate innovative and
technically complex factual situations or transactions will typically be
more persuasive than letters evaluating factual scenarios that were
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
Cf Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996) ("To be sure,
agency interpretations that are of long standing come before us with a certain credential of
reasonableness, since it is rare that error would long persist.").
425 See Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380,
390 (1984) (deferring to agency interpretation in part because the agency had "longstanding expertise in the area"); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,433-34 (1971) (according "great deference" to a Title VII interpretation expressed in an EEOC guideline);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137-38 (1944); see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 n.9 (1980) (noting that "to the extent that deference to administrative views is bottomed on respect for agency expertise, it is unrealistic to draw a
radical distinction between opinions issued under the imprimatur of the [Federal Reserve]
Board and those submitted as official staff memoranda").
423
424
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foreseeable when the policymakers drafted the particular regulatory
provision. 42 6 Additionally, regulatory interpretations that proffer advice on the workings of technical and arcane statutory or regulatory
provisions will be more useful to a court than no-action letters seeking
4 27
to interpret less complicated provisions.
In light of these considerations, it is ironic that litigants have
most frequently advocated judicial deference to no-action letters in
Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal cases and, in so doing, have emphasized the SEC staffs expertise. 4 28 Courts, however, should be wary of
arguments touting staff expertise in the context of Rule 14a-8 no-action letters.
For instance, in many cases involving Rule 14a-8, the reviewing
court must address the issue of whether a shareholder's proposal
properly can be excluded under the Rule's exception for "ordinary
business operations." 42 9 This, in turn, often requires the court to determine whether the shareholder's proposal implicates a matter of
"significant policy considerations." 4 0 Yet determining whether a
shareholder's proposal involves a "mundane business matter" or a
"matter of social or political importance" typically does not draw on
expertise unique to the SEC staff.43 ' A federal district judge is there426
See no-action letters cited supra note 419. Indeed, as then-Judge Kenneth Starr
observed:
Courts are often ill equipped to master the complexities of these sometimes
labyrinthine statutes that govern highly technical matters beyond the expertise of a generalist judiciary. In addition to the complexity of the subject
matter, these statutes often regulate technologies not even in existence
when the governing statute was enacted. In such cases, the courts are faced
with a daunting search.., to figure out what a reasonable Congress would
decide if the specific issue were put before it.
Kenneth W. Starr, ObservationsAbout the Use of LegislativeHistory, 1987 DUKE LJ. 371, 372; see
also Weaver, supra note 234, at 609-10 (contending that an agency's "greater appreciation
of the subtleties and intricacies of its regulatory program" generally makes the agency eminently more qualified to determine the meaning of its regulations).
Cf Aluminum Co. of America, 467 U.S. at 390 (deferring to agency interpretation in
427
part because the "subject under regulation is technical and complex"); Akindemowo v.
INS, 61 F.3d 282, 285 (4th Cir. 1995) ("Deference... is particularly apropos here because
the immigration laws 'ha[ve] produced a complex and highly technical regulatory program.'" (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991))); Methodist
Hosp. v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1225, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (maintaining that the complexity of a
statute "adds to the deference which is due" an agency's interpretation); Evans v. Commissioner, Me. Dep't of Human Servs., 933 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that, where the
statute under interpretation is "highly technical and complex," the agency should have
greater interpretive leeway).
See supra notes 276-83, 298-99, 304-12 and accompanying text.
428
429
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (7) (1997).
430 See supra note 194 (discussing the SEC's interpretation of the ordinary business
operations exception in Rule 14a-8 set forth in the SEC Release announcing the adoption
of the revised rule).
431 Linda Quinn, a former Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, shared the
following insight regarding the staff's methodology for interpreting this aspect of the ordi-
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fore as capable an interpreter as an SEC staff member. Accordingly,
in Rule 14a-8 cases involving the "ordinary business operations" exception, a court should accord little weight to no-action letters based on
4 32
staff expertise.
Regulatory interpretations in no-action letters may also rest upon
the staffs interpretation of state or foreign law, or statutory or regulatory provisions that another federal administrative agency administers.
On some occasions, the staffs interpretive judgments concerning the
meaning of this other law may in fact be based on the staff's experience with securities products or transactions. 4 33 Yet on other occasions-particularly with respect to many of Rule 14a-8's enumerated
exceptions-the staff based its regulatory interpretations in no-action
letters on its interpretations of law far removed from its area of expertise. 43 4 Instances involving interpretations of collateral legal issues un-

related to securities law therefore represent another area where
arguments in favor of Skidmore-type deference are less convincing. 43 5
nary business operations exception: "'To determine what constitutes an important social
or policy issue... the division looks to see whether there has been any serious and substantial congressional action on the topic.'" HAFr, supra note 11, at § 11.04[7], at 11-24 (quoting Cou'oRATE CouNs. WKLY., May 30, 1990, at 7).
432
Cf. Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Reviewing a lawyer's disbarment
order under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, the court said:
Here we have not been confronted with an issue which depends upon the
Commission's expertise so often involved in the agency's administration of
its special field.... [The case] is not concerned with some speciality developed in the administration of the Act entrusted to the agency. Rather, this
case arises in an area we know something about.
Id. at 961.
433
See, e.g., Southern Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,149, at 79,402 (May 1, 1992) (interpreting Internal Revenue Code
to determine whether acquisitions of company stock through DRIP and ESOP Plans are
exempt from Exchange Act section 16(b)'s short-swing profit prohibitions pursuant to SEC
Rule 16b-2);.Standard Oil Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 28871, at *4 (Dec. 19,
1983) (interpreting ERISA to determine whether officers' and directors' unfunded contract claims constitute reportable items under section 16(a) of the Exchange Act).
434
See, e.g., NYCERS v. American Brands, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (contending that deference to an SEC no-action letter was unwarranted because
Rule 14a-8(c) exception called for an interpretation of antidiscrimination law in Northern
Ireland, a regulatory area in which the staff possessed no particular expertise); see also
Eaton Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 233733, at *9 (Feb. 24, 1988) (stating that an
interpretation of Ohio state contract law was necessary to determine whether the company
may omit shareholder proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c) (2) of the Exchange Act); Transamerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1992 WL 43436, at *13 (Mar. 3, 1992) (interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to determine whether exclusion of shareholder
proposal is permissible pursuant to Rule 14a-8(c) (2) of the Exchange Act). See generally 4
Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 10, at 2012 (discussing no-action letters and contending that
the SEC staff has developed a " ' common law'" of excludable proposals under state law).
435
SeeEEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) (finding EEOC interpretive guideline unpersuasive under Skidmore in part because issue involved the extraterritorial application of a congressional statute, a legal issue that did not draw upon
particular administrative expertise).
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Reliance Interests

As a final factor, courts faced with requests for deference to noaction letters should in some cases consider market participants' reliance interests. Indeed, in evaluating the persuasiveness of an agency's
regulatory interpretation, courts have often considered the extent to
which the public may have altered its conduct in reliance on the
agency's interpretation. 43
43 7
v. Tallman,

6

As the Supreme Court recognized in Udall

"[G]overnment is a practical affair intended, for practical men.
Both officers, law-makers, and citizens naturally adjust themselves to
any long-continued action of the Executive Department-on the
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to
be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That
presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a wise and
quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a statute or the
existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself-even
438
when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation."
Regulatory interpretations in no-action letters clearly do not fall
within the provisions of the federal securities laws that insulate defendants from liability for acts done or omitted in good faith conformity with SEC rules or regulations. 43 9 Nonetheless, a court may, in the
proper circumstances, take good faith reliance into account when determining the meaning of an ambiguous regulatory provision. For instance, reliance interests would be directly relevant in a case where the
SEC had instituted an enforcement action against a defendant who
had reasonably relied on a regulatory interpretation issued to a similarly situated third party. If the prior regulatory interpretation was
based on sound reasoning, the court may well decide to adopt that
interpretation rather than the new litigation position that the SEC is
now advocating. 440
On the other hand, defendants' reliance interests should carry
relatively little weight, as a separate and distinct factor, in cases that
private plaintiffs initiate. A court's willingness to consider a defen436

See Merrill, supra note 39, at 1018-19.

437

380 U.S. 1 (1965).

438

Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 472-73 (1915)).
See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing good faith reliance provi-

439

sions in section 19(a) of the Securities Act and section 23(a) of the Exchange Act).
440
Cf Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988) (noting that ad
hoc agency interpretations made in the course of litigation "that are wholly unsupported
by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice" are not entitled to judicial deference);
Shoshone Indian Tribe v. Hodel, 903 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating, in response
to a claim of reliance on prior interpretation, that "where an administrative agency interprets a regulation consistently over a long period of time, publicly, and through careful
and sound reasoning, modifications of the interpretation should be scrutinized by the
courts").
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dant's reliance on a no-action letter may effectively deprive the private
plaintiff of a legal remedy to which he may be entitled. 44 ' Accordingly, in securities litigation between private parties, a court should
focus primarily on the previously identified factors that relate more
directly to the validity of the regulatory interpretation set forth in the
no-action letter.
CONCLUSION

Securities law practitioners and their clients have a number of
reasons for regarding the regulatory interpretations in no-action letters as a source of de facto law. However, for reasons related to both
doctrine and policy, it is important for courts to treat regulatory interpretations in no-action letters more like "lore," albeit lore that an experienced, qualified, and well-respected source-the staff of the
SEC-has generated. Accordingly, courts should never automatically
defer to no-action letters in rendering decisions regarding the meaning of ambiguous regulatory provisions. Rather, courts should rely
only on those regulatory interpretations in no-action letters that they
find persuasive. The factors outlined in this Article provide a practical
framework for making this determination.

441
See supranote 352 and accompanying text (discussing the unfairness that may result
for private litigants from a court's failure to accord meaningful review to a no-action
letter).

